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ABSTRACT 
The study has focused on the role and motivations of the Bengali military 
officers in the Pakistan Army during the initial but critical phase of the Liberation 
War of 1971. Unlike the military in some other Third World Countries, at that point 
of time, the Bengali military officers made a move neither for grabbing political 
power nor for replacing a corrupt or inept regime but for establishing an independent 
state of Bangladesh. The concept of liberation war has been used in this study in the 
sense of an internal war between East and West Pakistan. The aims of this thesis are 
to explain why the Bengali military officers became actors in the Liberation War of 
1971, how they were motivated for this war, when they took the crucial decision to 
revolt and declare independence of Bangladesh and how they proceeded till the 
formation of the Bangladesh Government-in-exile. 
The findings are also noteworthy. The Bengali political leaders prepared the 
people of East Pakistan for a revolutionary movement, but at the critical moment 
they faltered. As one of the dominant social forces in East Pakistan, the Bengali 
military officers watched from close quarters how the ethnically, linguistically and 
culturally different East Pakistanis were subjected to the discriminatory policies of 
the ruling elite in Pakistan which led to the wholesale alienation of the Bengalis. The 
1970 general election worked as a catalyst to sharpen the east-west confrontation still 
further. The post-election negotiation between the political leaders of East and West 
Pakistan was used by the ruling elite of West Pakistan as a ploy to strengthen their 
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military strength in East Pakistan, because they already decided to undertake a 
military solution to the political crisis, in fact for crushing the revolutionary 
movement by force. The Bengali military officers, who were deeply motivated by 
nationalistic aspirations, knew what was happening in the cantonments. That 
prompted them to take the critical decision of revolting from the Pakistan Army, 
declaring independence of Bangladesh and starting the Liberation War from 25 
March 1971 when the political leaders were in disarray. Not only did they start the 
war but also continued the Liberation War on their own till 17 April 1971 when the 
Bangladesh Government-in-exile was formed to take it up. The Bengali military 
officers then accepted the command of the Bangladesh Government and ultimately 
came out victorious on 16 December 1971 through a grueling nine-month long 
Liberation War. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Amitai Etzioni has identified three integrative powers in the political system 
corresponding to three capacities - identitive, utilitarian and coercive. (i) Identitive 
power involving common values, symbols or identity of interests, is the primary force 
of integration. This power is enhanced and reinforced by (ii) the utilitarian power of 
the system, representing its economic and administrative capabilities. If any political 
system has been able to acquire adequate identitive and utilitarian power, its coercive 
power is likely to increase; but when identitive power becomes ineffective and 
utilitarian power weak, then the alienated group or unit may seek to secede or alter the 
structure of a union. The use of (iii) coercive power at that stage not only compounds 
the problem but also accelerates decay (Etzioni, 1965: 37- 40,122- 124). 
The Union of East and West Pakistan was entered into voluntarily in 1947. 
The factors working in favour of such a union were the predominantly Muslim 
majorities in both the regions and fear of domination by the Hindu majority in united 
India. These factors resulted in a Pakistan nationalism based on the ideal of Islamic 
unity. The ruling elites in Pakistan, however, from the very beginning followed 
certain policies, which alienated the Bengali elites. For example, the policy of cultural 
assimilation was born out of distrust of the Bengalis. The ruling elites in Pakistan 
believed that if Bengali language and literature in East Pakistan were allowed to 
maintain contacts with the Hindu-dominated West Bengal, this might adversely affect 
the ideological unity of Pakistan. Hence time and again efforts were made to 
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Islamicize Bengali language and literature (Ahmed 1967: 57- 70; Ahmad, 1968: 150- 
160). 
The policy of centralized administration and the increasing monopolization of 
political power by the West Pakistanis, especially after 1958, had an alienating effect 
on the Bengalis. After the military coup of 1958, the civil-military, bureaucracy where 
East Pakistan had the least representation, came to the forefront as the ruling elite in 
Pakistan. Thus East Pakistanis lost their representation in the decision-making 
structure and became disaffected. Without a sense of shared political community the 
Bengali elite were increasingly inclined to distance themselves from the highly 
centralized administration of Pakistan. ' The strong economic growth that had 
emerged in Pakistan during the 1960s made Bengali elite conscious of their 
deprivation on the one hand and raised their expectations on the other. Thus in the 
1960s, both the identitive and utilitarian power of the political system in Pakistan 
declined beyond measure, because the system denied adequate opportunities for 
effective participation to Bengali elite, and the segmented economic growth in 
Pakistan heightened their sense of deprivation. The Six-Point Programme of the 
Awami League, enunciated in 1966, was both a reaction to, and a challenge against, 
the policy measures of the central government (Rahman, 1966). This was in fact 
designed by the leading political party of East Pakistan, the Awami League, to bring 
about a fundamental change in the structure of power in the system, and it ultimately 
led to the disintegration of Pakistan (Ahamed 1989: 28-47). 
Here stability of the political system in Pakistan has been viewed in the line of David Easton. See his 
A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: John Wiley and Sons: 1965. 
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The basic premise of the Awami League's Six-Point Programme was that the 
domination of vital areas of economic policy by the West Pakistani elite had resulted 
in the growing economic deprivation of East Pakistan and consequently the bitter 
relationship between the two regions. The Six-Point Programme was designed 
primarily to transfer power regarding currency, taxation, utilization of foreign 
exchange earnings and foreign trade to the regional governments from the centre. This 
programme, if implemented, might have reduced the areas of conflict, and enabled the 
two regions to develop a healthy working relationship. 
In 1971, the situation dramatically altered in favour of the Bengalis, because in 
the first ever general elections in Pakistan in the later days of 1970 and the early days 
of 1971, the Awami League, representing Bengali interests, won a landslide victory, 
and emerged as the majority party in Pakistan. Unfortunately, even after that, the 
Bengalis were deprived of the opportunities to take control of the central government. 
At the crucial stage of negotiations in 1971, the West Pakistani generals played a vital 
role. They were primarily concerned with the defense forces in Pakistan. They 
considered that the regional government's control of currency, foreign exchange 
earnings, foreign trade and taxation would mean an end to Pakistan, because that 
would mean East Pakistan's control over the resources of East Pakistan, and the East 
Pakistani elite might not be interested in the maintenance of a big military 
establishment manned mainly by the West Pakistanis. Ultimately that would result in 
a drastic weakening of the defense of Pakistan. To the Bengali leaders, however, the 
defense of Pakistan was nothing more than the defense of West Pakistan. The 1965 
Indo-Pakistan- War, during which East Pakistan was totally defenseless, left an 
indelible impression in the minds of the Bengali elite. The ruling elite of Pakistan, 
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especially the generals, who were dominant at this stage, denounced the Six-Point 
Programme as secessionist and condemned the Awami League leaders as traitors. 
The Bengali military officers, because of their nearness to the Pakistani 
military officers in the cantonments, were well placed to realize the gravity of the 
situation, and secretly planned to rise up in revolt at the most opportune moment, with 
a view to giving a focus to the revolutionary aspirations of the people in East 
Pakistan. Captain Oli Ahmad organized a revolt in Chittagong on the night of 25 
March 1971, although Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the recognized leader of the Bengalis, 
surrendered to the Pakistani forces that night. Most of the political leaders went 
underground and Major Ziaur Rahman declared the Independence of Bangladesh with 
himself as the Provisional Head of the State on behalf of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (the 
civilian leader) on 27 March 1971. This small group of Bengali military officers also 
began to organize the War of Independence. This state of affairs continued till 17 
April 1971 when the political leaders regrouped in India and set up the Bangladesh 
Government-in-exile at Mujibnagar. Till then the Bengali military officers were in the 
forefront of the revolutionary activities. Major Ziaur Rahman and his troops kept the 
Chittagong and Noakhali areas under their control for a few days and went across the 
border for further preparations. Major Khaled Mosharraf and his followers took 
control of the Comilla and Sylhet areas. Major K. M. Safiullah and his troops, who 
were stationed at Joydevpur, a township near Dhaka, moved to Tangail and 
Mymensingh and took control over those areas. They subsequently moved to the 
Sylhet area. Major Osman Choudhury, after liquidating a group of Pakistani soldiers, 
took control of Chuadanga and parts of Kustia. Major Jalil and his followers kept a 
large part of Khulna and Barisal under their control. Captain Hafiz with First Bengal 
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regiment took control of a part of Jessore area. Thus, the Bengali army officers, 
casting aside all their professional and service norms and breaking the canons of 
military discipline and chain of command, revolted against the Pakistan Army and 
started the War of Independence. This study will focus on the role and motivations of 
the Bengali military officers during the early and critical phase of the War of 
Independence. 
The Importance of the Study 
The factors that were crucial in the disintegration of Pakistan, especially the 
political, economic and cultural conditions, have been well documented. The military 
dimension however still remains unexplored, although the role of Bengali military 
officers during that critical period, that is from 25 March to 17 April 1971, was 
crucial. The Independence of Bangladesh was declared by an army officer, Major 
Ziaur Rahman. The revolt itself was organized by another army officer, Capt. Oli 
Ahmad. They began the War of Independence at Chittagong and gradually other 
Bengali officers also joined the war along with the forces under their command. 
What led these military officers to come forward at this historic moment? 
What circumstances motivated them to deny their professional and service norms of 
obedience and loyalty? This study will explore the socio-political environment that 
precipitated revolt among the Bengali military officers, and reflect on the 
transformation of a professional cadre into a revolutionary elite. The study also 
examines why the Bengali military officers, though deeply imbued with nationalistic 
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feelings, were not interested in seizing political power in East Pakistan and why they 
initiated the War of Liberation after 25 March 1971. 
The study also provides material on the missing link between the people's 
movement in East Pakistan in March 1971 and the full-scale War of Independence 
under the leadership of the Bangladesh Government-in-exile formed on 17 April 
1971 
Immediate Context of the Liberation War 
After postponement of the session of the National Assembly by President 
Yahya Khan on 1 March 1971, the political parties in East Pakistan felt threatened, 
because they saw in it an excuse by the West Pakistani ruling elite to deprive East 
Pakistani leaders of the benefit of electoral victory. The people of East Pakistan, who 
were mobilized during the election campaign of 1970, became greatly agitated. In 
Chapter Two, it has been noted that Bengali military officers, who were watching 
these events carefully, became more alert and wary. 
The autonomy movement in East Pakistan which began quite early in the 
1950s, was gradually intensified in the 1960s, especially after the promulgation of 
martial law in Pakistan by President Ayub Khan in 1958. Following the promulgation 
of martial law in Pakistan, the bureaucrats, both military and civil, became the chief 
policy makers. - Unfortunately, East Pakistan's representation in bureaucracy, 
especially at the national level, was minimal; and it was here that the crucial decisions 
were made affecting both East and West Pakistan. In the 1950s, the Bengali leaders 
wanted opportunities for more participation in the political system. In the 1960s, they 
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made those demands more vociferously and proposed certain structural changes in the 
political system so that their demands could be met through negotiations. They 
demanded that East Pakistan as the home of the majority of its population should have 
adequate representation at the policy-making level. The East Pakistani leaders were 
also opposed to the transfer of resources from East Pakistan to West Pakistan in the 
name of rapid development of Pakistan. They also demanded that East Pakistan 
should be self-sufficient in defense. 
The electoral victory in the 1970 general election made the East Pakistani 
political elite more confident of their success at the negotiation table. By the East 
Pakistani political elite we mean those who were elected in the general election of 
1970. It may be mentioned that the elected Awami League leaders of East Pakistan 
constituted the majority in the National Assembly of Pakistan. They expected and 
quite naturally that they would at last take control of the central government and 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman would become the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Thus they 
remained prepared for negotiation with the West Pakistani political elite which 
consisted of the elected members from West Pakistan and the West Pakistani 
generals. As it has been already stated, the West Pakistani generals were threatened 
by the contents of the Six-Point Programme for two reasons. Firstly, the armed forces 
in Pakistan was mainly West-Pakistan centred; the representation of East Pakistanis in 
the Pakistan armed forces was absolutely minimal. Secondly, the Six-Point 
Programme intended to put the resources of East Pakistan under the control of the 
Bengali elite through regional government's control over currency, foreign exchange 
earnings, foreign trade and taxation (points 3,4,5 of the Six-Point Programme). The 
ruling elite in Pakistan were not at all interested in handing over power to the Bengali 
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elite. Thus, while the negotiations were going on, more and more arms and 
ammunition from West Pakistan began to be transported through the Chittagong Port 
and more armed personnel from West Pakistan began to be air dropped. The process 
continued till 25 march 1971. 
On 1 March 1971 President Yahya Khan announced his decision to postpone 
the National Assembly session, citing Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's unwillingness to 
participate in the National Assembly. The postponement sparked off spontaneous 
demonstration in East Pakistan against the central government. Sheikh Mujib, the 
leader of the East Pakistanis, came under heavy pressure both from the radicals of his 
own party, the Awami League and other political parties of East Pakistan to declare 
independence of Bangladesh. Mujib however decided to launch a non-violent non- 
cooperation movement instead of going in for declaration of independence. His 
intention was to build up tremendous popular pressure to force the central government 
to negotiate with him the terms of transferring power to the majority party. 
Between March 1 and 7, President Yahya Khan came out with an offer to the 
East Pakistani leader Sheikh Mujib for a round-table conference of the leaders of two 
wings of Pakistan and recalling of the National Assembly session; but while he was 
offering negotiating terms, violent clashes between the army led by West Pakistani 
generals and people of East Pakistan continued to occur on the streets of Dhaka and 
several other cities. On 7 March Mujib laid down his four preconditions for joining 
the National Assembly session, the most important precondition being immediate 
transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people. Simultaneously, the 
Awami League leader Sheikh Mujib launched a non-cooperation movement which 
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placed him in complete control of East Pakistan. The entire East Pakistan 
administration, even the Bengalis working in the central government agencies in East 
Pakistan and in the civilian branches of the armed forces, complied with Mujib's call 
for non-cooperation. Faced with Mujib's de facto assumption of power in East 
Pakistan, President Yahya Khan came to Dhaka on 15 March 1971 to work out a 
political settlement of the crisis. Thus the negotiation began. 
Detailed information of the Mujib-Yahya talks in Dhaka has never been made 
available to the public but from published reports, it appears that Yahya agreed in 
principle to Mujib's four preconditions, much to the vociferous chagrin of ZA 
Bhutto, who was demanding more time. The Awami League had been continuing its 
non-cooperation movement for more than three weeks, and it was becoming 
increasingly difficult to sustain it non-violent. Confrontations between the military 
and the people became more frequent. Enmity to the non-Bengalis living in East 
Pakistan rose high, and a large number of them migrated to West Pakistan. The plight 
of these migrants was also used as a counter pressure on the Yahya regime. 
On 23 March the Awami League advisers presented a draft proclamation 
which granted East Pakistan autonomy on the basis of the Six Points (GOB, August 
1971: 18- 27). The Awami League pressed for quick acceptance of the proposal. On 
25 March, while the Awami League leaders were hoping to hear the declaration of 
acceptance of their demands, Yahya Khan, without formally breaking the negotiation, 
launched a brutal attack against the East Pakistanis. On that night the Pakistan Army 
attacked the Dhaka University Campus, the head quarters of the East Pakistan Rifles 
and Police and some offices of Awami League newspapers and killed a large number 
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of unarmed civilians. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was arrested. A reign of terror was 
initiated in East Pakistan. 
The Political leaders of East Pakistan did not have enough information about 
the military build-up in different cantonments, because these were being done secretly 
in the cantonments. But the Bengali military officers, who were in the Chittagong 
Cantonment and other cantonments, had a clear picture of what was going on. The 
Chittagong Cantonment was crucial in the sense that heavy weapons and huge 
amounts of ammunition were coming from West Pakistan by sea to be released from 
Chittagong Port. This was one of the reasons why the crucial decision of the 
Declaration of Independence of Bangladesh - which was expected from the top-level 
political leaders - in fact was made by a young military officer of the Chittagong 
Cantonment, and why the Bengali military officers revolted and undertook a holding 
operation from 26 March to 17 April 1971. After that the political leaders of East 
Pakistan regrouped and formed the Bangladesh Government-in-exile at the border 
village of Baidyanathpur, re-christened Mujibnagar after the formation of the 
government. Different dimensions of the Liberation War have been analyzed in a 
number of studies (Saflullah 1989: 1- 12; Islam 1981: 7- 93; Garg 1984: 27- 62), but 
nowhere has the role of military personnel, especially in the period from 26 March to 
17 April, been discussed. This study will throw light on this. 
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The Objectives of the Research 
The main objective of the study is to focus on the motivation, role and 
experiences of those Bengali military officers during the crucial early period of revolt 
especially in the Chittagong Cantonment. This involves: 
i) An in-depth analysis of the politico-economic and cultural conditions existing 
in Pakistan, especially in the context of the Six-Point Programme, which 
wanted to re-structure the political and economic systems in Pakistan. 
ii) Examining the reasons why the West Pakistani generals felt so much 
threatened by the regional government's control over currency, foreign 
exchange earnings, foreign trade and taxation as envisaged in the Six-Point 
Programme. 
iii) Examining the role of the key actors in the War of Independence, especially 
the role of Major Ziaur Rahman, Captain Oli Ahmad and other senior Bengali 
military officers at various cantonments. 
iv) Analyzing the reasons why the Bengali military officers became actors in the 
War of Liberation to establish an independent Bangladesh. 
In sum, this study wants to analyze why the Bengali military officers took a 
pioneering role in organizing the Liberation War with a view to establishing an 
independent Bangladesh since 25 March 1971, although the military in many other 
countries were busy taking over political role by displacing the political leaders. The 
Bengali military officers not only revolted from the Pakistan Army on that day and 
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one of them declared independence of Bangladesh, but also sustained the war till 17 
April 1971 when the Government-in-exile was formed and took up the Liberation 
War. The Bengali military officers from that point of time began fighting under the 
command of the political leaders. 
Organization of the Thesis 
The study is organized in eight chapters. The Introduction has outlined the 
issue along with the importance and objectives of research, and the organization of the 
thesis. Chapter One describes the methodology adopted in this study, especially its 
autoethnographical dimensions, because the researcher was not only an observer but 
also an active participant in the Liberation War of 1971. Chapter Two brings out the 
political role of the military in comparative perspective. Chapter Three clarifies the 
conceptual framework by defining such concepts as revolt, revolution and liberation 
war. With reference to themes of the social and political change, it sets out the need 
for a focus on key actors in the Liberation War of 1971. Chapter Four provides the 
socio-economic background of the issue. In Chapters Five and Six, the policies 
pursued by the ruling elite in Pakistan in administrative, cultural and economic areas 
are analyzed with an eye to their impacts on the Bengali military officers and soldiers 
(Privates). Chapter Seven specifically deals with the role of the military officers at 
that point of time. In Chapter Eight the relevant data obtained from primary sources 
are analyzed with a view to explore the motivations of the key players. The findings 
are summed up in the Conclusion, 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Methodology of the Research 
The study has applied mainly qualitative tools of data collection. It is 
primarily based upon examination of existing literature, official documents and notes 
in the archives of the University of Dhaka to construct the history of this crucial 
period. The biographical and autobiographical writings of the freedom fighters have 
also been valuable data. Primary data have been generated by using both structured 
and open-ended interviews with selected military officers, who took part in the War of 
Independence. The study has also drawn upon unpublished diaries kept by key 
participants, as referred to in the bibliography, to provide unmediated narrative 
reconstructions of motivations and events. 
For generating the primary data, several techniques have been adopted. 
Appropriate questionnaires were prepared for the selected respondents. These 
respondents were selected with care and caution given the sensitivity of the issue. The 
set of interview questions and list of interviewees are available in Appendix 9. The 
results of the field work are analyzed in Chapter Eight, although, some responses are 
noted in Chapter Seven. The notes and diaries of key military officers have also been 
used throughout the dissertation. 
The researcher has had to confront the delicate - issue of autoethnography 
(Adler & Adler, 1994; Denzin, ' 1989; Kreiger, 1991). He was not only an observer but 
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also an active participant in the War of Liberation. Autoethnography is an 
autobiographical genre of writing and research that reveals multiple layers of 
consciousness. Autoethnographers may have to look in two directions, first through 
an ethnographic wide-angle lens, focusing outward on social and environmental 
aspects of their personal experience. Then, they turn inward to examine a vulnerable 
self that is moved by social interaction but which refracts, and may even resist 
cultural influences (Deck, 1990; Neumann, 1996: Reed-Danahay, 1997). 
Autoethnography or radical empiricism, as Jackson (1989) calls it, has been a vital 
part of the study in the sense that the ethnographer's experiences and interactions with 
other participants form an important part of what is being studied (Ellis and Bochner, 
1999: 733- 742). 
The term autoethnography has been in use for quite some time. Emphasizing 
either on culture (ethos) or on self (auto), the researchers use their own experience in 
certain action to bend back on self and look more deeply at "self-other interactions" 
(Ellis and Bochner, 2000: 740). In personal narration, social scientists take on the dual 
identities of academic and personal selves to put up autobiographical stories about 
some aspect of their experience. In reflexive ethnography, the researcher's personal 
experience becomes important for its role to illuminate the culture under study. 
Feminism has contributed greatly to legitimize the autographical voice associated 
with reflexive ethnography (Behar, 1996; Kreiger, 1991). 
Distinguishing between ethnographic memoir and narrative ethnography, 
Tedlock (1991) has stated that while in a memoir ethnographer tells a personal tale of 
what went in the backstage of doing research, in narrative ethnography ethnographer's 
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experiences are incorporated into the description and analysis of others. In the latter 
case, "ethnographic dialogue or encounter" between the narrator and members of the 
group under study is emphasized. According to Tedlock, the development of this kind 
of reflexive writing is related to a shift from an emphasis on a participant observation 
to "observation of participation" and an exphasis on the process of writing. 
The process has at least two advantages. In the first place, the ethnographer 
knows quite well what he has in mind as the focus of the study. Secondly, the 
ethnographer finds it convenient to interact with his partners or colleagues because 
they also know the details of the incident or event. It has however one big 
disadvantage. The fact or series of fact which the ethnographer wants to bring out 
through arduous process may be clouded by his personal idiosyncrasies or heightened 
emotional touches. The objectivity of the study may therefore suffer. Having this in 
view, the researcher has decided to use third person singular in the narration so that 
his self (auto) may not surface and darken the objectivity. 
Much like Ellis and Bochner, this researcher feels that "the act of telling a 
personal story is a way of giving voice to experiences that are shrouded in secrecy" 
(1992: 79). Yet he has to tell a very personal story which became "a social process for 
making lived experiences understandable and meaningful" (Ellis and Bochner, 1992: 
79- 80). Caught up in the war, he was too engaged by what was happening to fully 
record his experiences at the time. Only later did he reconstruct the events that took 
place, including the emotional dimension of decision-making. 
However, one advantage the researcher has had, a practice encouraged by his 
professional norms, was to write a diary even under difficult circumstances. Both the 
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researcher and his colleagues in the war of liberation have become subjects in the 
inquiry that follows and his and their experiences are the primary data in this study 
(Jackson, 1989: 4). Drawing on diaries and brief notes on the happenings on those 
days, recalling their experiences, and checking and re-checking through 
conversations, the researcher will lead his readers through a journey in which "they 
develop an ̀ experiential sense' of the events" (Krieger, 1984: 273; McCall, 1991) 
The eight other actors, who were selected for an in-depth interview, were the 
war-heroes, some of whom were sector commanders in the Liberation War of 1971. 
The process of interview was both time consuming and painstaking in the sense that 
prior appointments had to be made with each one of them and that too at their 
convenient time. Since all of them are persons of some social standing, the logistics of 
the research had to be very carefully arranged and including such necessary 
implements as tape-recorders and low intensity microphone so that statements could 
be faithfully recorded. 
Prior to appointments, each respondent was informed of the detailed purpose 
of the interview so that they could be prepared with short notes, if necessary. The 
researcher did not know for sure how long the interview of one respondent might 
take. That is why he undertook one as a test case and that took two hours and twenty 
minutes. Having that experience in store, he made appointments with the rest of the 
respondents in their residence at a time convenient to them, especially in the evening 
so that they could give more than two hours at a stretch. 
The researcher himself being one of the active participants in the Liberation 
War did, not know how the interview would go, because the respondents were 
17 
--- 
required to respond to queries on issues of three decades ago. Moreover, he did not 
know how these respondents, most of whom have become activists of different 
political parties professing different action programmes, would interact with him. He 
was not sure whether the respondents would be relevant over some questions. He was 
also not sure whether he would be able to put the right questions. Having a lot of 
tensions, the researcher proceeded with care and caution. He felt confident because of 
the fact that there was a questionnaire already prepared for the purpose. The 
researcher feels happy that the scheduled interviews went on well. Working together 
at a crucial point of time in history, fighting hand in hand, and sharing the same 
views, the researcher has felt that all of them went back thirty long years, thus 
effacing all the distance which he had in him as a role player and an observer. 
In most cases, while giving their views they consulted their diaries, because of 
the need to recollect correctly what they thought and did some three decades ago. 
Most of them remembered the events quite vividly; each one of them took their roles 
in the war as the high point of their lives. 
While conducting the interviews, the researcher, because he himself was one 
of the key figures in the war, was able to engage with respondents on an equal 
footing, a matter of some importance given their relative eminence. Indeed Chapter 
Seven of the thesis has been drawn mainly on his personal experiences. The 
respondents agreed readily and co-operated with the researcher eagerly; but were 
inclined to give details of every episode in lengthy speeches. Overcome by a kind of 
nostalgic recollection they made long statements of some intensity. The researcher 
had to painstakingly glean from these materials relevant to the question of induction, 
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but without compromising the narratives too much. For the purpose of the study, the 
researcher wanted them to be frank and free and express their opinions. The 
respondents were reminded through a number of questions that they fought for 
establishing a nation state under the leadership of political leaders at a time when the 
military in most of the Third World countries were busy capturing political power by 
displacing the political leaders. The comparative perspective has been analyzed in the 
following chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Political Role of the Military in Comparative Perspective 
Most of the post-colonial states emerged with constitutional structures 
inherited from the western democratic models of former colonial powers. Among 
other things, separation of the legislature, executive and judiciary, popularly elected 
legislatures, multiparty systems designed to provide a basis for a division between the 
government and opposition and subservience of the military to civil authorities, were 
prominent general features of such constitutions (May, Lawson and Selochan, 1998: 
1). The role of the military was generally seen to lie in defending the country against 
external aggression, though, of course, "colonial rule left behind armed forces more 
often oriented towards maintaining internal order than to external defence, and 
therefore implicity attuned to domestic politics" (May, Lawson and Selochan, 1998). 
This was evident in states where ethnic cleavages were obvious and where military 
personnel were recruited from ethnic groups most compliant to colonial policies in 
Pakistan, for example. Thus the shifts from parliamentary democracy to military rule 
or military-dominated regimes were not long in coming. 
Military intervention in politics is not a recent phenomenon, however. In fact, 
independent political activities by the military have been widespread and of long- 
standing. There were 48 independent states in the world at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. Three more states emerged between 1900 and 1917.32 of these 
states underwent some form of military intervention in their politics. Of the 28 
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independent states that came into being during the period 1917- 1955,13 of them 
underwent military rule (Finer 1975: 2). In June 1987 the United Nations 
Organizations (UNO) had 159 member states and 82 of them (50%) had been under 
military rule at one stage or the other (Finer 1975: 274). 
Extent of Military Intervention - Comparative Data 
Military intervention in politics increased all over the Third World since the 
Second World War and continued upto the middle of 1980's, but it became endemic 
in four regions: Latin America, South and South-East Asia, the Middle East and Sub- 
Saharan Africa. During that period 13 of the 20 Latin American states (62%), 21 of 
the 42 African states (50%) and 9 of the 22 South and South-East Asian states (41%) 
experienced military rule during the period 1958- 1973 (Finer 1975: 275). Even 
Europe was not free from it and 3 of the 18 states (11%) underwent this experience 
during that period. Taking a longer time frame Gavin Kennedy has shown that as 
many as 53 successful coup d'etat took place in Latin America involving 16 of the 20 
states (80%), and 22,42 and 32 successful coup took place in South and South-East 
Asia, the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa respectively involving 9,14 and 25 
states during the period 1945- 1972 (Kennedy, 1974: 337- 344). According to his 
estimate, there were more than 200 military coup d'etai in those four regions since 
1960. The number of coups since 1945 amounted to over 280: there were at least 42 
coups in Asia, 86 in Latin America, 62 in the Middle East and 76 in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Kennedy, ' 1974: 45). 
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If we look at the incidence of such coups year-wise, we find that 12% of all 
independent states in the world were under military rule in 1961. It rose to 19% in 
1966,27% in 1973 and 29% in 1975 (Margiotta 1976: 214). There was a slight 
decline of such incidence in the 1980s however, the percentage of states remained 
under military rule in 1980 being a little less than 24 and in 1984 being 23. The 
incidence of military coup has begun declining since the mid-1980's and came down 
to the lowest level in the 1990's (Liria 1993; Seitz 1991; Ashkenaz 1994). Having that 
in view, the number of successful and unsuccessful coups has been recorded in Table 
2.1 and 2.2. 
There were as many as 317 successful coups during 1945- 1985, and including 
the unsuccessful ones, the total number of coups and coup-attempts were 616 during 
the period (Table 2.1 and 2.2). Of these, 203 took place in Africa, 208 in Latin 
America, 113 in Asia, 74 in the Middle East and the rest in Europe. The events of 
military coup was the highest in the 1950s and the 1960s. The trend is faithfully 
reflected in the incidence in Latin America where coups began to increase in 
frequency from the second quarter of the 20'h century. The amount of time that the 
presidency in 20 Latin American countries was occupied by the military rose 
markedly from 28.7% in the decade 1917- 1927 to 38.5% in 1927- 1937,49% in 
1937- 1947 and 45% in 1947- 1957% (Huntington, 1962: 33). 
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The degree of military intervention however varies from country to country 
and from region to region, and no generalization is possible about its impact on the 
society. There are states which were subjected to it time and again, and the whole 
fabric of society was permeated by the military ethos. Iraq, for instance, experienced 7 
coups between 1936 and 1951 and 6 more in 1952,1958,1959,1965,1966 and 1968 
(Finer, 1975). Syria experienced 4 coups between 1949 and 1952, and another two in 
1961 and 1970, excluding another 6 abortive coups in 1962,1963 and 1966. Sudan 
also experienced coups in 1958,1959,1969 and 1984, and two more abortive coups 
in 1971. In South-East Asia, Thailand is unique in that it underwent 8 coups between 
1932 and 1971. In Latin America, however, its incidence was the highest. Kennedy 
has shown that 4 of the 20 Latin American countries i. e. Bolivia, Paraguay, Honduras 
and Equador, accounted for almost 50% of military interventions in the region during 
the period 1960- 1972 (Kennedy, 1974: 30). A study of Sub-Saharan Africa between 
1960 and 1982 alone recorded 90 plots to overthrow governments, 60 attempted 
coups, and 50 successful coups (Orkand Corporation quoted in Seitz 1991: 65). 
Having all these in view Joseph Lapalombara commented in 1977: "Military coups 
are now so frequent and widespread that they must be considered as significant as 
elections" ("Foreword" in Nordlinger 1977: X). Janowitz's statement, some seven 
years ago, almost in the same vein, speaks of the same thing. He wrote: "The 
intervention of the military in the domestic politics (of non-Western states) is the 
norm; persistent patterns of civil supremacy are the deviant cases that require special 
exploration" (Janowitz, 1971: 306). 
Looking at the scale of interventions we can conclude that the military 
constitute an independent political force in the sense that they are a part of the power 
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structure. That the military have intervened in the politics of many and widely diverse 
countries in the world, and that they have done it in the past and are doing so at 
present, is indicative of a political phenomenon which is "abiding, deep-seated and 
distinctive" (Ahamed, 1988: 5). That is precisely the reason why a growing literature 
has emerged on the military intervention in politics and its impact. The role of the 
Bengali military personnel in 1971, though expressly political in nature, is distinctive 
in that it was to create an independent Bangladesh out of East Pakistan and not to take 
over its administration by displacing civil authorities. In that role the Bengali military 
were motivated by the nationalistic aspirations of the people of East Pakistan and not 
by their corporate interests, although, as we will see in Chapter Eight, they were not 
totally oblivious of these interests in the new state. Of course most military 
interventions claim to be altruistic, expressing the needs and aspirations of `the 
people' 
Reasons for Military Intervention 
Since military interventions are seen often as a denial of the incipient 
democratic values and institutions of new states, considerable scholarly attention was 
devoted to explaining why and how military coups occurred. Early scholarship 
explored the reasons for military intervention in the relative `underdevelopment' of 
civil political institutions (May, Lawson and Selochan, 1998: 2) and the relative 
capability of the military, associated with the very organization of the armed forces. 
These organizational features provide them with discipline and cohesion, hierarchy 
and centralized command and unity both at the decision-making and executive levels. 
These enable the generals to take over political power promptly if they decide to act. 
Among a large number of studies which broadly pursued this line, major contributions 
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include Shils (1962); Pye (1962,1966); Finer (1962); Johnson (1962); Halpern 
(1963); Janowitz (1964); Von der Mehden (1964); Huntington (1968); Zolberg 
(1968); Daalder (1969); Dowse (1969); Lefever (1970); Bienen (1971,1983); Lissak 
(1976); Perlmutter (1977,1981); Stepan (1978,1988); Crouch (1985) and Chazan, et 
al. (1988). 
An alternative line of reasoning is related to the corporate interests of the 
armed forces. Any threat to their corporate interest may impel them to move and 
capture political power. The corporate interests of the military may be threatened 
when the military is fiscally deprived, or its autonomy or professionalism threatened 
(See, for example, Janowitz 1964; First 1970; Bienen 1971; Hakes 1973; Thompson 
1973; Nordlinger 1977; Horowitz 1980; Clapham and Philip 1985; Rouquie 1987). 
In both these lines of reasoning the military is viewed essentially as a cohesive 
entity with a sense of collective unity. The third strand of thought, in contrast, has 
portrayed the military "as simply an extension of the larger civil society, subject to the 
same class, regional and ethnic cleavages, prone to internal friction, and likely to side 
with particular political factions at particular times" (May, Lawson and Selochan, 
1998: 3). That the military is at least potentially fragmented has had particular 
salience in those states in which the military had a specific ethnic bias, and where 
recruitment was made during the colonial period either from the so-called "martial 
races" or from ethnic minorities rather than dominant ethnic groups (Daalder 1969; 
Guyot 1974; Kabwegyere 1974; Mazrui 1976; Hansen 1977; Nordlinger 1977; Enloe 
1980; Horowitz 1985 and Gow 1991). Added to this is the "intra-military elite 
factionalism", due mostly to ethnic bias in its composition, and as the Orkand 
Corporation Study of 1990 has suggested, about a third of the plots, attempted coups 
and coups were instigated because of intra-military elite factionalism (Seitz 1991: 70). 
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In some studies various types of coup and coup attempts have been distinguished. 
Some coups sought to set up new regimes, but some were directed against regime 
change (Huntington 1968; Hoadley 1975; Chazan et. Al. 1988; Luckham 1991). 
These explanations are however not necessarily mutually exclusive. In most cases, 
"Personal, organizational and societal factors are intermingled" (Welch 1974: 135). 
There are however two types of civilian regimes which are more prone to military 
intervention: first, those regimes which consist mainly of traditional aristocratic 
elements, generally with hereditary kings, are more prone to military intervention; 
second, such regimes "whose primary support comes from the lower class, and those 
that might come to power with the support of politicized workers and peasants" 
(Nordlinger 1970: 77). Not surprisingly, therefore, a growing body of case studies, 
intended to provide support to all these hypotheses, emerged. All these suggest 
however that while there were some recurring characteristics of military intervention, 
the explanation of individual cases involved an understanding of their special 
historical and social circumstances. It has been found that in some countries the 
military, or factions within the military, serve as tangible means of taking over 
political power (May, Lawson and Selochan, 1998: 5); in some others the military 
intervened to replace an inefficient or corrupt civilian regime; while in still others the 
military went ahead to forge a partnership deal with the civilian authorities for 
exercising political power. Having this in mind Bebler wrote in 1990: "Whether 
officially recognized or not, the military everywhere constitute an important part of 
the state apparatus and of the political system, and the soldiers, even when sound 
asleep in their barracks, participate in the political process and tacitly share political 
power with civilian rules" (Bebler 1990: 262- 263). 
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How do we characterize the role of the Bengali military officers in March 
1971? No doubt their intervention was political, but they made a move neither for a 
blatant seizure of power for themselves nor for replacing an inept or a corrupt regime, 
neither did they intend to establish a system of joint participation in government. They 
revolted in effect against their parent body, the Pakistani military. One of their 
leaders, Major Zia, made a Declaration of Independence of Bangladesh and they took 
up on their shoulders the responsibility of fighting the War of Independence during 
that crucial period. While the Pakistani generals were fighting in 1971 for retaining 
control over East Pakistan by sheer force and governing it as a captive territory, 
through a joint partnership with the West Pakistani political leaders, the Bengali 
military officers fought the Liberation War under the leadership of Bengali political 
leaders to free East Pakistan and make it an independent Bangladesh. 
So how can we conceptualize this war? The Government of Pakistan portrayed 
it as an "internal war" or a civil war (GOB 1981). Some Indian security experts 
termed it as "classical war" between two natural enemy states (Palit 1972; Pran 
Chopra 1972; Mohammad Ayub and K Subrahmanyam 1972). Some military officers 
in Bangladesh, who took part in the War of Liberation, called it a War of 
Independence against the Pakistani occupation forces (Bhuiyan 1972; Islam 1981; 
Safiullah 1989). The political leaders of Bangladesh took it as a Liberation War, while 
some of the academics, delineating its characteristics, termed it as "a revolution" 
(Jackson 1975; Loshak 1972; Talukder 1980; Ahamed 1988). 
This war has been taken in this study as the Liberation War. Its beginning may 
be traced to the revolt of the Bengali military officers at the night of 25 March 1971 
and subsequently to the Declaration of Independence of Bangladesh by Major Zia on 
27 March 1971. The series of events i. e. revolt of the military officers, declaration of 
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independence and beginning of the war, were however precipitated by the action of 
President Yahya Khan when he, without formally breaking the negotiation with the 
East Pakistani political leaders, left Dhaka in the evening of 25 March after deploying 
armed forces with a view to solving the East Pakistan crisis militarily. The Pakistan 
Army since then began to be treated as occupation army by the Bengalis, resisted by 
the Bengali armed forces and people of all sectors in the society in the revolutionary 
political situation of East Pakistan. The role of the Bengali military in the Liberation 
War and revolt are analyzed in Chapter Three. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Role of the Bengali Military: The Liberation War in 1971 
Types of War 
Some wars may be messianic in the sense that these will bring about 
wholesale changes in the social orders in the conquered territories in terms of faith or 
privilege or power, and some others may be global involving major powers in the 
world and affecting different parts of the globe. Some wars may again be 
characterized as local or localized; others regional. There may also be internal or civil 
war (Margiotha 1983: 1040- 48). The Crusades of the past (1099- 1204), the `Master 
Race Theory' in the recent past, and the very recent doctrine of war in the New World 
Order (NWO) signifying absolute supremacy of the U. S. in the global system are the 
expressions of the messianic philosophy. The First and the Second World War have 
represented the global variety. 
The forms of war vary from time to time, place to place and situation to 
situation. There is however no universally accepted terminology for the various forms 
of war. There may be total war, involving the complete utilization of all resources 
available to a belligerent. The `totality' involves the relevant nation's economic, 
political and social resources completely mobilized, and war ends only when their 
opponents are forced to surrender. The limited war takes place when the belligerent 
employs only limited military means. Conventional war is fought without the use of 
nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, although availability of these weapons may 
have some influences on the courses and outcome of war. In contrast, the general war 
36 
involves the total engagement of military might including these days' nuclear, 
biological and chemical weapons. Low-intensity war covers military actions in the 
gray zones. It stands somewhere between peace and open warfare, and it includes 
military assistance to insurgents or to countries fighting insurgents, or reprisals by 
military means and often like "gun-boat type diplomacy. " The forces and methods 
used are strictly limited (Margiotha, ed. 1920: 1048). According to motivations of 
those who wage it, war can be of several types: wars of conquest, preemption and of 
missionary zeal. 
Mens' outlook and attitude toward war have changed many times throughout 
human history, and different studies have been made over time about the rules of war. 
(Brinton 1958: Walzer 1965; Pettee 1958; Johnson 1964; Sola Pool et al. 1963; 
Chamberlin 1952; Johnson 1962; Jouvenel 1962). 
As organized collective violence or as an instrument of power or belief, war 
can be found in very diverse socio-political conditions, ranging from the ritualized 
vendettas of tribal society to the military regimes of the recent times. Mediaeval wars 
have very little in common with those of the industrialized world and this is not just a 
matter of technology. During the feudal era, war was an integral part of political life. 
Sometimes wars have been an expression of a chivalrous ethic. Warfare during the 
early modern period has been closely associated with military might. Finally the 
concept of a total war, endangering the very existence of nation states, has become a 
reality; yet war is still regarded as one of the ways of conflict resolution when all 
other diplomatic means fail. 
During the mediaeval period religion dominated all aspects of social life, 
including the conduct of war. The concept of bellrmi jiushim i. e. the just war was a 
meaningful idea. But the stage for a fundamental change in men's outlook on war was 
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set by Machiavelli (Machiavelli 1950: 183- 186). He was the first one to tear the 
fabric of morality from war as he did in his consideration of politics. He emphasized 
the "reason of state" in relation to war. In his own words: "when the very safety of a 
country depends upon the resolution to be taken, no considerations of justice or 
injustice, humanity or cruelty nor glory or shame should be allowed to prevail" 
(Machiavelli, 41). 
Writers like Clausewitz considered moderation in war and upheld the 
application of force only for the realization of a determined goal. When later writers 
justified war for reasons of state only, they did not exclude anything as the object of 
military action and included almost everything as object of attack. During the Age of 
Enlightenment, however the European states developed a theory which distinguished 
clearly between combatants and non-combatants. As an ideal, King Frederick of 
Prussia excluded the non-combatant civilians, villagers, hospitals, academic 
institutions, forests from the object of war. In war, the state itself has remained the 
main actor for a greater part of human history. When two Prussian provinces were 
occupied by French and Russian troops during the 18th century, the inhabitants 
initiated a resistance movement against the occupied forces. Then King Frederick 
himself dissuaded them from getting involved, as it was the responsibility of the state 
to regain their rights and uphold the sovereignty of the state. The attitude prevailing 
during the 18th century can be gauged from a quotation from Rousseau's Social 
Contract, (Rousseau, 1964: 357): "War is not a relation from man to man, but a 
relation from state to state. Therein the individuals are enemies by accident only, not 
as human beings, not as civilians, but as military men. " 
Modern war, however, has undergone profound changes since then, and has 
turned to people from the state in the sense that it is the people who make a state. 
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Modern writers have advocated pro-people war and sometimes the idea of a people's 
war. In the acclaimed and influential work of Clausewitz, politics/ diplomacy is the 
central theme of war, and not people directly. He has emphasized that "war is nothing 
else than a continuation of political transactions" (Clauswitz 1992: 119). The political 
purpose of wars determines what methods the belligerents adopt to realize their goals. 
Sometimes the treaties that concluded a war did not become the source of 
embitterment, but were acceptable to both sides and succeeded in installing a more 
peaceful order in the societies, thus touching the lives of common people. 
With the affairs of the state increasingly run by the representatives of people 
themselves following democratization, especially in Western Europe and North 
America, the objectives set forth by Clausewitz for waging war tended to become 
obsolete. Woodrow Wilson, the President of the United States (1913- 21), for 
instance, was not satisfied with the limited political aim as prescribed by Clausewitz. 
He set a new goal and that was "to make the world safe for democracy. " The First 
World War was to be "a war to end wars. " The masses around the globe were happy 
with this ideological slant and democratic tone. Thus a new age of just wars began 
and good wars were fought by the righteous and peace-loving people against vested 
interests. 
The growing influence of the common people began to be felt during and after 
the Second World War. Modern wars require the active participation of the entire 
nation as well as their readiness to bear the burden and sufferings of war. The 
involvement of the common people in the war has moreover resulted in a qualitative 
change both in its context and content. The civilian population is not included these 
days as in the 18`x' century or earlier. It had been a part of the ethics of soldiery not to 
use arms against the unarmed for centuries, but the entire civilian population of an 
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enemy country has become the target of naval blockades, large scale aerial 
bombardments and so on during the twentieth century. Even after the end of 
hostilities, the civilians in many cases find their property expropriated, their ancestral 
homelands forcibly taken away and sometimes, they are driven away. Thus war has 
intruded into the civilian sphere on an unprecedented scale in modern times, and 
civilians also have become militarized. 
Revolution and Liberation War 
When the Second World War came to an end, the colonial powers were 
thoroughly exhausted and weakened both economically and politically. The retention 
of overseas possessions by continuous military dominance became problematic for 
several reasons. Nationalism in the guise of anti-colonialism spilled over into the 
colonies and its pace became more intense after the recognition of the right of self- 
determination in the Versailles Treaty of 1921. The local leaders in the colonies, most 
of whom had been educated in European schools and colleges, became vocal about 
this right of self-determination. Moreover, many inhabitants of the colonies had to 
take part in the wars of the colonial masters in Europe and elsewhere. The impact of 
all these factors was quite profound. 
Throughout the twentieth century there were many liberation wars, directed 
against colonial masters in different forms. Ceylon, for example, got independence in 
1948 and it was made possible by the activities of the armed guerilla groups, aided by 
armed police and political activists. The Indonesian fought against the Dutch military 
and gained independence in 1949. The Chinese Communist Party through fierce fight 
against the Chinese Nationalist Government established their rule in mainland China 
in 1949. The nature of liberation war underwent changes over time, but guerilla 
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tactics had been the favourite modus operandi with the army fomenting national 
revolution. Political parties, pressure groups, professionals and semi-military 
organizations like the volunteer corps played a vital role in these wars. Such wars 
have always been nationalistic in character and were fought by self-styled liberation 
armies. Much importance was often attached to the use of Marxist-Leninist dogma by 
the young students, workers, peasants and political activists. The struggle of the 
Vietnamese or the Algerians against the French colonial masters are typical in this 
respect (Geertz 1963). The instances of independence struggles in Guinea and Ghana 
may also be cited in this connection (Wallerstein 1961). In some cases, the charisma 
of the leaders of independence movement was used to mobilize people. The military 
had also to respond to the call of the nation. Thus, it turned out to be great liberating 
promise in most of the colonies of Asia, Africa and Latin America. While the 
common denominator of these movements in the colonies had been anti-imperialism 
stance and a political rejection of capitalist form of economic reconstruction, the 
ideology guiding them has been a mixture of agrarian populism and radical 
nationalism. 
These movements were generally led by political leaders, but where violent 
means were used against the colonial armed forces, the military also got involved. 
Young intellectuals and the rising professionals also played important roles, but 
students constituted the most important mass base of the liberation war. It must be 
remembered that the conditions vary from country to country, but primarily the 
students and military constitute the bulk of such armies. 
Can the term ̀ liberation war' be defined? Liberation war, like war in general, 
is a complex concept. No simple or single theory is likely to account for it. Bowyer 
Bell has defined the liberation war as a military action. Thus, "if a small, renewable 
41 
core of true believers can be organized, willing to sacrifice their lives for a cause 
professed by a reasonable portion of the population and possible of realization, then, 
in spite of the obstacles, real or imagined, an armed struggle can be launched" (Bell, 
1976: 526). The cause of the struggle need not necessarily be fully understood or 
completely accepted by those for whom they fight and it certainly need not have to 
have majority support. 
The essence of a revolt is commitment to a cause beyond the capacity of the 
system to co-opt or absorb. The motives that inspire revolt and the take up of arms are 
generally couched in fear of losing some vital interests of a collectivity, for which 
they are prepared to lay down their lives. The major interest of the rebels is to cause 
as much disorder as possible, even using guerilla tactics where feasible. Liberation 
war is a sort of omnibus term and covers wars of independence, guerilla warfare, 
revolution, rebellion, revolt, insurrection, peasant revolt, uprising or mutiny. It is 
however undeniable that conceptual confusion still persists. The 1956 `Hungarian 
Revolution' as referred to by one analyst becomes for another `The Hungarian 
Revolt', because in his definition `revolution' succeeds while `revolt' fails 
(Keskemeti, 1961: 2). Similarly, some writers have termed the War of American 
Independence an act of revolution, but others differ (Greene, 1974: 7). While such 
phenomena are sometimes described as ̀ new wars', Harry Eckstein has used the term 
`internal war' (Eckstein, 1964), because such wars take place between two nations in 
one state and remain confined within one state. The concept of liberation war has 
been used in this study in the sense of an internal war. John Chalmers has also used 
the term in this sense. In his own words: "During that time the world also witnessed at 
least fifteen revolutions of diverse types. These include the 1971 revolution that 
created Bangladesh out of what had been East Pakistan" (Chalmers, 1982: IX). Some 
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Bangladeshi scholars have also described the bloody confrontation between the 
Pakistani authorities (the internal colonialists) and the East Pakistanis during 1971 as 
Liberation War (Ahamed, 1988; Talukder, 1980), although the Pakistan authorities 
termed it as rebellion because the Bengali military officers revolted against "their 
lawful authorities". 
The term `revolution' has been derived from astronomy. It was initially used 
by philosophers to imply a cyclical process in human development and it entered into 
common political parlance only after the French Revolution of 1789 (Arendt, 1926: 
35-36). The Encyclopedia of Social Sciences defines revolution thus: "Revolution in 
its common sense is an attempt to make a radical change in the system of government. 
It often involves the infringement of prevailing constitutional arrangement through the 
use of force. Revolution may also mean any fundamentally new development 
in the 
economy, culture and social fabric, that is, in practically in any field of human 
endeavour" (Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, 510). Crane Brinton, analyzing the 
anatomy of this limited political revolution in broader social and cultural context, has 
found out such abstract general social values as freedom, security, equality or justice 
as the causes of revolution since these are the ones that provide a basis for 
revolutionary sentiment (Brinton, 1958). 
Though the concept of revolution since the time of Aristotle was originally 
related to the notion of a cyclical alteration in the forms of government, it implies a 
totally different thing today. It is "the idea of a new order" and this concept of 
revolution predominates since the American and French revolutions. The concept of 
revolution began to be used in this sense since the seventeenth century, as "a 
challenge to the established political order" and "eventual establishment of a new 
order, radically different from the preceding one" (Encyclopedia of Social Sciences: 
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510). Its recent use is indicative of "an attempt to make a radical change in the system 
of government", and in fact a successful revolution is more than an attempt, in that it 
radically changes the system of government. It inaugurates new order both in the 
society and polity (Skocpol, 1975: 175-180; Skocpol, 1976: 57-60). To avoid them or 
to reduce its possibility, effective changes by means of gradual transformation are in 
order so that adaptation of the institutions or processes of political order to evolving 
values, interests and beliefs becomes easier. 
In the pre- revolutionary situation, large groups of people remain alienated 
from the established political order. The existing laws and regulations thus lose their 
" legitimacy to them and appear arbitrary, their enforcement unjustified. During the pre- 
revolutionary period though, efforts are often made to reform and re-establish the 
political and socio- economic order, but they fail and this failure enhances the sense 
of revolutionary potential. Looking at the Six- Point Programme of 1966, and its 
implications for Pakistan, one is forced to conclude that it was intended to re-structure 
the political system in Pakistan so that in such areas as finance and currency, taxation 
and trade that the integrity of the Pakistani state was severely challenged and the 
Bengali elite would have had their control firmly established. The West Pakistani elite 
could not accommodate this situation mainly because they were not prepared to part 
with the resources over which they had continued to exercise absolute control since 
1947. The military leaders of Pakistan, most of whom were from West Pakistan, 
became especially alarmed because at least 4 points of the Six- Point Programme (2, 
3,4 and 5) were against their corporate interests. From this perspective, the 
happenings of 1971 in East Pakistan can be understood as a revolution (Talukder, 
1980). The Six-Point Programme and its implications for the Pakistani armed forces 
have been analyzed in depth in Chapter Six. 
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One must however proceed with caution in this slippery terrain. The changes 
that occurred in East Pakistan after the revolution were much more than the revolution 
from above as formulated by Ellen Kay Trimberger (1978). East Pakistan, unlike 
Turkey after the Ataturk regime, or Japan after Meiji restoration, or Egypt after 
Nasser's take over, became a totally new entity, an independent and sovereign state, 
and in this transformation, mass upheaval accompanied by a bloody war fought by the 
Bengali soldiers and Mukii Bahini (freedom fighters) became the crucial factor. 
Revolution has a variety of connotations. If it results in change of the 
government only, it becomes labeled as political revolution; if it also changes the 
distribution of wealth and status symbols in the society, for example, by destroying 
the privileges of a nobility, it becomes known as social revolution (Skocpol, 1976). 
Attempts that are made against a government or a state, seeking to change the ruling 
elite or their policies, but not intending to fabricate wholesale changes in the 
institutional framework, are generally known as revolts (Johnson 1964: 50- 75; Tanter 
and Midlarsky 1967: 15- 35; Gurr with Ruttenberg 1967: 66- 77; Eckstein 1963: 115- 
121; Wallerstein 1961: 159- 163; Pettee 1938: 85- 96). In revolts, the rebels abrogate 
previous authorities by recourse to armed forces in an attempt to seize power in the 
name of a new legitimacy upheld in the name of people. 
Although the aims of a revolt may in large part be determined by the 
orchestration of the rebel's resources, no new vision or any intention of fashioning a 
new society are necessary. In short, a revolt is a means to a limited end or varying 
ends, a determined but coherent intervention with violence. It maybe difficult for the 
rebels to create a recognizable, legitimate alternative to the challenged authority. In 
the words of J. Bowyer Bell: "A revolt is coherent, armed rising of sufficient 
proportion to challenge seriously the existing central authority, but without the 
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capacity to create an alternative authority: a lethal dialogue between rebel aspirants to 
power and the forces of authority" (Bell, 1976: 5-6). The momentous events in East 
Pakistan on 25 March 1971 may be characterized as a revolt in the sense that the 
Bengali armed forces, very casually trampling on their allegiance to the parent body 
i. e. the armed forces of Pakistan, and joining hands with other paramilitary forces and 
the political elements in the society, began fighting against the Pakistani forces. The 
Bengali forces issued a historic Declaration of Independence of Bangladesh; they 
coordinated their activities both with the military and paramilitary forces stationed in 
different cantonments; they agreed to fight under the recognized political leadership 
which started functioning on 17 April, 1971; the political leaders promulgated a 
constitutional formula to shape the destiny of the land and its inhabitants. 
It can similarly be said that those cataclysmic events of 1971 in East Pakistan 
were revolutionary in that those were designed to make radical changes in the existing 
politico- economic system in East Pakistan through use of force, and were strongly 
motivated by the earnest desires of the participants for such social values as freedom, 
democracy, equality and justice. Ultimately it was pro-v ed that those events were more 
than a revolution in the sense that the authors of the revolution although they 
proceeded with the goal of re-structuring the system and the mass upheaval finally 
hardened and became solidified with a national movement desirous of setting up a 
new nation state. It can not be termed a revolution from above because the Bengali 
military leaders, who took the first crucial jump in the revolution and revolted by 
throwing aside the professional discipline finally fought under the leadership of an 
organized government, the Bangladesh Government-in- Exile at Mujibnagar. For all 
these reasons, it is more reasonable to term that revolution the Liberation War of 
1971, and this is how it has been described in the study. 
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The Historical Context of the War of Liberation in Bangladesh 
The Liberation War of 1971 in East Pakistan has a long history. Such historic 
events as the Language Movement of 1952, the general election of 1954, the Six- 
Point Movement of 1966, the popular uprising of 1969, the general election in 
Pakistan in 1970 are so many landmarks, and each one of these events and 
movements was characterized by unprecedented popular involvement. The 
penultimate stage was reached when on 25 March 1971 the Pakistan Government 
decided to crush the people's movement in East Pakistan by creating a reign of terror 
and unleashing genocide through its organized disciplined forces, the Pakistan Army 
(Ali, 1973: 40- 45; Bhutto 1971: 11- 21; Choudhury 1972: 50- 81). 
The story however began with the Partition of India in 1947. Bangladesh, then 
a part of undivided Bengal became independent as the eastern wing of Pakistan on the 
basis of the two-nation theory (Ali 1967; Callard 1957; Morris-Jones 1958). This 
resulted in a new nationalism based on Islamic values in East Bengal. The 
assimilationist cultural policies of the Pakistan Government, based on a distrust of the 
Bengalis and aimed at evolving a unitary culture in a plural society, began to alienate 
them gradually from the political system. The emergence of military rule in Pakistan 
in 1958 had the effect of drastically cutting down representation from East Pakistan 
because it was basically an administration run by civil and military bureaucrats and 
East Pakistani representation was of an absolute minimum in those sectors. This has 
been discussed in details in Chapter Five. The Ayub Khan regime concentrated 
mainly on economic growth instead of strengthening Islamic values in the society, but 
the kind of economic growth that emerged in Pakistan during that period became 
segmented not only in class terms but also in regional terms, and the West Pakistan- 
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centred crude economism resulted in an explosive politics in East Pakistan. The 
demand for regional autonomy thus gained momentum in the late 1960s and the Six- 
Point Programme was its direct offshoot. The Six-Point Programme emerged as a 
reaction against the policy measures of the ruling elite in Pakistan. It was designed, in 
effect, to establish the authority of the Bengali elite over the resources of East 
Pakistan. The Six-Point Programme intended to deny the central government in 
Pakistan to utilize the East Pakistani resources in West Pakistan (Rahman 1966). 
During those days, the number of Bengali soldiers and officers increased 
slightly in the Pakistan armed forces because of demands from East Pakistani leaders. 
As they grew in number, they also developed a sense of togetherness and affinity 
amongst them because of their distinct identity (Ziring 1971: 125- 140; Ahamed 1980: 
60- 72). Bitter experiences of being discriminated against in terms of pay and 
perquisites also fostered a sense of common grievance. In the absence of adequate 
political representation of East Pakistan at the centre, the Bengali bureaucrats, both 
civil and military, had to work as pressure groups for the articulation of demands for 
East Pakistan. As the number of these bureaucrats increased slightly over time, they 
began to feel more and more confident of themselves as representatives of East 
Pakistan's interest. Some of them deliberately became linked with the Bengali 
political leaders. Many of them supplied secret information and other materials to the 
top leadership of Awami League, Sheikh Mujib. The Agartala Conspiracy Case, 
which was framed in 1968 against Sheikh Mujibur Rahman with a view to defaming 
him for conspiring to bring about secession of East Pakistan from Pakistan with 
Indian help, involved a number of civil and military officers. It was no wonder, 
therefore, that the Bengali bureaucrats lent full support to Sheikh Mujib when he 
organized a civil disobedience and non cooperation movement in East Pakistan with a 
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view to paralyzing civil administration from 1 March to 25 March 1971. This non- 
cooperation movement ultimately proved crucial, because it paved the way for 
launching a bigger struggle against the oppressive Pakistan Government. The Six- 
Point Programme became transformed into a one-point movement i. e. the movement 
for independence. In the face of such a dire situation, General Yahya Khan, the 
President of Pakistan, took steps to buy some time - to enhance their military strength 
by bringing in more men and materials from West Pakistan - in the guise of a 
dialogue between the Awami League and the West Pakistani leaders and generals. 
The Bengali military officers saw this as a delaying tactic by the Pakistani generals 
and prepared themselves for the crucial moment. They exchanged views with some of 
their colleagues and kept themselves abreast of the situation. They were sure that the 
enhanced striking power of the Pakistan army through the addition of more men and 
materials brought forth from West Pakistan would be used against the people of East 
Pakistan. The Bengali military officers decided to strike back if and when the 
situation so demanded. 
After the completion of thorough preparation militarily, the Pakistani generals 
showed their teeth in the form of the `Operation Searchlight'. It was designed to 
suppress the people's uprising in East Pakistan through a reign of terror involving 
massacre and genocide in Dhaka in the night of 25 March 1971. The political leaders 
of East Pakistan were caught unaware. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who had been 
leading the people's movement till then, surrendered to the Pakistani generals. The 
other leaders also escaped to a safe haven in India without giving any direction to the 
people. At this juncture, the military officers, though junior in rank, played a direct 
role. At this point of time, some of them did what the political leaders were supposed 
to do. They staged a revolt, pronounced the Declaration of Independence of 
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Bangladesh and continued to mobilize the war efforts till the political leaders could 
re-group and consolidate their efforts through the formation of government-in-exile 
on 17 April 1971 in the neighboring country India. This indicates that the Bengali 
armed forces were interested only in the independence of Bangladesh. Unlike the 
military in most of the Third World countries at that point of time, the Bengali 
military officers were not interested in political power. They fought the Liberation 
War under the leadership of the Bangladesh Government-in-exile, headed by the 
political leaders. 
The period from 25 March 1971 to 17 April 1971 may better be termed a 
missing link in the political history of Bangladesh because there was no legal 
government, no direction from the political leadership and no efforts whatsoever for 
mobilizing resources for the Liberation War from any quarter save those historic 
attempts made by Eight Bengal Tigers led by Major Ziaur Rahman. This study is 
designed also to throw some light on this missing link. 
When the people of different strata in the society, different professional groups 
and different social forces, who became involved directly in the non-co-operation 
movement, lost touch with the political leadership, they were motivated and 
mobilized by the call of the Bengali military leadership. The military leadership 
appealed to the nation to resist the aggressors i. e. the Pakistani forces, anywhere and 
everywhere by whatever means. They also appealed to the international community to 
recognize the newborn state of Bangladesh and to condemn the atrocities committed 
by the occupation army of Pakistan. The activities of the Bengali military were not 
confined to rebellion and the Declaration of Independence only, they began to engage 
in the face-to-face fighting on occasions and organized guerilla type activities also. 
All these decisions on the part of the Bengali military helped bring renewed 
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confidence to their compatriots scattered over the different cantonments and more 
importantly among the people, who from then on began to be involved in the 
Liberation War as active combatants (Safiullah 1989: 18- 92; Islam 1981: 112- 170). 
It is noteworthy that when the Bangladesh Government-in-exile was formed at 
Mujibnagar on 17 April 1971 the Bengali military officers instantly gave up giving 
directions to the fighting forces and concentrated solely on fighting the occupation 
forces under political leadership with a view to liberating Bangladesh. The saga of the 
nine-month long Liberation War is thus one of the richest, the most glorious, the most 
gallant ones, and to the historians, this is the most glorious chapter in Bangladesh 
history. It has all the unique characteristics of a successful revolution, but to the 
people of Bangladesh it has always remained both as a revolution and a Liberation 
War. It liberated the people from the marauding occupation army of Pakistan; it 
brought into being an independent and sovereign Bangladesh. 
During those critical days of March 1971 the successful role of the band of 
nationalist Bengali military officers stationed in Chittagong was as much crucial as 
the gross failures of the West Pakistan- based power-hungry generals, who were for 
all practical purposes the ruling elite in Pakistan. But for their impolitic and ill- 
conceived haughty moves, Pakistan probably could have lingered for few more years. 
(Etzioni, 1965: 37-40). This orientation of the Bengali military officers did not grow 
overnight. No revolt comes up in a vacuum. Such an important decision as the 
Declaration of Independence of Bangladesh by a Bengali military officer Major Zia 
has its root deeper in the structural conditions of Pakistan. This has its socio-economic 
background: it has been shaped by the administrative and cultural policies of the 
ruling elite of Pakistan. It has been brought to a focus by the economic policies 
pursued by them. Only in the context of these structural factors can the role of the 
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Bengali military officers, at that point of time, be properly understood. In the next 
chapter the socio-economic background of the issue has been discussed. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Socio-Economic Background of the Issue 
Introduction 
The issue in question i. e. the cataclysmic upheaval in the form of a Liberation 
War in East Pakistan in 1971 led by the Bengali military officers, must be understood 
in relation to its socio-economic context. Though the union between East and West 
Pakistan was voluntarily entered into in 1947, most of the ingredients that generate in 
people a solid bond of unity as a nation were absent in Pakistan. The people of East 
and West Pakistan had neither any experience of living together for generations 
within a continuing political framework, nor had they been united under identical 
political institutions which might have fostered common political perceptions, neither 
did they belong to a distinct cultural area. The only common bond that existed 
between the peoples of the two wings was a set of Islamic values and some 
experiences of the political movement for a separate Muslim homeland in the Hindu- 
dominated India on the basis of the two-nation theory (Bolitho, 1954; Chowdhury, 
1967). For all these, Pakistan has been known as a 'double country' since its inception 
(Marshall, 1959: 5). This chapter delineates in detail the socio-economic background 
of the issue in terms of geographical features, their demographic characteristics, 
linguistic heterogeneity, cultural traits, history and economic status of the two wings 
of Pakistan. 
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Geography 
Pakistan as a state emerging in 1947 comprised two separate areas of British 
India - the Muslim dominated northwest regions (Punjab, 
Sindh, Baluchistan and 
North-West Frontier Province) and East Bengal, which were later named as West 
Pakistan and East Pakistan respectively. These two provinces of Pakistan together had 
a total area of 3,65,529 square miles (East Pakistan 55,126 sq. miles and West 
Pakistan 310,403 sq. miles) with more than 1000 miles of Indian territory lying 
between them (Jahan, 1994: 11). This geographical distance also created differences in 
the configuration of the physical and climatic conditions of the two regions. East 
Pakistan being the lowest riparian of the Ganges-Brahmaputra and Meghna (GBM) 
river system was mostly filled with sediments deposited by the respective rivers and 
their tributaries. The only variation in the topography is observed along the eastern 
and southeastern margins, where there are small hills and mountains and in the 
northern part with marginally high land mass, some thirty feet above the sea level. 
Due to the dense river network and heavy monsoon rainfall (average 80 inches) 
almost 30%-40% of the land of East Pakistan experience river flood every year, which 
also feeds the summer crops, whereas winter or Rabi crops require irrigation to some 
extent. The agricultural pattern of the country is mostly dependent on the flooding 
regime. In contrast to East, West Pakistan has diverse topography ranging from 
highlands like the Himalayas, the Karakoram and the Hindukush on the west and 
plains like Indus flood plains and delta on the east. When East Pakistan enjoys cool 
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dry winter and hot humid summer, West Pakistan is noted for hot summer and cold 
winter with semi-arid to and conditions prevailing in most parts, and sub-humid 
conditions in a small area in the north. The overall and nature of West Pakistan made 
the region extensively dependent on irrigation for agricultural production. The only 
unifying element in the climate of East and West Pakistan is the influence of monsoon 
wind in a particular time of the year. 
The differences in climate and topography of the two regions not only 
generated differences in agricultural pattern but have also nurtured different food 
habit, dress, rituals, customs of the people, thus producing two distinct cultures. 
Taking into consideration the geographical boundaries of the two parts of Pakistan, 
East Pakistan has common frontiers with India from west, east and north. In the south 
east, East Pakistan has a common boundary with Burma and to the south-east lies the 
Bay of Bengal, West Pakistan is bounded by Iran and Afghanistan on the west. In the 
north-west, Wakhan, a narrow belt of Afghanistan, separates West Pakistan from the 
Central Asia. In the north, West Pakistan has a common frontier with China. To the 
east, it is surrounded by India. The Arabian Sea lies to the south of West Pakistan. 
This extensive geographical separation has also prohibited the communication and 
social interaction between these two different socio-cultural units in general in the 
same country. 
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Population 
The demographic features of East and West Pakistan also displays great contrast (Table 
4.1). 
Table 4.1: Demographic Features of East and West Pakistan 
Population Population Urban *Dependency 
(in Millions) Density Population Ratio (Per 100 
(Persons/ Sq. (%) Adults) 
Mile) 
1951 1961 1951 1961 1951 1961 1961 
East Pakistan 41.9 50.8 701 922 4.3 5.2 105.33 
West Pakistan 33.7 42.9 109 138 17.8 22.5 97.6 
Source: Jahan, 1994, p.!!, Khan, 1971, p. 697; The data of 1971, reflecting comparative 
perspective of two wings are not available, because the population census was not held in 
1971. It was held in 1974. 
The population was not evenly distributed in the two wings of Pakistan. The 
area of East Pakistan, being six times smaller than West Pakistan, contained 54% of 
the total population. East Pakistan's population density was seven times greater than 
that of West Pakistan. The density of population in the rural areas of East Pakistan 
was 1,483 persons per square mile of cultivated land and this figure in West Pakistan 
was 658 persons (Khan, 1971). The physiography and soil primarily control the 
distribution of the rural population in both the wings. The lands along the major rivers 
of East Pakistan, the Padma, Meghna and Brahmaputra, which are annually flooded, 
contain the densest population rising to over 2000 persons per square mile. In the 
Western wing the highest density of rural population rises to 200-700 persons per 
square mile in the humid areas of Upper Indus Valley and the intermontane high 
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plains (Khan, 1971). On the contrary West Pakistan has a higher density of urban 
population than East Pakistan. 
The dependency ratio was also high in East Pakistan than that of West 
Pakistan. A major part of this ratio was occupied by the child (0-14 age group) 
dependency. Another distinct demographic feature of Pakistan was the refugee 
population particularly migrating to the region after the partition of 1947. West 
Pakistan with better economic status experienced more influx of refugees (7.2 million, 
1951 census) than East Pakistan (0.7 million, 1951 census). According to 1951 census 
refugees constituted 39.9% of the total urban population of West Pakistan. By contrast 
the vacuum created in the east wing by the departure of the Hindu elite was not filled 
by the new immigrants (Jahan, 1994). 
Language 
The topographic and climatic diversity often determines the linguistic 
complexity in a region. East Pakistan, an area with uniform landscape, had one 
dominant mother tongue that was Bengali. The colloquial practice of this language 
with some regional variations in terms of pronunciation and elocution displays strong 
resemblance all over East Pakistan, though some exception in the hilly regions are 
seen, where trans-boundary linguistic influence has modified the language to a greater 
extent. A totally different scenario existed in West Pakistan, where a very complex 
polyglot was practiced. As the topography of West Pakistan changed from mountains 
to plains so did the language. The following table illustrates the linguistic differences 
in the two provinces of Pakistan. 
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Table 4.2: Mother Tongue Commonly Spoken by Population of East and 
West Pakistan (%) 
East Pakistan West Pakistan 
Language 
1951 1961 1951 1961 
Bengali 98.16 98.42 0.02 0.11 
Punjabi 0.02 0.02 67.08 66.39 
Pushtu - 0.01 8.01 8.47 
Sindhi 0.01 0.01 12.85 12.59 
Urdu 0.64 0.61 7.05 7.75 
English 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 
Baluchi - - 3.04 2.49 
Source: Jahan, 1994, p. 14, same as in Table 4.1. 
Bengali remained almost an unfamiliar language for the West Pakistanis 
(except some bilingual elite), likewise the majority of East Pakistanis or the Bengalis 
could never adopt Urdu, Punjabi, Pushtu which are the widely spoken languages of 
West Pakistan. The differences in the alphabets and script and the elocution imposed a 
barrier in the acceptance of the languages in both the wings. Despite such diversity, 
West Pakistani administrators tried to impose Urdu as a single state language rejecting 
Bengali on the ground of secularist contributions by Hindu authors in the language. 
Though Bengali script is derived directly from Gupta Brahmi script, the historical 
development of the language dates back to Mughal era when Bengali literature was 
greatly influenced by Persian literature and Islamic thoughts via Sufi mysticism. 
However the attempt of developing Urdu as a national language was discarded in the 
face of strong resentment by the Bengali nationals. Both Bengali and Urdu were 
recognized as national languages in Pakistan under the 1956 Constitution. Ultimately 
this settlement failed to incorporate the two languages at national level and English 
remained the official language since it is understandable in both the wings. The cause 
for such failure as identified by Jahan (1994) has increased the trend not conducive to 
national integration mainly because of the small number of mobilized and 
differentiated groups in the country. 
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Religion, Culture and Society 
When the British decided to give independence to the subcontinent, the 
Muslims were not sure of a fair deal from the caste-ridden Hindu majority. The 
Hindu-Muslim rivalry dates back to the eighth century AD, when the Muslims rulers 
first entered the subcontinent and reigned over 600 years till the British regime 
started. The Indian Muslims therefore demanded a separate Muslim state where they 
could preserve their own constitutional rights, culture, tradition and Islamic laws. 
Though the society in East and West Pakistan was based on Islamic principles, still 
there remained some basic differences in terms of attitude towards the religion. In 
East Pakistan, Islam is more of a liberal type in the sense that more of its day-to-day 
ethos rather than its archetypal rites and practices appealed to the people. In West 
Pakistan, however, Islam is more conservative and orthodox. This is mainly because 
of the fact that Islamic Principles had been made popular in East Pakistan mainly by 
the Sufi saints, popular both to the Muslim and non-Muslims alike since the thirteenth 
century. Whereas in West Pakistan it has largely been associated with the works of 
the conquering rulers, and that too since the ninth century. This liberal nature of 
Islam in East Pakistan has quite often been misunderstood by West Pakistani leaders, 
some of whom termed Bengali Muslims as lesser Muslims in Pakistan. 
The distribution of the religious groups in the two wings was also quite 
disproportionate (Table 4.3). A good proportion of Hindu population resided in East 
Pakistan, whereas in West Pakistan the Hindu. population was very negligible. The 
cultural diffusion from the surrounding states also plays a vital role in moulding the 
lifestyle of a country. West Pakistan is bounded by two Muslim States, Iran on the 
west and Afghanistan on north east, thus the cultural interaction that occurred among 
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these nations belonged to the same orthodoxy. The dominance of fundamentalist 
perceptions could possibly be the reason for minimum Hindu population in West 
Pakistan. East Pakistan, once being a part of Hindu-dominated Indian territory, has a 
very enriched cultural heritage influenced by Buddhism-Hinduism. This disparity 
between the culture and society of East and West Pakistan within the broader context 
of Islam has always been a barrier to a united Pakistani nationalism. 
Table 4.3: Religious Groups in East and West Pakistan (% of total population) 
Religion East Pakistan West Pakistan 
1951 1961 1951 1961 
Muslim 76.8 80.4 97.1 97.2 
Hindu 22.0 18.4 1.6 1.5 
Christian 0.3 0.3 1.3 1.3 
Other 0.9 0.9 0.0 0.5 
Source: Jahan, 1994, p. 23; as in Table 4.1. 
The society of West Pakistan has been more fragmented than that of East 
Pakistan. The economic status-segregation has been quite predominant in West 
Pakistan, but tribalism posed as a strong factor retarding cohesion in the regions of the 
former North-West Frontier and Baluchistan provinces. The stratification regarding 
the linguistic identities of the ethnic minorities like Pathans, Baluchis, Sindhis has 
also been acute in this region. The Feudal Landlord system has been more widespread 
in West Pakistan compared to East Pakistan. A caste-like system has been prevalent, 
particularly in Punjab and often endogamy was practiced and children followed the 
caste occupation (Jahan, 1994): 
In terms of ethnicity East Pakistan was more homogenous. The majority of its 
population belonged to one ethnic group Bengali, though racially Bengalis are a 
mixed group, comprising the Caucasoid, Proto-Australoid and Mongoloid. The 
existent tribal groups in the region form a very small proportion of the population 
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(about 496,000) residing in the Chittagong Hill tracts, Sylhet, Comilla and 
Mymensingh and never posed any problem to the Bengali nationalism. The agrarian 
community dominated the social lifestyle of East Pakistan. According to 1961 Census 
of Pakistan 85 percent of the total population were engaged in agriculture; 4 percent 
in manufacturing and 9 percent in tertiary activities, while the figures in West 
Pakistan were 59,14 and 25 percent respectively. This rural society was loosely 
structured with no permanent leaders or institutions. The local Samaj and the local 
leaders only appeared during any crisis of the society. This Samaj was mostly 
constituted of the rural elite who were particularly the affluent and religious leaders of 
the rural society. Urban life in East Pakistan was mainly centred in the few urban 
centres like Dacca, Chittagong, Narayanganj and Khulna. The urban culture in East 
Pakistan has always been the culture of the educated elite of the society. Social 
stratification based on economic status was prevalent both in rural and urban social 
system, which also overshadowed other caste-based social stratification. But prior to 
the partition a more rigid socioeconomic segregation prevailed between the agrarian 
society and the landowners, more popularly known as the Zan, idars. Most of these 
landlords were Hindus who after partition either fled the country or were thrown out 
of their land holdings by the East Bengal Estates Acquisition and Tenancy Act of 
1950 that abolished the feudal landlord system from the country. The perspectives of 
a Bengali farmer who voted for Pakistan was also to elect a legislature that would 
abolish the hold of the Hindu Zamidars and Mahajans over his daily life. This 
perspective was somewhat different from that of the tribal leaders or elite of Punjab, 
Baluchistan, the North West Frontier Province and Sindh, who sought regional power 
to retain the domination of their provincial power structures against encroachments by 
the Hindu dominated centre (Sobhan, 1993). 
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In the rural societies of both East and West Pakistan land ownership was the 
prime indicator of economic status. In both the provinces the majority of the lands 
were in the hands of a few (Table 4.4). The major difference in the land ownership 
was that the percentage of the landowners with smaller sized lands were higher in the 
Eastern province compared to the Western province, which was also indicative of 
high land fragmentation in East Pakistan. The small and fragmented lands are direct 
results of the population growing without the opening up of new employment 
opportunities (Khan, 1971: 792). No organized effort of consolidating holdings was 
made in East Pakistan, while in West Pakistan Consolidation of holdings Ordinance 
was promulgated in 1960. 
Table 4.4: Distribution of Land Ownership by Size in East and West Pakistan 
(1960) 
Size of Farms 
in Acre 
East Pakistan West Pakistan 
% of Owners % of Total % of Owners % of Total 
Farm Land Farm Land 
Under 1.0 24 3 15 1 
1 to 4.9 53.5 39 34 9 
5 to 12.4 19 39 28 22 
12.5 to 24.9 3 14 15 26 
25 and Above 0.5 5 8 42 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: Khan, 1971, p. 792 
History 
The prehistory of East and West Pakistan is not very clear. But both East and 
West Pakistan have been a melting pot for different races and culture. The two 
provinces also have a common Islamic history belonging to the Muslim Period in the 
Subcontinent. This bond was emphasized by leaders of the Pakistan movement prior 
to the establishment of Pakistan. Following independence it was often used by 
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Pakistani policy makers to cement relations between the two wings (Jahan, 1994). In 
fact the first territorial demand that was put forward for Pakistan, corresponded 
roughly to the area of West Pakistan. When Choudhury Rahmat Ali and his associates 
first coined the name "Pakistan", they thought of P for Punjab, A for Afghanistan, K 
for Kashmir, S for Sindh and TAN for Baluchistan. There was no trace of East Bengal 
within this acronym. The Lahore Conference of Muslim League in 1940 called for 
"Independent States" in the Muslim dominated regions of northwest and east. This 
was interpreted by many prominent Bengali Muslim Leaguers as demand for two 
states. The Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946 conceived by the ruling British Government 
as the basis for Indian Independence devolved power on three sub-states - Hindu 
dominated Jukta Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa, Bombay and Madras; 
Muslim dominated Punjab, North-Western Frontier Province, Sindh and Baluchistan 
and Muslim dominated East Bengal and Assam. The Cabinet Mission Plan was 
rejected by the Congress Party. It was only when the Congress Party high command 
rejected the idea of a united and sovereign Bengal that the idea of the Muslim 
majority areas of Bengal and Assam joining a `moth-eaten and truncated' Pakistan 
was accepted as the ultimate home of Muslim Bengali nationalism (Sobhanl993). In 8 
November 1945, Jinnah, in an interview to the Associated Press of America, stated 
that Pakistan would be a United States and its provinces would enjoy autonomy 
(Khan, 1998). The attempt to modify the Lahore Resolution in favour of one state was 
opposed by some East Bengal Muslim Leaguers. It was in 1946 when the Lahore 
resolution was finally amended in support of one Muslim State in Muslim League 
Council Session held at Delhi. 
Thus Bengali nationalism found its national identity defined by religion 
located in the territories of East Bengal and Sylhet, though non-Muslims constituted 
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22 percent of the total population of Eastern Bengal at the time of partition (Haxner, 
1969). But after August 14,1947 Bengali nationalism was more bounded by a 
territorial definition which not only contained the existing Hindus but also the Muslim 
population who migrated to East Pakistan from different parts of India and having 
different perspective on politics and economy. Among all these divergent groups the 
Bengali Muslims had high expectations from the newly emerged nation, since they 
were the most deprived Indian Muslims throughout history. The minority Urdu 
speaking Muslims of India had a good hold over the business, profession, lands and in 
some parts of India they also belonged to the higher class of the society. It was the 
Bengali Muslims who had been economically and politically exploited by the British 
rulers and the later by the Hindu Zamidars. The backwardness of Eastern Bengal 
could be very much attributed to such prolonged domination by the external forces. 
The struggle for Pakistan and the struggle for power within Pakistan which eventually 
focussed on the struggle for self-rule from Pakistan thus constituted a continuum 
within the consciousness of Bengalis of Eastern Bengal and should not be seen as a 
discrete historical episodes (Sobhan, 1993). 
Economic Status 
The economy that the two wings of Pakistan inherited during the partition of 
India was quite frail. Among the two provinces, East Pakistan left most of the sources 
of its economic resources in West Bengal and brought in only the agrarian hinterland 
of Bengal and the tea growing estates of Sylhet and Assam, while West Pakistan 
inherited a better infrastructure of roads and railways, experienced entrepreneurs, 
armed forces personnel and a pool of professionals. Still, East Pakistan superceded the 
West Pakistan in terms of highly fertile agricultural land, higher carrying capacity of 
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the land and a strong rural industrial base like handloom industry from where a good 
amount of cloth for the population of that region were supplied. There was not even 
much difference in the educational attainment of the two regions. In the first decade 
of Pakistani rule most of the policies developed by the centre was within the 
framework of centralization and expediency and economic policy was of no 
difference. While the Bengali economists blamed the economic policy of the central 
government to be accentuating the overall disparity between the Eastern and Western 
province of Pakistan, the economists of West Pakistan emphasized on the weak 
economy that East Bengal attained at the time of partition. The causes of disparity 
between East and West Pakistan is a matter of debate; the relevant document reveals 
that East Pakistan has always lagged behind in every sector of the economy compared 
to West Pakistan. 
In sum, the structural differences that existed between East and West Pakistan 
at the time of birth of Pakistan in terms of physical features, demographic 
characteristics, linguistic heterogeneity, cultural pluralism, economic status, and 
especially the expectations of people, provide the context of the upheaval of 1971 in 
East Pakistan. The people of East Pakistan expected that they would not only rid 
themselves of the exploitation they were used to in United India under the 
dispensation of Hindu Zamidars and Mahajans in Muslim Pakistan, but they would 
also have ample opportunities to fashion their lives in accordance with their cultural 
heritage, to have effective participation in the political systems and to have just and 
equitable share of the national pie as participant citizens. 
For historical reasons the Muslims of Bengal and especially of East Bengal, 
which became East Pakistan in 1947, remained backward both economically and 
educationally. It is Bengal where the British established their domination first and to 
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suit their imperial interests they completely transformed the existing socio-economic 
structure. In the process, the Muslims in general and Muslim aristocracy in particular 
were deprived of all kinds of privileges they were used to as the ruling community 
(Seal 1968: 30). In the eastern parts of Bengal, where the Muslims were the most 
numerous, this was particularly evident. They were conspicuously absent from 
schools and colleges. A new class of landlords was created by the British by the 1793 
Company Act, who were mostly Hindus (Seal 1968: 32- 33). The Muslim culture also 
suffered under the dispensation of the Hindu landlords. That is one of the reasons why 
the Muslims in East Bengal opted for Pakistan. (Ahamed 1980: 63- 64) 
The policy measures adopted by the ruling elite in Pakistan since the very 
beginning, which have been analyzed in Chapter Three and Four, ran however counter 
to their expectations. They had neither any freedom to pursue their own culture nor 
any effective participation in the polity, nor had they equitable share in the growing 
economy. Much of the dynamics of the Six-Point Programme, which intended to 
restructure the political system in Pakistan in the late 1960s for the benefit of the 
people in East Pakistan, can be understood in this context. If the Six-Point Programme 
were accepted by the ruling elite, Pakistan might have continued as a confederal or a 
consociational polity with maximum autonomy to the units. Chapter Four analyzes 
why the Programme was not accepted by them. After the general election of 1970, 
when Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the leader of East Pakistan- based Awami League, 
won the majority of seats in the National Assembly of Pakistan and yet denied the 
opportunity of forming a government at the centre' as the leader of the majority party 
through conspiratorial manoeuvres, legitimacy of the central government was 
grievously eroded and so also the allegiance of the people of East Pakistan. At that 
stage, the Pakistani ruling elite were left with" only coercive measures, the use of 
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which resulted in the break-up of Pakistan and emergence of the independent 
Bangladesh. The people of East Pakistan, having not many chances to be integrated 
with Pakistan during the last 23 years and most of the time taking themselves merely 
as aliens in the polity because of the structural differences, thus became a dynamic 
force in the revolution which they termed as the Liberation War. 
This socio-economic background, which was sharpened by the administrative 
and cultural policies of the ruling elite in Pakistan, discussed in the next chapter, 
alienated the people of East Pakistan from the central government in Pakistan. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Administrative and Cultural Policies of the Ruling Elite in 
Pakistan 
Introduction 
The structural differences that characterized the two wings of Pakistan at its 
birth, as we have noted in Chapter Two, were exacerbated more and more because of 
the pursuit of certain policies by the national elite from the very beginning. The 
administrative and political policies, which were highly centralized, resulted in what 
has been known as the "viceregal system" (Sayeed, 1968, chapter 10). The 
Government of India Act, 1935, under which Pakistan was administered until 1956, 
provided for a strong central government with the provinces totally dependent on it. 
The Constitution of 1956, which supplanted the 1935 Act, perpetuated the essentially 
strong position of the centre. The parliamentary system of government, which was 
adopted in Pakistan in 1947, guaranteed adequate provincial autonomy. The governor 
of East Pakistan was supposed to be a constitutional head, working on the advice of 
the Provincial cabinet. In practice, however, the Provincial governor remained the 
effective head of the Provincial government and as the centre's nominee. He was 
always eager to protect centre's interest in the provinces and worked as an important 
instrument of centralization. The centre could direct the governor to use article 92A of 
the Government of India Act 1935 or article 193 of the Constitution of 1956 and take 
upon himself the entire responsibility of provincial administration and thus impose 
direct central rule on the provinces. Its most blatant use took place in East Pakistan in 
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1954 when the newly elected United Front Government was ousted from office on 
flimsy grounds, though the United Front Government represented more than 90 
percent of the voters of East Pakistan during the 1954 election. The centre could also 
control individual provincial politicians through the Public and Representative 
Officers (Disqualification) Act (PRODA), and its use was extensive. 
The Policies of Administrative and Political Centralization 
The most effective instrument of centralization were such central services as 
the Civil Service of Pakistan, the Central Audit and Accounts Service, the Police 
Service of Pakistan and so on, which accounted for most of the key decision-making 
posts in both the centre and provinces. Ultimate control over, and co-ordination of, 
these functionaries lay with the centre even when they worked in the Provinces. It was 
more like pre-independent India, where the central services constituted the single 
most important stable bond between the centre and the Provinces. The top echelons in 
the military hierarchy monopolized the formulation of defence policies and 
increasingly became directly involved in shaping economic policies from 1958 when 
Martial Law was proclaimed in Pakistan. These military officers i. e. the top layers of 
the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, wielded an influence far disproportionate to 
their numbers (Wilcox, 1965). The Bengali elite, especially the growing "vernacular 
elite" of East Pakistan (Jahan, 1972: 28- 30) was unhappy with the policies of 
political- administrative centralization, for they found that not only were they not 
participants in the strong centre which was developing, but they were not even 
masters of their own house. The demand for full provincial autonomy thus became the 
logical corollary; and it began to be raised from the early 1950s. As the process of 
centralization continued, the demand for autonomy began to be louder and it drew 
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growing public support. It was the autonomy issue that swept the United Front to 
power in 1954 in East Pakistan. The dismissal of the United Front government and the 
continued imposition of Article 92A of the Government of India Act 1935, thus 
ignoring the popular will in East Bengal and instancing the ruling elite's intolerance of 
any political opposition, led to further intensification of the demand for autonomy. 
Hamza Alavi and Angus Maddison expressed the view that the bureaucratic 
elite in Pakistan had been "in effective command of the state power" right from the 
beginning (Alavi, 1973: 152; Maddison, 1971: 136). They functioned with a 
"Parliamentary facade of politicians" in the 1950s. In 1958 they openly seized power 
which they exercised in practice. The dominant position of the bureaucrats in Pakistan 
was due partly to historical reasons and partly to social dynamics. 
The bureaucracy was the chief instrument of control and domination in British 
India, and their control over the structures of government and their monopoly of 
decision-making was a prominent feature of colonial rule. If British control was to be 
maintained, they needed to hold all the key offices and supervise the subordinate 
ones. Since they were a very small group, ruling over a populous country, the small 
group of officials needed to retain ultimate control in their hands, so that the 
supremacy of their final authority could not be challenged. The elite bureaucracy i. e. 
the Indian Civil Service, was organized on these precepts. Its members were 
responsible for filling all executive as well as political and judicial posts at the highest 
level. It was not only the executive branch of government, it also helped formulate 
and direct policy. These bureaucrats always held the key positions in the 
administrative hierarchy and exercised the widest possible discretionary power. In the 
act of governance they were neither responsible to those whom they ruled, nor were 
they responsive to their demands. The members of the Civil Service had always been 
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the key links in the chain of governance because of their superior position and status 
and the whole system was orchestrated in such a fashion that it worked like a 
"machine", a classical bureaucracy (Houghton, 1913: 30). Seeing the coherent 
working of the system by the members of the Indian Civil Service, Lloyd George 
termed the service the "steel frame of the British empire" (Ahamed, 1980: 49- 50). 
The military officers in British India also played a dominant role in the governance of 
India. They strongly supported the "viceregal" system. They were used frequently to 
govern various frontier regions (Ahamed, 1980: 50). 
As a post-colonial state Pakistan inherited this kind of "overdeveloped state 
apparatus and its institutionalized practices" (Alavi, 1973: 147), and the bureaucratic 
elite in Pakistan, which was the lineal descendant of "the colonial bureaucrats" 
inherited the "attitude" and "orientation" of their predecessors. The elitist character of 
the Indian Civil Service, which made it a tightly knit group of officers, recruited at a 
uniform age and exposed to a common training and education, became the ideal of the 
Civil Services of Pakistan. Similarly, the character of the Pakistan military was 
extraordinarily similar to that of the British Indian Army (Tinker, 1962: 156- 60). The 
tone of the military officers was laid down by the Sandhurst, Cranwell and Woolwich 
trained senior officers and they carefully preserved the values and traditions of the 
British Indian Army (Ahamed, 1980: 50). 
The bureaucratic elite in Pakistan inherited the intellectual orientation of the 
Indian Civil Service. They also inherited the orientation of the British Indian Army 
and the apparatus of the colonial bureaucracy. Being recruited and trained in the same 
tradition and working within a similar institutional framework, they were able to 
retain their elitist nature, and became the most dominant social sector in Pakistan. The 
Muslim League, which was largely responsible for mobilizing the people for 
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establishing an independent Pakistan, disintegrated soon after Pakistan came into 
being and a number of rival factions emerged from it within a few years. The 
representative institutions such as the legislature and local government, which were 
set up belatedly and hesitantly during the closing part of the colonial regime did not 
strike deep roots. The political system which was established in Pakistan was more or 
less similar to that which functioned in colonial India -a highly centralized and 
unitary system managed by the bureaucrats. 
Apart from this historical reason, social dynamics also contributed heavily to 
the strong position of the bureaucrats over the structures of government. Most of the 
bureaucratic elite - the top level civil servants and the military officers - who were 
responsible for the formulation of major public policies in Pakistan came from the 
north-western part of India (Braibanti, 1966: 360- 77), and in this part of the 
subcontinent the tradition of bureaucratic domination reached its highest watermark. 
This was due to two reasons. First, this part of India was what had been the non- 
regulation area (Sayeed, 1968: 103), and in the non-regulation area the rule of the 
bureaucrats was personal and paternal. They exercised power with minimum 
interference from the centre or provincial governments. Secondly, there were many 
big landlords in that area and politics was dominated by them. The struggle for power 
was decided most often by factional strife or intrigues rather than by public discussion 
or political bargaining. Such schemings or intrigues provided ample opportunities for 
the bureaucrats, and in effect, power tended to gravitate toward the bureaucratic elite. 
In East Pakistan, the Permanent Settlement of 1793 took away much of the 
discretionary powers of the district officers since it was a regulation area (Sayeed, 
1968: 103). East Pakistan, moreover,,, was not dominated by the landlords, because 
most of them were Hindus, and they migrated to India after partition. This condition 
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explains why the bureaucrats in the region were less dominant. But in Pakistan, there 
were fewer bureaucrats from East Pakistan and practically none in the higher echelon 
(Choudhuri, 1963: 78). Consequently, power tended to gravitate towards the 
politicians in East Pakistan. But since the politicians from East Pakistan championed 
the cause of provincial autonomy, decentralization of power and so on, they were 
looked upon with suspicion, and quite often sidetracked from the policy-making 
structure. 
Imbalance in Bureaucracy in Regional Terms 
There was an imbalance in the bureaucracy in respect of regional 
representation right from the time of partition. This imbalance was not only between 
East and West Pakistan but also between the various regions of West Pakistan. The 
elite cadre of civil servants from Sindh constituted a bare 5 percent of the total 
number, and that from the North-Western Frontier province and Baluchistan was 
merely 7 percent (Ahamed, 1980: 63). East Pakistan's representation in the civil 
services was the poorest. For historical reasons the Muslims in Bengal remained 
backward both economically and educationally. It was in Bengal that the British 
established their domination first and to suit their imperial interests they completely 
transformed the existing socio-economic structure. In the process Muslims in general 
and the Muslim aristocracy in particular were deprived of all kinds of privileges they 
were used to as the ruling community (Seal, 1968: 30). This economic backwardness 
inevitably led to educational backwardness. Only at the beginning of the twentieth 
century did a small middle class began to emerge in Bengal. For all these reasons 
there were few civil servants from East Pakistan. 
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At the time of partition there were only 2 Indian Civil Service (ICS) officers 
from East Pakistan, and up to 1950 only 17 new recruits entered the Civil Service of 
Pakistan (CSP) out of a total of 175 such officers (Ahamed, 1980: 64). To remedy the 
situation and to increase representation of East Pakistan in the services, a quota 
system was introduced in 1950. But it did not produce the intended results and the 
regional imbalance between the two regions continued to grow. 
Table 5.1: East-West representation in Civil Service of Pakistan, 1950-68 
Year Total No. of CSP East Pakistan West Pakistan 
Officers No. % No. % 
1950 11 4 36.4 7 63.6 
1951 17 5 29.4 12 70.6 
1952 13 3 23.0 10 77.0 
1953 25 7 28.0 18 72.0 
1954 17 5 29.4 12 70.6 
1955 21 11 52.4 10 47.6 
1956 20 7 35.0 13 65.0 
1957 24 10 41.7 14 58.3 
1958 25 12 48.0 13 52.0 
1959 30 10 33.3 20 66.7 
1960 28 11 39.2 17 60.8 
1961 27 12 44.5 15 55.5 
1962 28 13 46.5 15 53.5 
1963 31 13 41.9 18 58.1 
1964 33 14 42.2 19 57.8 
1965 30 15 50.0 15 50.0 
1966 30 14 46.7 16 53.3 
1967 20 13 65.0 7 35.0 
1968 20 11 55.0 9 45.0 
Total 450 190 260 
Source: Ahamed, Emajuddin, Bureaucratic, Elites in Segmented Economic Growth: 
Pakistan and Bangladesh. Dhaka, University Press Ltd. 1980. Pp. 65- 66. 
77 
Over the years East Pakistan's representation increased considerably and in the 
period 1950- 1968,42 percent of the new recruits were from East Pakistan, though 
overall representation remained less than 30 percents in the civil services. In the 
Foreign Service, Audit and Accounts Service and Taxation Service, East Pakistan's 
representation during the period was 37.5 percent, 25.5 percent and 38 percent 
respectively (Ahamed, 1980: 64). 
Table 5.2: Secretaries in the Central Secretariat, 1956 
Number East West 
Secretary 19 - 19 
Joint Secretary 41 3 38 
Deputy Secretary 133 10 123 
Under Secretary 548 38 510 
Total 741 51 690 
Source: Ahamed, Emajuddin,. Op. Cit. Pp. 66 
This representation was, however, in the lower echelons and in departments 
which did not influence the vital areas of policy. As late as 1956 there was no 
Secretary from East Pakistan, and there were only three Joint Secretaries, ten Deputy 
Secretaries and 38 Under Secretaries. 
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Table 5.3: East-West Representation in Class 1 Officers in Some 
Divisions, 1968- 1969 
Division 
1968 
East Pakistan West Pakistan 
No. % No. % 
Economic Affairs 
Commerce 
Finance 
Agriculture 
Industries 
Cabinet Division 
Establishment 
Division 
Planning 
Information & 
Broadcasting 
Labour and Social 
Welfare 
Defense 
19 38.0 33 62.0 
10 29.0 27 71.0 
4 13.0 26 87.0 
9 28.0 23 72.0 
3 13.0 21 87.0 
12 32.0 25 68.0 
21 30.0 51 70.0 
5 25.0 15 75.0 
4 28.0 10 72.0 
1969 
East Pakistan West Pakistan 
No. % No. % 
20 44.0 29 59.0 
20 33.0 41 67.0 
12 30.0 30 70.0 
6 17.0 28 83.0 
10 32.0 21 68.0 
4 16.0 22 84.0 
11 30.0 25 70.0 
28 29.0 67 71.0 
6 26.0 17 74.0 
15 33.0 10 67.0 
4 10.0 35 90.0 15 13.0 31 87.0 
Source: Ahamed, Emajuddin, Op. Cit. Pp. 66- 67 
In 1964 there were only two secretaries from East Pakistan and five joint 
secretaries. Even in 1968, there were only two secretaries from East Pakistan and 
eight joint secretaries. But the key posts like those of cabinet division, establishment 
division or economic affairs division, or secretaries of finance, industries, commerce, 
defense, home were never held by East Pakistani officers. Even among the class I 
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officers, East Pakistan's representation was very low; in some divisions it varied from 
10 percent to 13 percent. 
Table 5.4: East Pakistan's Representation in the Armed Forces in 1964. 
The Army Percent 
1. Officers 5.0 
2. Junior Commissioned Ranks 7.4 
3. Other Ranks 7.4 
The Air Force 
1. Officers 16.0 
2. Warrant Officers 17.0 
3. Other Ranks 30.0 
The Naiy 
1. Officers 10.0 
2. Branch Officers 5.0 
3. Chief Petty Officers 10.4 
4. Petty Officers 17.3 
5. Leading Seamen and below 28.8 
Source: Ahamed, Emajuddin, Op. Cit. Pp. 69 
Like the civil servants, all the top ranking military officers were from West 
Pakistan. This was also due to historical reasons. The British deliberately excluded 
certain groups and races of the northern and eastern parts of India from the British 
Indian Army since the "Mutiny of 1857" (Ahamed, 1980: 67). Recruitment to the 
British Indian Army was largely confined to the north-western part of India from the 
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so-called "Martial Races" (Cohen 32- 36). The Simon Commission pointed out that 
"those races which furnish the best sepoys are emphatically not those which exhibit 
the greatest accomplishment of mind in an examination", yet they provided the bulk 
of recruit to the Indian Army (The Indian Statutory Commission, 1930). 
During the Second World War a considerable number of persons were 
recruited from the non-martial races. They fought so well in the war that the myth 
concerning the martial race theory was exploded, and after the war, they were well 
represented in the Indian Army. In Pakistan, however, the myth continued. The bulk 
of the armed forces had been drawn from West Pakistan, particularly from four 
districts of northern Punjab and two districts of the North Western Frontier Province. 
On the whole East Pakistan's representation did not exceed 10 to I1 percent in the 
officer ranks and other ranks (Table 5.4). Thus the bureaucratic elite in Pakistan was 
an exclusive group in regional terms. 
The policies of administrative and political centralization, which had been 
pursued in Pakistan since the beginning, demonstrated in sharp relief the domination 
of West Pakistan over East Pakistan through the domineering roles of the West 
Pakistan- based bureaucratic elite. In the first decade following independence, Bengali 
participation in the national power elite was limited indeed, but the parity among the 
political elite had a sort of balancing effect. After the military take over in 1958 it was 
lost totally, because the military rule was in effect a rule of the bureaucratic elite i. e. 
the top level civil servants and the military officers in partnership, where East 
Pakistan's representation was the lowest. 
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Table 5.5: Central political elite in Pakistan 1947- 1958 
East West 
Heads of State 22 
Prime Ministers 34 
Ministers including State and Deputy Ministers 27 27 
Members of Constitutional and National Assembly 84 75 
Source: Jahan, Rounaq; Pakistan: Failure in National Integration. 
Dhaka, University Press Ltd. 1973, pp. 25. 
Of the bureaucratic elite, who were responsible for the formulation of 
development strategy and policy in Pakistan from 1958, only a few members were 
from East Pakistan. The two generals who were the Chief Martial Law Administrators 
and Presidents of Pakistan from 1958 to 1970 were West Pakistanis. Of the nine 
governors during the period, seven were top ranking bureaucrats, and six of them 
were from West Pakistan. Of the seventeen ministers, who were in charge of the 
Ministries of Finance, Industries, Food and Agriculture, Economic Affairs and 
Commerce, eleven were West Pakistani. Of them, ten were bureaucrats and eight 
were from West Pakistan. Of the forty one secretaries and joint secretaries who were 
in charge of the key divisions in the Central Secretariat from 1961 to 1969, there were 
only three secretaries and four joint secretaries from East Pakistan. More than 80 
percent of those who held the posts of chairman or managing directors in the key 
corporations were West Pakistanis. In other words, the people of East Pakistan were 
greatly alienated because of the policies of administrative and political centralization. 
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The Policy of Cultural Assimilation 
While the policies of administrative and political centralization first prompted 
the Bengalis to raise the issue of provincial autonomy, the cultural policy of 
assimilation provided a wider emotional appeal to the demand for autonomy and 
helped develop a linguistic nationalism among the different classes in Bangladesh. It 
was believed by the national elite that the two wings could be held together only if 
there were one language and one culture between them. This idea was projected 
boldly by the first Governor General of Pakistan Mohammad Ali Jinnah in his speech 
in Dhaka in 1948. He said: 
Let me make it clear to you that the State Language of 
Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other language. 
Anyone who tries to mislead you is really the enemy of 
Pakistan. Without one State Language no nation can remain 
tied up solidly together and function (Ahmad, 1960: 490). 
While answering a question in regard to an amendment to the National 
Assembly rules, allowing Bengali to be used in the house along with Urdu and 
English, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan said in the same vein: 
Pakistan is a Muslim state and it must have as its lingua 
franca the language of the Muslims. ... (The mover) should 
realize that Pakistan has been created because of the 
demand of a hundred million Muslims in the subcontinent 
and the language of a hundred million Muslims is Urdu... 
It is necessary for a nation to have one language which can 
only be Urdu and no other language. (Constitutional 
Assembly Debates, 25 February 1948. ) 
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This policy of linguistic and cultural assimilation in a heterogeneous society of 
Pakistan, having diverse ethnic and regional groups proved counterproductive. The 
people of East Pakistan opposed it tooth and nail as they took it as West Pakistan's 
clever ploy to keep them subjugated for ever not only politically and administratively, 
but also educationally and culturally. This is the reason why the first Basic Principles 
Committee Report (BPC), which came out in 1950, was rejected by all sections of 
people of East Pakistan as it recommended Urdu as the only state language in 
Pakistan. The move was opposed not only by the students, intelligentsia and different 
professional groups, but also by all the political parties of East Pakistan. Even the 
party in power of East Pakistan, the Muslim League, adopted a unanimous resolution 
urging recognition of Bengali as one of the state languages. 
The central government however persisted in its effort until 1956 when the 
Constitution of 1956 recognized both Urdu and Bengali as state languages and that 
too after a lot of bickering among the leaders of the two wings of Pakistan. The 
centre's cultural policy thus drove a wedge between the two wings instead of uniting 
them. The language movement, which began surfacing quite early in East Pakistan, 
was crucial to the development of the vernacular elite (Jahan, 1973: 42- 43). It helped 
foster a kind of linguistic nationalism in East Pakistan and set the pattern for a 
'student-literati-professional alliance' which was used adroitly in all subsequent 
movements. It provided the vernacular elite with a popular issue under the banner of 
which all Bengalis could meet, and in fact that helped them bridge the elite-mass gap 
on this popular issue. 
The language movement got off the ground quite early, in February 1948. The 
students and some teachers at Dhaka University, analyzing the various dimensions of 
this issue, made the people conscious of the importance of language and began 
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demanding that Bengali, which was the language of about 54 percent of the people of 
Pakistan, should be accepted as one of the state languages. The students, who were 
the main spokesmen of the vernacular elite, were mobilized in this popular cause. The 
movement reached a penultimate stage in 1952, especially on 21 February, when in a 
massive demonstration in deliberate violation of the government ban in Dhaka, a few 
students lost their lives because the police fired on them. The events of 21 February 
1952 left a profound imprint on East Pakistan's political development. The language 
movement in fact created new myths, new symbols and new slogans which 
strengthened further the emerging vernacular elite. It gave them not only a common 
cause but also their first martyrs. A whole literary and cultural tradition grew out of 
the events of 21 February 1952. Every year the day began to be observed with 
solemnity as a memorial day and the martyrs were remembered with veneration. In 
1999,21 February was recognized by the 188-nation United Nations Educational 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as the Universal Mother Language 
Day 
In sum, the policies of administrative and political centralization and the 
assimilationist cultural policy, which were pursued in Pakistan by the ruling elite, not 
only alienated the people of East Pakistan from the overarching framework of 
Pakistan but also made them conscious of their separate identity is a people. The rule 
of the bureaucratic elite, which was mainly based on West Pakistan, always reminded 
them that they were not equal partners and participants in the affairs of the state. The 
language movement and the events of 21 February 1952, on the other hand, helped 
foster in them a sense of identity which they never experienced before. These, above 
everything else, generated in the minds of the vernacular elite in East Pakistan the 
kind of hope and aspirations, which began to be expressed first of all in the form of 
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provincial autonomy and finally in the Six-Point Programme formulated in 1966 by 
the Awami League. 
The alienation of the people of East Pakistan, which was due mostly to the 
administrative and cultural policies of the ruling elite in Pakistan, deepened further by 
their economic policies pursued right from the early 1950's. This has been analyzed in 
the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Economic Policies of the Ruling Elite in Pakistan 
Introduction 
While the administrative policy of centralization and the cultural policy of 
assimilation added an emotional appeal to the demand for autonomy and helped 
develop a linguistic nationalism among the various classes in East Pakistan, the 
economic policies, which directly affected the emerging middle classes, led to the 
wholesale alienation of the Bengalis. They began to attack the economic policies for 
the perpetuation and widening of economic disparity between East and West Pakistan. 
As we have discussed, the two regions of Pakistan were dissimilar in many 
respects, but they were similar in that both were industrially underdeveloped and had 
been the producers of agricultural raw materials. East Pakistan produced 85 percent of 
the world's best quality jute and West Pakistan produced a considerable amount of 
good quality cotton. At independence the industrial bases of the two regions were 
almost of the same size (Papanek, 1964: 48). In terms of industrial development, there 
was very little difference between the two, although in such products as textiles and 
tea, East Pakistan was ahead, while West Pakistan had an advantage in sugar and 
metals (Sobhan, 1962: 31- 37). In irrigation facilities, however West Pakistan had a 
greater advantage, though banking activities were slightly greater in East Pakistan 
(Ahamed, 1980: 118- 119). In the aggregate there was very little difference in the 
level of development. Per capita income was, of course, slightly higher in West 
Pakistan. 
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Economic Disparity Between the Two Wings 
The small gap that existed between the two regions widened very rapidly over 
the years and in the 1960s it took on critical proportions. The Gross Regional 
Products (GRP) in East Pakistan grew from Rs. 12,360 million in 1949/50 to Rs. 
14,945 million in 1959/60 and to Rs. 23,119 million in 1969/70. The average annual 
growth rate was 0.2 percent in the first decade and 5.4 percent in the second decade. 
Compared to this, the total GRP of West Pakistan was Rs. 12,106 million in 1949/50, 
Rs. 16,494 million in 1959/60 and Rs. 31,157 million in 1969/70 - the average annual 
growth rate in West Pakistan being 3.6 percent in the first decade and 7.2 percent in 
the second decade. (Table 6.1) 
Table 6.1: GRP of East & West Pakistan at 1959/60 Constant Factor Cost (Rs. 
Million) 
1949/50 1959/60 1969/70 
East Pakistan 12,360 14,945 23119 
West Pakistan 12,106 16,494 31,157 
Source: The Third Five Year Plan 1965-70, op cit., p. 11; Government of Pakistan, Planning 
Commission, Reports of the Advisory Panels for the Fourth Five Year Plan 1970- 75 
(Islamabad: July 1970) I, p. 134. 
The rate of growth was reflected in per capita income in the two regions. The 
per capita income in West Pakistan increased from Rs. 338 in 1949/50 to Rs. 367 in 
1959/60 and Rs. 533 in 1969/70; whereas in East Pakistan per capita income declined 
from Rs. 287 in 1949/50 to Rs. 277 in 1959/60 and rose to Rs. 331 in 1969/70 (Table 
6.2). 
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Table 6.2: Per Capita Income in East and West Pakistan, 1959/60 Prices (Rs. ) 
1949/50 1959/60 1969/70 
East Pakistan 287 277 331 
West Pakistan 338 367 533 
Source: Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, The Third Five Year Plan 1965- 70 
(Karachi: 1965), p. 11; Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, Reports of 
the Advisory Panels for the Fourth Five Year Plan 1970- 75 (Islamabad, July: 1970) 
Vol. I, p. 134. 
The rate of growth was the outcome of the inter-regional disparity in per 
capita output and the level of disparity went on increasing rapidly since independence 
In 1949/50 the disparity was 19 percent but in 1959/60 it rose to 32 percent and in 
1969/70 to 61 percent (Table 6.3), indicating a highly differential rate of development 
in the two regions. 
Table 6.3: Rate of Interregional Per Capita Disparity in GRP at 1959/60 Prices 
Per capita gross Per capita gross East-West disparity 
regional product of regional product of ratio (per cent) 
East Pakistan West Pakistan 
1949/50 Rs. 287 Rs. 345 1.19 
1959/60 Rs. 269 Rs. 355 1.32 
1969/70 Rs. 314 Rs. 504 1.61 
Source: Reports of the Advisory Panels for the Fourth Five Year Plan 1970- 75 op. Cit., pp. 
22,136. 
The disparity was, however, an underestimate for two reasons. First, the 
estimate of output or value-added in some sectors was on the high side for East 
Pakistan and low side for West Pakistan (Ahamed, 1980: 119). Secondly, these 
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comparisons did not allow for inter-wing price differences for the same commodities 
and, in reality, the purchasing power of the rupee was lower in East Pakistan. The cost 
of living in East Pakistan was 5 percent to 7 percent higher on an average from 
1959/60 to 1966/69. 
These differential rates of growth of the two regions were primarily due to 
different rates of industrialization. In East Pakistan the industrial sector accounted for 
9.4 percent of regional output in 1949/50 and it rose to about 20 percent in 1969/70, 
but in West Pakistan the industrial sector came to account for almost a third of the 
regional output in 1969/70, though in 1949/50 it represented only 14.7 percent 
(Griffin & Khan, 1972: 4). If the share of industrial employment in the total labour 
force is used as an index, the level of industrialization in East Pakistan was much 
lower and, in fact, it failed to industrialize in the period 1951- 61, because the 
percentage of the labour force employed in agriculture increased from 84.7 percent to 
85.3 percent, while in West Pakistan it declined from 65.3 percent to 59.3 percent and 
it came down to 53.4 percent in 1966/67 (Griffin & Khan, 1972: 4). This, more than 
anything else, reflects the relative shift and direction of structural change in the 
economy. 
The principal reason for the unequal rates of growth in the two regions was the 
incomparable shares of investment and the various policies the Government of 
Pakistan had been following since 1948. East Pakistan's share of investment varied 
from 21 percent to 26 percent in the 1950s and from 32 percent to 36 percent in the 
1960s; but by far the largest share of both revenue expenditure and development 
outlay went to West Pakistan (Table 6.4) 
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Table 6.4: Revenue and Development Expenditure in East & West Pakistan (Rs 
crores) 
Period Revenue Development Outside Total Development 
Expenditure plan plan expenditure 
expenditure expenditure as percentage 
of all 
Pakistan total 
East Pakistan 
1950/51- 171 100 - 271 20 
1954/55 
1955/56- 254 270 - 524 - 
1959/60 
1960/61- 434 925 45 1,404 3 
1964/65 
1965/66- 648 1,656 - 2,141 36 
1969/70 
West Pakistan 
1950/51- 720 400 - 1,129 80 
1954/55 
1955/56- 898 757 - 1,655 74 
1959/60 
1960/61- 1,284 1,840 211 3,355 68 
1964/65 
1965/66- 2,223 2,610 360 5,195 64 
1969/70 
Source: Adapted from Reports of the Advisory Panels for the Fourth Five year plan 1970-75 
op. cit., p. 25. 
, 
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East Pakistan's share out of the total investment of Rs. 1160 crores (11600 
million) in the First Five Year Plan was 254 crores (2540 million) as against 898 
crores (8980 million) in West Pakistan. In the Second Five Year Plan East Pakistan's 
share in plan allocation was 47 percent and 30 percent in the public and private 
sectors respectively. In actual implementation, the share of East Pakistan was 32 
percent of the total public and private expenditure. During the Third Plan Period East 
Pakistan's share was 36 percent. 
The disparity in development and revenue expenditure can be fully 
appreciated if they are considered on a per capita basis. In the pre-plan period (1947- 
1955) the per capita development and revenue expenditure on average were Rs. 22.08 
and Rs. 37.75 respectively in East Pakistan as against Rs. 108.03 and Rs. 201.94 
respectively in West Pakistan (Table 6.5) 
Table 6.5: Per Capita Revenue and Development Expenditure in East and Vest 
Pakistan 1950-70 
Year Revenue Development Average Per capita 
Expenditure expenditure population estimate (Rs. ) 
(crores) (crores) (M) 
Dev. Dev. 
East Pakistan 
1950/51-1954/55 171 100 45.3 22.08 37.75 
1955/56-1959/60 254 270 52.0 51.92 48.86 
1960/61-1964/65 434 970 59.4 163.30 73.06 
1965/66-1969/70 648 1,656 69.0 240.0 70.29 
West Pakistan 
1950/51-1954/55 729 400 36.1 108.03 201.94 
1955/56-1959/60 898 757 42.3 178.96 212.26 
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Year Revenue Development Average Per capita 
Expenditure expenditure population estimate (Rs. ) 
(crores) (crores) (M) 
Dev. Dev. 
1960/61-1964/65 1,284 2,071 49.1 421.79 261.51 
1965/66-1969/70 2,223 2,970 57.0 521.05 390.35 
Source: As in table 6.4. 
A similar policy was followed in respect of the allocation of foreign aid and 
loans. During the period 1947/48 - 1959/60 East Pakistan received only Rs. 93.89 
crores out of a total foreign development aid of Rs. 542.14 crores and Rs. 129 crores 
out of total US commodity aid of Rs. 409 crores. These represented only 17 percent 
and 30 percent respectively, and the rest were allocated to West Pakistan 
(Government of East Pakistan, Planning Department, Economic Disparity between 
East and West Pakistan, 1961: 21). The Government of Pakistan received Rs. 7,003 
million as economic assistance both in grant and loans till December 1970 (Ahamed, 
1980: 123) and East Pakistan's share in the net foreign resources was about 25 percent 
during the Second Plan Period and about 30 percent during the Third Plan Period. 
Disparity in the allocation of resources, both domestic and foreign, in the two 
regions was the inevitable result of the development strategy. An entrepreneurial 
approach based on a one-economy policy was the basic feature of the development 
strategy in Pakistan and the bureaucratic elite defended it on the grounds of efficiency 
and productivity. West Pakistan had a larger stock of social and economic overheads 
in the form of power, transportation and communication facilities and higher ratio of 
natural resources with a relatively lesser density of population. The West Pakistani 
railway system was more developed and less affected by the partition in 1947. The 
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port of Karachi was more developed. Most of the refugee industrialists, moreover, 
settled in West Pakistan and thus there was a larger pool of private enterprise as well 
as greater managerial and technical ability in West Pakistan. In East Pakistan 
communication and transport facilities were poor. Chittagong Port was yet to be 
developed. There were fewer entrepreneurs. The adoption of the one-economy policy 
based on an entrepreneurial approach, however, accelerated the rate of economic 
disparity. 
In 1947 the two regions were almost at the same level of industrial 
development. Following independence one factor was crucial in helping West 
Pakistan widen its initial gain. The capital city of Pakistan was located (and then 
expensively relocated) in West Pakistan. In view of the wide control the government 
exercised over the economic life of the country, particularly industrial enterprises, 
exchange control, import regulation, allocation of resources and so on (Rahman, 
1968: 16) West Pakistan gained immensely. West Pakistan not only hosted the central 
government, but also held nearly 100 percent of its key positions. 
The allocative bias in favour of West Pakistan, concentrating nearly 75 percent 
of the total expenditure in a region where only 46 percent of total population lived, 
generated not only income and employment, but also created a favourable condition 
for private investment. Apart from maintaining more than a quarter of a million armed 
forces personnel, largely recruited in the West and stationed there, running defense 
industries and maintaining an efficient communication system for defense and hosting 
almost 100 percent of the relatively wealthy diplomats and their families, West 
Pakistan was in more comfortable position and all these were helpful for building the 
market for industrial products in the West and , 
in providing capital for private 
investment (Rahman, 1968: 16). East Pakistan's low starting point, lack of private 
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entrepreneurs in industry, low level of infrastructure demanded a sustained effort on 
the part of the government to create conditions for private investment; the policy 
measures of the bureaucratic elite were however different. They worked as sanctions 
against East Pakistan's industrialization. 
The financial institutions in Pakistan followed a kind of discriminatory attitude 
to East Pakistan. The Industrial Development Bank (IDBP) distributed Rs. 2,044 
million as loans for industrial development from 1961/62 to 1969/70, and East 
Pakistan received only Rs. 990.8 million. The Pakistan Industrial Credit and 
Investment Corporation (PICIC) disbursed Rs. 2,521,93 million as loans to investors, 
but East Pakistan investors received only Rs. 821.28 (32.28%) only during 1957/58 to 
1968/69. For all these private sector in East Pakistan could not be a thriving sector. 
Apart from the disproportionate expenditure and differential growth of the 
private sectors in the two regions, disparity increased because of the government's 
agricultural policy, particularly in the first decade. The Government of Pakistan 
adopted a policy of industrialization through the private sector and to make 
industrialization a success, fiscal and monetary policies were geared to extract 
adequately the surplus from agriculture and then to re-channel it to industrial sector. It 
was estimated that over 15 percent of the value of gross agricultural output was 
extracted and re-directed to industry and manufacturing and its burden on the farmers 
was over 10 percent of their income. East Pakistan was severely affected by the 
policy, because East Pakistan accounted for; a larger share of export than West 
Pakistan (Table 6.6) and a greater proportion of agricultural goods in total exports. 
The transfer of surplus from agriculture to industry was in effect a transfer of the 
agricultural surplus of East Pakistan to the industries of West Pakistan, because 
import licenses were distributed to West Pakistani manufacturers and traders against 
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East Pakistan's foreign exchange earnings. The process continued throughout the 
1950s. When, in the 1960s the government began to subsidize agriculture, most of the 
benefit went to the landlords and rich farmers, 90 percent of whom were from West 
Pakistan 
Furthermore, through a surplus in international trade and a deficit in inter- 
wing trade, a sizable amount of East Pakistan's foreign exchange earnings was 
diverted to the West wing. Exports from East Pakistan earned the bulk of Pakistan's 
foreign exchange. At the same time the major share of imports was destined for West 
Pakistan. In terms of regional commodity trade East Pakistan had a continued deficit 
in its current account which until 1957 was less than its surplus on its foreign trade 
account, thus indicating a net transfer of resources to West Pakistan (Stern, 1970: 14; 
Rahman, 1968: 11- 15). Added to this was East Pakistan's share in foreign aid which 
was mostly utilized in West Pakistan. Haq estimated that such transfer amounted to 
Rs. 210 million per year from 1950 to 1955 and perhaps Rs. 100 million a year from 
1956 to 1960 (Haq, 1963: 100). The Advisory Panels of economists showed that the 
net transfer amounted to Rs. 31,120 million at the rate of Rs. 1,556 million a year 
(Reports of the Advisory Panels for the Fourth Year Plan 1970- 75, Vol. I, pp. 84-86). 
In other words, West Pakistan grew at the expense of East Pakistan. 
This did not mean, however, that all classes of people in East Pakistan became 
impoverished; rather that the incomes of the upper classes in East Pakistan increased. 
The rate of their gains accelerated when the government decided to strengthen the 
commercial and industrial class in East Pakistan and increased public sector 
expenditure in the 1960s. This created an awareness among the Bengali elite and 
raised their expectations and they became more anxious for effective participation in 
the system. When they felt that the system created by the bureaucratic elite had denied 
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them opportunities for participation, they became determined to bring about a 
structural change in the system. The Six-Point Programme, which was a reaction of, 
and a challenge to, the policy measures of the bureaucratic elite, can be properly 
understood only in this context. 
The Impact of the Economic Policies: Growth of the Six-Point 
Programme 
The Six-Point Programme was a significant political-economic document. 
Politically it sought to re-structure the system in a manner which would ensure 
effective participation of the Bengali elite in the polity; economically, it was designed 
to put East Pakistani resource-management at the disposal of the Bengali elite. 
Militarily, it strove to make East Pakistan self-sufficient. The Bengali political leaders 
felt that the parliamentary system in a federal structure might increase their 
participation at the decision-making levels and the Six-Point Programme called for 
the establishment of a federal and parliamentary government in which the election to 
the federal legislature and legislatures of the federating units would be direct and on 
the basis of universal adult franchise (Rahman, 1966). 
While the political system did not provide room for the effective participation 
of the Bengali elite, Bengali economists and bureaucrats pointed out that economic 
development could be accelerated by altering the development strategy and policies. 
Bengali economists and bureaucrats showed that East Pakistan lagged because of the 
strategy and policies pursued by the ruling elite. They suggested that there should be 
two economic strategies for the two regions. East and West Pakistan started from 
almost the same base, but after independence the rate of industrial growth in West 
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Pakistan outpaced that in East Pakistan. The main reason was that the foreign 
exchange earned by the East Pakistani farmers was utilized for the industrialization of 
West Pakistan. They also showed that though East Pakistan's share in foreign 
exchange earnings was declining from 70 percent in the 1950s, yet it was more than 
West Pakistan's share in the 1960s. Even in 1966 it was 56 percent of the total foreign 
exchange earnings. 
Table 6.6: Export Earnings of East and West Pakistan (Million Rs. ) 
Year East Pakistan West Pakistan East Pakistan's share in total 
earnings (%) 
1960/61 1,259 540 70 
1961/62 1,301 543 70 
1962/63 1,249 998 55 
1963/64 1,224 1,070 54 
1964/65 1,268 1,140 53 
1965/66 1,514 1,204 55 
1966/67 1,660 1,325 56 
Source: Emajuddin Ahamed, op. cit., page 128. 
East Pakistan's industrial backwardness forced the Bengalis to buy goods and 
services from West Pakistan, and in order to do that, they had to surrender East 
Pakistan's foreign exchange earnings. Moreover, since West Pakistan's industries were 
operating behind the protective walls, Bengalis had to buy West Pakistani goods at 
higher prices. Thus, the development strategy the ruling elite had pursued, the Bengali 
economists and bureaucrats pointed out, was responsible for the regional disparity. 
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The ruling elite of Pakistan favoured West Pakistan by issuing more licenses and 
permits for the establishment of new industries there, making larger allocations and 
sanctioning more loans and grants both from its own resources as well from foreign 
aid. The quantum of foreign aid was moreover increasing. In 1952 Pakistan received a 
paltry amount of 8 million dollar as foreign aid, but in 1970 it rose to 7.03 billion 
dollar (Pakistan Economic Survey, 1970-71). Bengali economists and bureaucrats not 
only pointed out the reasons for regional disparity, but also suggested remedies 
"There must clearly be an accelerated growth in East Pakistan as compared with 
West; in other words, West Pakistan's economy, although it undoubtedly will still 
continue to grow, will grow at a slower pace than that of East Pakistan" (Report of the 
Five Members of the Finance Commission, 1963: 11- 12). The Advisory Panels of 
Economists also noted: "The administrative efforts for plan implementation was 
basically limited by the absence of East Pakistani at the top level executive positions 
both in central and provincial governments" (Report of the Five Members of the 
Fourth Five Year Plan, 1970-75: 27). 
Table 6.7: Income per Worker Employed in Agriculture (Rs. in 1959/60 constant 
prices) 
1951/52 1955/56 1959/60 1961/62 1964/65 1966/67 1967/68 
E. Pakistan 714 724 688 652 630 585 620 
W. Pakistan 903 990 971 891 911 892 881 
Source: As in Table 6.6. 
The Six-Point Programme was thus a product of an air of optimism, lt 
reflected a spirit of self-confidence. The Bengali elite felt that they could participate 
in the decision-making process only if the parliamentary system in a real federal 
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structure were re-instituted, and that was the first point of the Programme. The second 
point of the programme demanded that the federal government deal with only two 
subjects- defence and foreign affairs- and all other subjects "rest in the federating 
states" (Rahman, 1966). Point three suggested that there be either two separate but 
freely convertible currencies for the two wings or one currency for the whole country, 
provided that effective steps were built in the system to stop the flight of capital from 
East Pakistan to West Pakistan. An arrangement should be in place for a separate 
banking reserve and a separate fiscal and monetary policy for East Pakistan. The 
objectives were obvious; West Pakistan must not grow at the expense of East Pakistan 
and the Bengali elite should have the resources of East Pakistan at their disposal. The 
fourth point denied the central government the right of taxation which was to be 
vested in the hands of the federating units with the centre receiving a fixed share. In 
the fifth point of the Programme some specific arrangements were suggested in 
respect of foreign trade and foreign exchange earnings. There should be two separate 
accounts for the foreign exchange earnings of the two wings. The earnings of East 
Pakistan should be under the control of the East Pakistan Government. The foreign 
exchange requirements of the federal government would be met by the two wings 
either equally or in a ratio to be fixed. The indigenous products should be allowed to 
move free of duty between the two wings. The constitutional provisions should be 
made to empower the regional governments to establish trade and commercial 
relations with, set up trade missions in, and enter into agreement with, foreign 
countries. The sixth point demanded the establishment of a militia or a paramilitary 
force for East Pakistan. 
In Pakistan, expenditure on armed forces had always been very high. In 
1948/49,71.5 percent of the budgeted expenditure was allocated to the armed forces. 
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It came down considerably over the years, but still a staggering figure was 
apportioned to the defense services. In 1957/58 it was 56 percent of the budgeted 
amount and in 1968/69 it remained 43 percent (Ahamed, 1979: 44- 45). The defense 
services however were always an exclusive preserve of West Pakistan; East Pakistan 
had neither any control over it nor any stake in its continuance in that form. The 1965 
Indo-Pakistan war made it absolutely clear to the Bengalis that Pakistan defense 
forces were entirely for West Pakistan. During the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, East 
Pakistan remained entirely defenseless and the Pakistani armed forces were deployed 
for the defense of West Pakistan. East Pakistan was safe only because India did not 
invade it. In this context Bengali elite's demand for having control over the 
composition of the Pakistan defense forces is quite understandable. 
The Six-Point Programme, thus designed in 1966, differed radically from the 
autonomy demands of the 1950s in that it specially denied the central government the 
right of taxation, advocated that the regional governments have the right to establish 
separate trade and commercial relations with foreign countries and keep separate 
accounts of their foreign exchange earnings, and suggested that the units have their 
own military or paramilitary forces. For all practical purposes, a confederal rather 
than a federal form of government was built into the Six-Point programme; it was, in 
fact, a reaction against, and a challenge to, the policy measures of the ruling elite in 
Pakistan. These policies made the West Pakistani businessmen-industrialists 
fabulously rich. The landlords and rich 'Kulaks' became richer by their agricultural 
policies. The developmental activities, which were mostly concentrated in the urban 
areas, benefited the urban-centred professional of West Pakistan. The Bengali counter 
elite, which grew up in reaction to these policy measures as a counter-elite, was keen 
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to have control of the resources of East Pakistan so that they might also repeat the 
process of economic growth in East Pakistan. 
The Six-Point Programme was supported enthusiastically by different social 
groups in East Pakistan. It had a great appeal to the petty bourgeois and the rising 
businessmen and industrialists, because it meant the elimination of competition from 
the West Pakistani big business houses. It attracted the urban salaried employees in 
East Pakistan because in it they saw an opening to further prospects. Bengali 
bureaucrats supported it enthusiastically because they found in it the key to their 
independence from centre's fiscal and administrative control and their promotion to 
the decision-making structure. The army officers favoured the Programme because it 
meant an unlimited scope for their promotion and consolidation of their position in 
East Pakistan. Though not explicitly, yet by implication of responses of the 
respondents the researcher got this impression. These elite groups were the main 
constituencies of the Awami League, which was in fact the most representative 
political party in East Pakistan. These elite groups, in essence, constituted the linchpin 
of the politically relevant strata of the society. the workers however lent their support 
to the programme not because it promised an opportunity for higher wages but 
because their lower wages, coupled with the fact that many of the industrial 
establishments in East Pakistan belonged to the West Pakistanis, led to an admixture 
of class, regional and ethnic conflicts. The rural farmers were looking for a change 
and the Six-Point Programme was the symbol of a big change to them (Ahamed, 
1979: 45- 46). 
The autonomy movement based on the Six-Point Programme gathered 
momentum and for about six months after its formulation the urban centres of East 
Pakistan were in the grip of "a popular revolt". It became highly radicalized and in the 
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words of Herbert Feldman, "If an election had been held in July of that year, Mujibur 
Rahman's party, The Awami League, would have swept the province on the Six-Point 
issue" (Feldman, 1972: 18). The election ultimately took place in 1970 and the 
Awami League won a sweeping victory on the basis of Six-Point Programme by 
securing 160 of 162 allotted seats in the National Assembly of Pakistan in the 300- 
seat house. 
This landslide victory of Awami League, which was the first ever victory of 
the Bengali elite since independence in 1947, brought them almost to the threshold of 
power in Pakistan, and not without reason they were determined to exercise this 
power within the framework of the Six-Point Programme. Much to the dismay of 
Bengali elite, however, conspiratorial moves were afoot mainly to deprive them of the 
opportunities to take control of the central government. In that conspiracy, the West 
Pakistani generals seemed to have a role and that became obvious at the final stage of 
negotiation in 1971. The Bengali political leaders, despite their victory in the general 
election of 1970, were deprived of the opportunity of forming the government at the 
centre. They took it as a conspiracy, pure and simple. Since the West Pakistani 
generals were primarily concerned with the defense and defense forces in Pakistan, 
they thought that the unit's power of taxation, control of currency, foreign exchange 
earnings, foreign trade would mean an end to Pakistan's defense forces in that format. 
Thus threatened, they denounced the Six-Point Programme as secessionist, 
condemned the Awami League leaders as traitors and took a strong position against 
handing over power to the elected representatives of East Pakistan. The Bengali 
military officers, who had been living with them as junior partners in the various 
cantonments, came to know of their designs much earlier than even the political 
leaders, and began to think of counter-measures for thwarting them. Thus when on 25 
104 
March 1971 the negotiation failed as it was destined to fail, and when the Pakistani 
generals' move to overwhelm the Bengali political leaders through brute force began, 
the Bengali military officers felt impelled to revolt and dissociate themselves from the 
Pakistani military. The reign of terror, which was let loose since 25 March, motivated 
them to take immediate step. 
As the researcher has noted, the process of alienation of the Bengalis from the 
Pakistani political system began since the beginning of early 1950's, and was 
exacerbated during the later years mainly because of the pursuance of certain policies. 
The Six-Point formula was the outcome of, and reaction to, these policy measures. 
Through use of this programme, the Bengalis wanted to make structural changes in 
the Pakistani polity so that they might achieve a measure of fairness. The election of 
1970, the first ever general election held in Pakistan on the basis of universal adult 
franchise, worked as a veritable catalyst to sharpen the east-west confrontation. The 
Awami League, representing the emerging middle classes in East Pakistan, took the 
election as a referendum on the Six-Point formula. The election-results were better 
than they expected, winning an absolute majority in the National Assembly (167 out 
of 313 seats) and receiving all but two of the 162 seats from East Pakistan. 
With an absolute majority in the National Assembly, the Awami League 
expected to come to power, and it was busy working out details of a draft constitution 
after the election. Mujib himself, as mentioned earlier, played up to his image as the 
leader of the majority party in Pakistan. He interpreted the election results a de facto 
transfer of power to the party, as is the practice in a parliamentary democracy. 
President Yahya Khan summoned the National Assembly in session to frame the 
constitution which might facilitate the transfer of power. When everything was 
proceeding peacefully and looking normal, the sudden announcement of the 
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postponement of the session of the National Assembly on 1 March 1971, citing 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's unwillingness to participate in the Assembly as the primary 
cause for the postponement, was critical. This announcement sparked spontaneous 
rebellious demonstrations in East Pakistan. To the politically conscious people in East 
Pakistan, especially to the students, workers, literati and professionals, the Six-Point 
formula unwittingly became transformed into a one-point formula i. e. the 
independence of East Pakistan. Sheikh Mujib came under tremendous pressure from 
the leaders of all political parties including his own to declare independence. On 7 
March 1971 Sheikh Mujib addressed a mammoth public meeting of about one million 
people in Dhaka, spoke as a national leader, whipped up their expectations but did 
not declare the independence of Bangladesh. He said that "the struggle of this time is 
a struggle for liberation" and pleaded for the transfer of power to the elected 
representatives in the strongest possible terms. Simultaneously, the Awami League 
launched a non-cooperation movement, which put Sheikh Mujib in complete control 
of East Pakistan. 
The whole of the East Pakistani administration, even the Bengalis serving in 
central government agencies and in the civil branches of armed forces, complied with 
Sheikh Mujib's call for non-cooperation. Faced with Mujib's de facto assumption of 
power, President Yahya Khan came to Dhaka on 15 March seemingly to work out a 
political settlement of the crisis. The minority leaders of West Pakistan also came to 
Dhaka along with ZA Bhutto, whose party (PPP) won majority of the seats of 
National Assembly in West Pakistan. The negotiations continued between the West 
Pakistani leaders and those of the Awami League for nine long days, but to no avail. 
On 23 March 1971 the Awami League leaders presented a draft proclamation, which 
in effect, was supposed to grant East Pakistan autonomy on the basis of the Six-Point 
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Programme. On 25 March, while the Awami League leaders were still hoping to hear 
the proclamation from the President of Pakistan, President Yahya Khan, without 
formally breaking the talks, launched a policy of military solution to the crisis. Thus, 
after 25 March 1971, when both the identitive and utilitarian powers of the political 
system in Pakistan were totally eroded, the use of coercive power at that stage by the 
ruling elite not only compounded the problem hundred fold but slowly and surely led 
to its decay. At that stage, the legitimacy of the system was lost to the people of East 
Pakistan and authority disintegrated. 
The Bengali elite at that stage were no longer eager to save the unity of 
Pakistan if it were at their expense; the ruling elite in Pakistan were equally reluctant 
to save the union with the primacy of the Bengalis. The Bengali military officers took 
up, at that stage, a leading role in destroying the existing order and replacing it by 
another, an independent and sovereign Bangladesh. Chapter Five describes and draws 
a pen picture of what they did at this crucial stage of history of Bangladesh. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
The Role of the Military Officers in the War of Liberation 
Introduction 
In this chapter the researcher has attempted to provide an account of how the 
Bengali military officers and soldiers (privates) of Chittagong Cantonment in 
particular and those of other cantonments in the country got involved in the Liberation 
War. This chapter is based mainly on researcher's recollection of events and personal 
account of the critical period i. e. March 1971. This includes his own motivation to 
join the Liberation War. Using autoethnography as the method and using third person 
singular, Oli Ahmad has narrated what he felt, experienced and did during that period. 
Various methodological strategies have been applied in connection with 
autoethnographic projects, but in this study generally those followed by Ellis, Denzin, 
Tedlock, Reed-Danahay have been applied (Ellis 1991, Denzin 1989, Tedlock 1991 
and Reed-Danahay 1997). 
The Liberation War of 1971 was no accident. It was the culmination of a long 
process of movement beginning from the early 1950's and at the penultimate stage of 
a revolution- nationalistic revolution - that gripped the nation during March 1971. As 
a soldier and active participant in the war, researcher Oli Ahmad has presented an 
insider's account of the series of events that led to the Liberation War. 
As discussed in Chapter Five, Bengalis had a disproportionately low 
representation in the armed forces of Pakistan confined largely to the lower echelons. 
The fact remains however that these officers, though junior in rank, played a historic 
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role at the crucial moment and helped shape the destiny of the nation. One of them 
pronounced the Declaration of Independence of Bangladesh. Many others were 
engaged in this historic Liberation War. All of them however made a common cause 
and collaborated to mobilize war efforts against the Pakistani forces till victory was 
achieved. 
History is replete with instances of how the military work hand in hand with 
political forces for achieving victory in the wars for liberation. In most cases, the 
political leaders initiate the move and the trained military work under their guidance 
and supervision (Nee and Beck 1973: 3- 25; Karnow 1983: 5- 15). In the case of 
Bangladesh, the military personnel took up the initiative at the crucial moment and 
continued the holding war operation until 17 April 1971 when the Mujibnagar 
Government-in-exile was formed. The military remained the symbol of independence 
till then and they kept the flag of Bangladesh flying. 
By focusing on the role of the Bengali military officers in general and those of 
Chittagong Cantonment in particular, this Chapter emphasizes how and why they 
revolted during that fateful night between 25 and 26 March 1971 and proceeded 
eventually to the crucial phase of the Declaration of Independence of Bangladesh. 
Since the researcher himself was an actor in these events, his role along with that of 
others in the whole drama has been delineated in some details. The critical situation in 
which they had to decide upon the appropriate course of action as they did, involved 
not only their personal survival but also the survival of the Bengalis as a nation. Thus 
their motivation to get involved in the national war of liberation seems to be 
sublimated from a coarse instinct of personal safety to a noble cause of national 
emancipation. This is how they saw it, and the researcher being an insider perceived it 
that way. This chapter delineates the sequence of events that unfolded in quick 
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succession; it also reflects the perceptions of the key players. What is also of 
importance is that this kind of academic work has not been performed earlier. 
At that point of time there were about 50 well trained Bengali officers and 
approximately 5000 soldiers stationed in Chittagong, Comilla, Jessore, Saidpur and 
Dhaka Cantonments (see Appendix- 1) in addition to about 15 thousand members of 
the East Pakistan Rifles (EPR), a para-military force trained for guarding the national 
frontiers. The Chittagong Cantonment had an added advantage in the sense that 
though quite far from Dhaka, it provided the Bengali military officers at the 
Chittagong Cantonment ample opportunities to watch closely how the Pakistani 
strategists were re-inforcing their grip over East Pakistan by bringing in more and 
more arms and ammunition through the Chittagong Port. The Comilla Cantonment 
being closer to the Chittagong Cantonment, provided a convenient opportunity for 
easy communication between the military officers and the political leaders. The 
political leaders of Chittagong, many of whom were quite influential in the policy- 
making hierarchy of the Awami League, had been in touch with the Bengali military 
officers at Chittagong. Chittagong also had one radio station. 
The researcher was commissioned on 29 October 1967 and posted to 4 East 
Bengal Regiment at Joydevpur, Dhaka. He was transferred to the Chittagong 
Cantonment in September 1970 and was appointed Quarter-Master in the newly 
raised 8th battalion of the East Bengal Regiment stationed in Sholosahar, Chittagong. 
The office of the Quarter-Master in the regiment was a crucial vantage point from 
which to view the events which ultimately led to that historic decision to wage the 
Liberation War in 1971. 
III 
Background of Revolutionary Decision of the Bengali Military 
Officers 
For those who might question why the military officers and not the political 
leaders initiated the first salvo against the Pakistani authorities in East Pakistan, some 
reflection on the Pakistan military is in order. 
Immediately after the emergence of Pakistan in 1947 its armed forces were 
preoccupied with their own organization. For a time they remained content with the 
policies of the ruling elite, since the armed forces were assured of their privileged 
status in respect of pay and other perquisites. Furthermore, having their roots firmly 
implanted in the landed aristocracy in West Pakistan, the military officers also felt a 
kind of class affinity with the civilian rulers (Ahamed, 1988,40- 41). Pakistan's 
strong anti-Indian foreign policy, coupled with a "stand off' at the first Kashmir 
Conflict of 1948, resulted in a stalemate with India on the issues of canal water and 
evacuee property and contributed towards making the armed forces in Pakistan 
strongly anti-Indian in nature from the beginning. This ultimately drove Pakistan 
much closer to the US, which had for long been seeking a reliable ally in South Asia 
within the framework of its global strategy of containing communism. 
After the conclusion of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement in 1954 
with the US, the Pakistan armed forces acquired sophisticated weapons from the US. 
It enhanced not only its striking power but also its bargaining strength, and gradually 
it began to penetrate the civilian government of Pakistan. When in 1954 effective 
political power was assumed by the bureaucratic elite the generals found it quite 
propitious to enter the political arena openly. Symbolic of the significant changes that 
had taken place in Pakistan in 1954 were the dismissal of the national government by 
President Ghulam Mohammad, dissolution of the National Parliament and 
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appointment of a member of the armed forces as a minister in the new government 
headed by Mohammad Ali. This new minister was General Ayub Khan who in league 
with the top-level military officers and civil servants, frustrated the development of a 
democratic system, and by staging a coup and then assuming dictatorial powers in 
1958, established the supremacy of the military in Pakistan. 
All the Bengali military officers, who played crucial roles in the Liberation 
War, were recruited during this period and were trained and socialized under the 
shadow of Ayub Khan's martial law. This had far-reaching effects on the Bengali 
military officers in many ways. In the first place, they became conscious of a regional 
imbalance in the armed forces. Moreover, they began to realize that the small number 
of Bengali officers and soldiers, who were recruited into the Pakistan armed forces, 
were not accorded equal treatment. They also felt that a policy of discrimination was 
followed against Bengali officers in matters of privileges, promotion and other 
perquisites. The discriminatory policies made the Bengali officers not only resentful 
but also vociferous against the Pakistan's ruling elite (Ahamed, 1988: 35- 50). 
In the 1960s, their complaints became louder and more structured when 
regional conflicts were "diverted from the usual political channels of expression and 
deflected into bureaucracy", and bureaucracy turned into "the arena for covert forms 
of political struggle, " in the absence of a political elite after the imposition of Martial 
Law in Pakistan in 1958 (Ahamed, 1988: 41). The limitations put on the political 
process and the absence of a Bengali political elite meant that the Bengali bureaucrats, 
both civil and military, constituted the only substantial Bengali group taking part at 
the national decision-making level. In fact, at that time the Bengali bureaucrats, both 
civil and military, though not holding senior positions at the key ministries became by 
default the chief spokesmen for Bengali interests. 
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This role of the Bengali bureaucrats at that critical time politicized them still 
further. The Agartala Conspiracy Case of 1968, which charged 33 Bengali politicians, 
civil servants and military officers with conspiring to bring about East Pakistan's 
secession in collusion with India, indicates how the Bengali bureaucrats were 
implicated because they were calling attention to East Pakistani interests (Ziring, 
1971; Ahamed, 1988: 42). The testimonies of these military officers also indicate how 
much politicized they were. These officers complained that in Pakistan they had been 
treated ̀ not as equals' but `as inferior breeds'. 
Many of the civil servants and military officers established linkages with the 
dominant East Pakistan political party, the Awami League, and remained on good 
terms with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Many of them supplied secret information to the 
Awami League leadership, which helped the Sheikh to sharpen his case for autonomy 
(Jahan, 1972: 198- 202). Not surprisingly, therefore, the bureaucrats, both civil and 
military, lent full support to Sheikh Mujib's call for civil disobedience and the non- 
cooperation movement which paralyzed the entire administration in East Pakistan 
from 1 March to 25 March 1971. It is also of great significance that the Six-Point 
Programme (Appendix- 2), which had been the basis of the national movement in East 
Pakistan since 1966, turned out to be a One-Point demand i. e. the demand for the 
independence of East Pakistan, after the ill-considered and impolitic declaration by 
President Yahya Khan on 1 March 1971, which called for suspension of the session of 
National Assembly to be held on 3 March 1971. Only in this context, can the role of 
the Bengali military officers be properly appreciated, as well as that of the Chittagong 
Cantonment, where a few junior officers worked together. 
Capt. Oli joined 8 East Bengal Regiment at Chittagong in September 1970. 
Within a few days, more Bengali and Punjabi Officers were posted to the new 
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battalion. They included Lt. Col. A. R. Janjua as Commanding Officer, Major Kelvi, 
Captain Abbas, Captain Ahmed Ali, Captain Akhtar, Captain Majid, Lt. Humayun 
Khan, 2nd Lt. Azam. Captain Chowdhury Khalequzzaman (now retired Brig. ), 
Captain Sadeque Hussain (now retired Brig. ), Lt. Mahfuzur Rahman (later on Lt. 
Col. ), Lt. Shamsher Mobin (now in Foreign Service as Foreign Secretary), Major Mir 
Shawkat Ali (later on retired Lt. General and former Cabinet Minister under Begum 
Khaleda Zia's BNP Government) and Major Ziaur Rahman (later on Lt. General and 
President of Bangladesh). Lt. Col. Janjua originally belonged to the 4 East Bengal 
Regiment, wherein Lt. Col. M. R. Chowdhury was the Commanding Officer. Lt. Col. 
Chowdhury was also transferred to the Chittagong Cantonment as the Chief Instructor 
of the East Bengal Regimental Centre. 
The researcher's association with Lt. Col. M. R. Chowdhury in Lahore was 
deep and far-reaching which made them even closer in Chittagong. The researcher 
used to visit Col. Chowdhury to discuss the political situation in the country and map 
out strategies of possible army involvement if necessary. The discussions were, 
needless to say, carried out secretly during the first and second week of February at 
Chittagong Cantonment and both officers were tense with anxiety lest they be 
disarmed and arrested. Lt. Col. Chowdhury's office was located inside the 
cantonment. The 20 Baluch Regiment, comprising some of the Punjabis, was also 
located next to his office. Pakistan Army intelligence became very alert at that time 
and was keenly observing the movements of the Bengali officers. 
Working inside the Pakistan Army, the researcher was aware of the Pakistani 
officials' attitude of demeaning Bengalis as a nation who, according to the Pakistanis, 
were no good at fighting. The rank and file in the Army was also taught to believe this 
stereotype. Drawing on his experiences of dealing with the Pakistanis, the researcher 
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felt that despite a clear victory for the Awami League in the parliamentary election, 
the central political leadership of Pakistan would never transfer power democratically 
and peacefully. These events troubled him and the seeds of revolt were sown in his 
consciousness. 
The researcher, as well as most of the Bengali military officers, felt that a 
critical situation lay ahead. Major General Ejaj Ahmed Choudhury, one of the 
interviewees for this study responded: "Pakistan Army started mobilizing their troops 
from early March. From their mobilization of troops I could understand that Pakistan 
Army was going to take actions to neutralize and suppress political crisis in the then 
East Pakistan. " Major General Mohammad Abdul Halim, another interviewee, said in 
that connection: "During the non-co-operation movement [of March] I was watching 
the situation and was mentally prepared for the war and kept my fingers crossed. " 
Major General Saflullah, another respondent had this to say: "Pakistan, which we 
knew comprising both East and West, I should say, did not exist in East Pakistan after 
1 March 1971. When Awami League, having won absolute majority for forming 
government [at the centre] and when Sheikh Mujib was declared as the prospective 
Prime Minister of Pakistan, they [Pakistani ruling elite] were making issues not to 
give that authority to Bengali leadership. So in the guise of conflict with India they 
were pouring in troops and at one stage there was a dialogue between the central 
government and East Pakistani leaders. We as military personnel knew what they 
were trying to do. " 
Being summoned, Capt. Oli met Lt. Col. Chowdhury in the first week of 
February 1971. He looked anxious and tense, especially over the uncertainty of the 
political dialogue, which was then in progress, between the Awami League leader 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and General Yahya Khan, Zulfiquer Ali Bhutto and others. 
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Col. Chowdhury and Capt. Oli were of the same mind. They believed that the West 
Pakistanis would never hand over power amicably. Then they moved on to the more 
significant issue: how would they react when and if their Bengali brethren sought 
assistance from them? They decided to extend their full support to uphold the cause of 
the Bengali nation even at the cost of their blood. They sat together and discussed the 
plans in detail. Both of them also decided in principle that they should do whatever 
was needed to be done under the political direction of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who 
was then leading the movement as the recognized leader of East Pakistan. Mujib had a 
mandate from the people and represented the absolute majority in Pakistan. It was 
their belief that Mujib knew his business well by virtue of his long association with 
such veteran politicians as Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, Sher-e-Bangla A. 
K. Fazlul Haque and Hussain Shahid Suharawardy. l Col. Chowdhury and Capt. Oli 
also decided that relevant information should secretly be collected about all the 
Bengali Officers stationed in different cantonments of East Pakistan (See Appendix- 
1). 
So they continued to meet regularly. They devised possible ways and means 
for procuring arms and ammunition, which were then at the disposal of the Punjabi 
officers. They remained sensitive to the contemporary political situation and the 
demands of the mass movement. They also collected information about the strength 
and specific location of Pakistani officers and soldiers serving in East Pakistan (See 
' Moulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani was a veteran political leader of East Pakistan. He was the 
Founder- President of Bangladesh Awami League. He was mainly responsible for initiating the 
populist orientation to Bangladesh politics since the 1950s. A. K. Fazlul Haque was the Chief Minister 
of united Bengal in the late 1930s and early 1940s, He was the Chief Minister of East Pakistan in 1954. 
Then he became its governor, and finally he became the Interior Minister of Pakistan in the mid- 1950s. 
It was he who put forward the Lahore Resolution in the Muslim League Conventions in 1940. Hussain 
Shahid Suhrawardy was the Chief Minister of United Bengal in the mid- 1940s. He was the Prime 
Minister of Pakistan in 1956. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman worked with these veteran political leaders as 
their young associate, and remained quite close with Moulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani and Hussain 
Shahid Suhrawardy. 
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Appendix- 3. Salik, 1997: 231-234). Thus the seeds of rebellion were sown in the 
minds of those who mattered most at that point of time. 
In this chapter, the researcher offers an insider's view of the Bangladesh 
Revolution. He argues that although Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his political 
colleagues prepared the nation for the struggle of self-rule and autonomy, he was 
subsequently not available to guide and lead the nation in the crucial time. Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman was the undisputed leader of East Pakistan. His party, the Awami 
League, turned out to be the majority party not only in East Pakistan but also in 
Pakistan since it secured 167 seats in 313-seat Pakistan National Assembly in the 
1970 general election. When President Yahya Khan postponed the session of the 
National Assembly on 1 March 1971, the people of East Pakistan began 
demonstrating in anger against the Pakistani ruling elite. The people of different 
sectors in East Pakistan i. e. the students, teachers, professionals, Bengali civil 
servants, leaders of different political parties in East Pakistan came out in the street 
decrying the decision of President Yahya Khan. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman knew it. He 
also made it public that he would make a significant declaration in the meeting to be 
held on 7 March 1971 at Paltan Maidan. Everybody including the members of the 
armed forces expected that Sheikh Mujib would declare independence on that day. 
He, instead, called for a non-co-operation movement since 7 March. At that time there 
was only one infantry division in the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan (Khan, 1993: 
41). The researcher feels that had the declaration come on 7 March, East Pakistanis 
would have been able to achieve independence with lesser bloodshed. 
The Bengali military personnel, to a significant extent, filled in the vacuum 
created by the political leadership. The revolt by the Bengali officers in Chittagong, in 
fact, marked the beginning of the nation's organized resistance to the Pakistani 
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occupation forces. The revolt was engineered by an active and enthusiastic section of 
the Bengali officers, who were able successfully to disseminate the spirit of revolution 
to the rank and file and, eventually, to the civilians. To sum up in more specific terms, 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman prepared the nation for struggle, but he failed to provide the 
leadership in the face of the Pakistan Army's crackdown on the Bengali officers, 
soldiers and civilians. Capt. Oli prepared and coordinated the soldiers of the 8 East 
Bengal Regiment and played the main part in the revolt on the crucial night of 25/26 
March 1971. Major Ziaur Rahman declared the Independence of Bangladesh. 
The Gathering Storm 
Immediately after the appointment of the researcher as the Quarter Master in 
the 8 East Bengal Regiment, Major Ziaur Rahman was posted there and was 
appointed second-in-command. Capt. ON found in Major Zia a smart, well-versed in 
war-strategy and accomplished officer. He used to speak less, listen more and work 
swiftly. Major Zia had a very good command of English and Urdu languages. Their 
Offices were located in a cluster, adjacent to one another, separated only by a thin 
wall of about 5 inches. At that time Major Zia and Capt. Oli were not known to each 
other. As the Quarter Master Capt. Oli was in an advantageous position, which 
required all officers and staff to associate with him. Their food, rations, clothing and 
other amenities were at his disposal, which gave him an opportunity to interact 
frequently with them. The researcher's good relationship and association with the 
officers and soldiers caught the attention of the second-in-command Major Zia who 
started to take an interest in Capt. Oli and became closely associated with him, 
especially when it emerged that he also shared the same view of the situation. 
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During the month of February 1971, Major Zia called Capt. Oli to his office 
several times. He wanted to ascertain what was going on in the political arena. He 
made queries about the ideas, feelings and views of Bengali army personnel. Capt. Oli 
was still not quite comfortable enough to open up fully to him and followed a rather 
cautious approach. Moreover, the researcher's training in intelligence work during his 
service with the Pakistan Air Force made him even more cautious. Major Zia, 
however, talked things over with OR without reservation. Although, Capt. Oli was 
careful, he was quite aware of the rapidly changing political situation in the country 
and of the necessity to develop a dedicated group who would be ready for action. 
Major Zia called the researcher, on an emergency basis, to his residence one 
evening in the third week of February 1971. On that day, without any hesitation, Capt. 
OR was open with Major Zia and briefed him all about the Bengali officers and 
soldiers. Zia seemed to be determined to act directly to safeguard the interests of the 
Bengali nation and Oli assured him of his support. They discussed the problems and 
prospects of such direct action in detail. The only information, which the researcher 
did not disclose to Major Zia, was about the understanding between Lt. Col. M. R. 
Chowdhury and himself. He kept it a secret for the time being and wanted to observe 
and understand Zia further. He also felt the necessity to consult with the political 
leaders of the Awami League in Chittagong, in order to search for a coordinated 
strategy of action and to keep them abreast of the political situation. 
Within a short while, Oli gained the complete confidence of Major Zia and 
they became very close. Major Zia and Capt. Oli had regular exchanges of thoughts 
and plans. The 20th Baluch Regiment was stationed in the Chittagong Cantonment. 
The Baluch regiment's overriding purpose at that time was to check and contain the 
Bengali nationalist movement. Captain Iqbal Hussain was the Quarter-Master of the 
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Baluch Regiment. Capt. Iqbal and Capt. Oli shared the same type of duties and 
responsibilities, and thereby developed an intimacy. Besides they studied together at 
Pakistan Military Academy and were course mates. During the first week of March, 
Iqbal disclosed to him that more and more Punjabi officers and soldiers were 
scheduled soon to enter East Pakistan with arms and ammunition. 
Capt. Oli communicated the news separately to Lt. Col. Chowdhury and Major 
Zia immediately and they were in no doubt that the Pakistanis were planning an 
armed crack down on the Bengalis. The 8 East Bengal Regiment was originally 
scheduled to be stationed in the Kharian Cantonment of West Pakistan. 
Since it was originally planned that the 8 East Bengal Regiment would be 
stationed at Kharian in West Pakistan, they were not provided with the arms and 
ammunition. There were 12 LMGs (Light Machine Guns) and 300 three-naught three 
rifles for training purposes only and the arms were not in good condition. Besides 
there were only 5 vehicles for the whole regiment. 
By the first week of March 1971, Major Zia and Capt. Oli were having 
frequent discussions about future course of action. On the 2nd March 1971, some 
Punjabis of the 2nd Commando Battalion and the 20th Baluch Regiment killed some 
Bengalis in the non-Bengali Area of Pahartali, Chittagong. Both Zia and Oli were 
worried. Tension enveloped the whole cantonment and beyond. In the evening, on 
Oli's return from the Hill District of Banderban, Havildar Abdul Aziz entered Capt. 
Oli's room in the officers' mess. He closed the door, informed Oli about the killing of 
the Bengalis and waited for his orders. Capt. Oli told him to prepare for the fight and 
promised to keep him informed of the right moment for action. On the Ist and 2nd 
March 1971, Oli hurriedly recorded in his diary the following: 
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"Had a discussion with Major Ziaur Rahman about the future of the 
Bengalis and the present situation and the behaviour of the West 
Pakistani Officers (01.03.1971). " 
"All West Pakistani Officers had a secret meeting at the Chittagong 
Cantonment Public School at 0030 hours. They decided to disarm all 
Bengali officers and troops when the time demanded. We somehow 
got this information and they were bringing more and more troops 
from Pakistan. Myself and Major Ziaur Rahman had a long discussion 
on the subject and decided to revolt if situation so demanded to 
liberate Bangladesh (02.03.1971). " 
It became a major part of Capt. Oli's duty to communicate everything secretly 
to Lt. Col. Chowdhury, whose encouragement helped him to take this audacious 
decision. Oli coordinated their activities towards mobilizing support from other fellow 
Bengali officers. On 4 March 1971 OR noted in his diary: "Major Ziaur Rahman 
asked me to inform Captain Khalequzzaman Chowdhury and Lt. Shamsher Mobin 
Chowdhury about the present situation of Bangladesh and find out their feelings about 
it. I found them in the same wave length. But I told them to keep their mouth shut for 
then and they would be informed of every thing they should know. " On 5 March 1971 
Capt. OR met Lt. Col. Chowdhury to update the information on the situation. 
Meanwhile, Major Zia advised Oli to exchange views with the Bengali Junior 
Commissioned Officers (JCOs), Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) and soldiers of 
the Regiment. Capt. Oli gave the responsibility to his most trustworthy JCO, Naib 
Subedar Abdul Hamid (Later on Subedar Major). Hamid brought to his notice that all 
Bengali soldiers were disgusted with the way they were being treated by the 
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Pakistanis and they would readily join the struggle for independence, if ordered by the 
researcher or called by Sheikh Mujib. 
Lt. Col. Janjua, the Commanding Officer of 8 East Bengal Regiment, made it 
a regular habit to visit the Officers' Mess. Sometimes his visits were sudden and 
surprising. The Bengali officers were also conscious about Janjua who kept a sharp 
eye on them and used to engage apparently in idle gossip in the Mess. One day he 
opened his mind to Capt. Oli and said: "You have all turned into Hindus and we shall 
have to reconcile the truth to you. " Oli knew well what the 'truth' might be. 
The researcher started keeping a vigilant eye on the movements and activities 
of the Punjabi Officers. After the 2nd March 1971, Brigadier Majumder, Lt. Colonel 
Chowdhury and Captain Amin Ahmed Chowdhury (Now Major General) were 
deputed to Chittagong city. They stationed their troops at the Chittagong Circuit 
House and the Chittagong Stadium in order to control law and order. Captain Amin 
Ahmed Chowdhury could not tolerate the humiliation and torture of the local 
Bengalis by the Pakistani soldiers belonging to 20 Baluch regiment deployed in the 
city. He personally went to the Non- Bengali area to help the Bengalis. He instructed 
them to be prepared to face greater odds. 
Meanwhile, Major Zia and Oli decided to brief Mustafizur Rahman Siddiqui, 
one of the senior most leaders of the Chittagong City Awami League, about the 
designs of the Pakistani forces. They subsequently made contact with many Awami 
League leaders and came to know that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman would make a public 
speech in the Race Course field of Dhaka on 7 March 1971, wherein he would declare 
the future action plans. The speech of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, however, could not 
give the people any clear guideline about the future course of action. He might have 
had his compulsions, but he failed to convey any definite signal for revolt or rebellion. 
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People expected that Mujib would declare some direct action for liberation of the 
country. Fakhruddin Ahmed has remarked in his book, Critical Times: 
Yahya announced the postponement of the National Assembly meeting 
scheduled in early March 1971. Dhaka reacted sharply. Many foreign observers 
in Islamabad were eagerly waiting for the announcement of Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman on March 7,1971. They also predicted that Sheikh Mujib would 
declare independence on that day. I remember a BBC commentator hinting that 
possibility. If this was done without any ambiguity the cost of sufferings would 
have been less. One can now say with certainty that the Pakistan army was not 
yet ready to strike. They were simply bluffing. Reinforcements were still 
continuing. Furthermore, the declaration of independence on 7th March 1971 
would have alerted the Bengali armed forces in the East to remain constantly 
vigilant. Thus the Pakistan army could hardly move out of the cantonment. 
Personnel of the East Pakistan Rifles and Police could have moved to safer areas 
instead of being slaughtered on the night of 25th and 26th of March 1971. 
(Ahmed, 1994: 57) 
The Bengali troops became intolerant of vacillating role of political leadership 
and agitated, as they felt that the speech failed to voice their expectation. Farooq Aziz 
Khan is of the same opinion in his book, Spring 1971: "To many Bengalis it was a 
lost opportunity. If Mujib had declared independence on March 7, as a lot of people 
thought he would, the history of our independence movement would have taken a 
different hue. Yahya thus got more time to prepare his army and execute his plans 
drawn up while he was shooting ducks in Larkana along with his co-conspirators as 
guests of Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto. " (Khan, 1993: 40) 
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In this connection, the statement of Colonel Shafaat Jamil, one of the 
interviewees in this study, is equally interesting. He said: "Before 7th March the then 
East Pakistan had a very small army. It consisted of only one infantry division. We 
had five battalions of East Bengal Regiment and there were five battalions from West 
Pakistan. We were superior to them. Apart from that there were the East Pakistan 
Rifles and the Police which were overwhelmingly manned by East Pakistanis. Had the 
declaration come on 7 March, we would have been able to achieve our end with lesser 
bloodshed. Whereas from 7 March to 26 March they got 17 days' time on account of 
negotiations. During those 17 days they brought in 10-12 infantry battalions, thereby 
outnumbering the military might of the Bengalis to 3: 1. " 
On 8 March at about 5.30 PM, Capt. Oli received a telephone call from Lt. 
Col. M. R. Chowdhury, while he was exploring with Lt. Shamsher Mobin Chowdhury 
the possible course of action. Lt. Col. Chowdhury wanted to give Oli some 
instructions and he wanted to do so via Lt. Shamsher Mobin. Lt. Mobin and Lt. Col. 
Chowdhury talked in the Sylheti colloquial dialect so that no one could understand 
them. Mobin then translated for Oli "He has instructed you to report to him in the 
Western side room of the Chittagong Stadium and Captain Amin Ahmed Chowdhury 
will be waiting for you in the evening. You proceed immediately. " Capt. Oli rang Lt. 
Col. Chowdhury again and asked permission to bring Major Zia along with him. Col. 
Chowdhury was taken by surprise for a moment, but agreed following Oli's 
explanation. 
Accordingly, Major Zia and Oli reached the Western gate of the Stadium at 7 
PM. Havildar Jan-e-Alam received them at the gate and escorted them to Captain 
Amin Ahmed's room. Havilder Alam appeared to be very jubilant to see them. 
= Captain Amin, who was anxiously waiting, informed them that Lt. Col. Chowdhury 
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had gone out to meet Brigadier Majumder in the Chittagong Circuit House. He 
wanted them to wait until he returned. In the meantime, Oli hurriedly went back to his 
battalion to ascertain the latest situation there, as Lt. Col. Janjua was suspicious of 
their movements. Moreover, their movement to the city was prohibited and it was not 
safe for them (Zia and Oli) to remain out together for a long time. Major Zia was 
sitting with Capt. Amin while Oli went back to the battalion. Oli, however, came back 
within thirty minutes and joined their discussion. About the meeting of 8 March 1971, 
his diary reads: "Had a discussion at the Chittagong Stadium building with Lt. 
Colonel M. R. Chowdhury, Major Ziaur Rahman and Captain Amin Ahmed 
Chowdhury at 1930 hours regarding the situation prevailing in Bangladesh and the 
behaviour of West Pakistani Officers. This meeting was arranged by Lt. Colonel M. 
R. Chowdhury and Captain Amin Ahmed Chowdhury. We finally decided to revolt in 
case the President does not fulfill the demands of the Bengalis". 
In the meeting it was also decided to inform M. R. Siddiqui and Col. M. A. G 
Osmani. about their proposed revolt. Both of them were members of Parliament, 
representing the Awami League and were very close to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. 
Thereafter, Lt. Col. Chowdhury, Major Zia and Capt. Oli started to meet on a regular 
basis and discussed about the day-to-day situation, future plans and programmes. 
On the 11 March 1971 in the afternoon, three officers of the Baluch Regiment 
came to the 8 East Bengal Officers' Mess. A few minutes later the Commanding 
Officer Lt. Col. Janjua joined them. Their demeanour was very suspicious and they 
seemed to be in a great hurry. Four of them left the Mess and started walking towards 
the residence of Major Zia and Lt. Mahfuz. The researcher immediately rushed to the 
roof of the mess to observe them. He could see the residence of Major Zia from there. 
He saw that they went near the residence of Major Zia, stopped for a few minutes and 
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came back to the mess. Soon after they left the mess. The researcher got the 
impression that Lt. Col. Janjua took these officers to show them the location of Major 
Zia's residence and feared that they had designs on Zia. Later on, Oli informed Major 
Zia of the incident and advised him to keep weapons handy. Thereafter, Zia used to 
keep weapons in his house. Zia and Oli received positive information that the West 
Pakistani officers were having secret meetings regularly and were intensifying their 
vigilance on the Bengali officers. 
On 18 March 1971, Captain Khalequzzaman came to Capt. Oli's room and 
asked to accompany him to the residence of Captain Rafiqul Islam (Retired as Major), 
then Adjutant of East Pakistan Rifles (EPR), Chittagong Sector, stationed at 
Halishahar. Capt. Oli suggested that they should take Lt. Shamsher Mobin 
Chowdhury along with them. Accordingly, Captain Khalequzzaman, Lt. Mobin and 
Capt. ON arrived at the residence of Captain Rafiqul Islam at 7 PM sharp. 
Anxiously walking the lawn, Captain Rafiqul Islam seemed quite restless. He 
informed his colleagues that some other gentlemen would also join them. Capt. 01i 
suggested that the meeting should be held in some place outside the city, which 
Captain Rafique readily endorsed. It was decided to hold the meeting at the residence 
of Shamsul Alam, the Chittagong University Librarian. Within a short time, Captain 
Haroon (retired as Major General) of East Pakistan Rifles (EPR), Dr. Jafar, an eye 
Specialist of Chittagong, and Ataur Rahman Khan Kaiser MNA joined them. They 
proceeded towards the University. 
The discussion was fairly extensive. At one point, Captain Rafique, Captain 
Khalequzzaman and Dr. Zafar raised the question as to what should be the action 
against the enemy in the event that the Pakistani Army attacked them. This led the 
group to discuss and assess their overall strength including the resources of the 
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Bengal Regiment, EPR and the available arms and ammunition. Capt. Oli was not in 
favour of discussing the operational strategy too openly and suggested that Captain 
Rafique and he should meet later. 
On 18 March 1971, Capt. Oli recorded in his dairy: "Had a discussion with 
Captain Rafique of EPR about the West Pakistani Officers' plan to disarm all 
Bengalis, and to kill them if they resisted. The discussion was held at the University 
Campus and attended by the following officers - Captain Chowdhury Khliquzzaman, 
Captain Haroon of 17 Wing EPR, Lt. Shamsher Mobin Chowdhury - Ataur Rahman 
Khan Kaiser MNA and Dr. Zafar, an Eye Specialist. " 
Capt. Oli approached Major Zia with the request to go alone to have a word 
with Captain Rafique in the specified place. This time Capt. Oli did not accompany 
Zia, as it was unwise for him to leave the mess since the Quarter-Master was always 
wanted. Major Zia went to meet Captain Rafique as planned and briefed Oli about 
their discussion on his return. Capt. Oli advised Major Zia to arrange further meetings 
with Lt. Col. M. R Chowdhury and Captain Rafique to finalize their plans, 
programmes and strategies. They also decided to inform Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, via 
M. R. Siddiqui, about the latest activities of the Pakistan Army in Chittagong. 
On 20 March 1971, Lt. Col. M. R. Chowdhury, Major Zia and Captain 
Rafique met at the residence of Shafi Ahmed, the Member (Planning), of the Railway 
Board and outlined the following plan of action: Lt. Col. M. R. Chowdhury with 
EBRC troops would occupy the entire Chittagong Cantonment and, if required, attack 
the 20 Baluch Regiment quartered next to their location. Subedar Helal of EBRC 
would take the responsibility for working out the details of `three inch mortar firing' 
positions on 20 Baluch Regiment and carry out the firing when ordered (this 
particular weapon could be fired from a distance without seeing the target and was a 
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high trajectory weapon); Captain Rafique with the EPR troops under his command 
would occupy the Naval Base and the Chittagong Airport; the 8 East Bengal 
Regiment would remain on stand-by under the leadership of Major Zia for any 
emergency. It was also decided that M. R. Siddiqui of the Chittagong Awami League 
would be kept informed about this plan and the subsequent amendments on a regular 
basis. Capt. Oli briefed Captain Khalequzzaman and Lt. Shamsher Mobin about these 
developments so that they could remain alert and mentally prepared to resist the 
Pakistan Army. Capt. Oli ordered his trusted Naib Subedar Quarter Master Abdul 
Hamid to mobilize their loyal troops against the Pakistani aggression. 
On 21 March 1971, around 8 AM, all officers were ordered to remain present 
at the Battalion Headquarters in uniform. Gen. Abdul Hamid Khan, the Chief of Staff 
of the Pakistan Army along with Maj. Gen. Khodadad Khan, Quarter Master General, 
and other top ranking officers would be visiting the battalion at 9 AM. They arrived at 
the Battalion Headquarters on time. Brig. M. R. Majumder, the Chittagong Area 
Commander, was also with them. All officers of the battalion were present except 
Major Zia. He was away at Chittagong City, shopping as it was a holiday. 
General Hamid maintained a very low profile during the visit as if everything 
was normal. He did not mention anything about the prevailing situation. Capt. Oli was 
suspicious of the motives of his visit, believing that Gen. Hamid came to have a final 
review of the arrangements taken by the Pakistani officers against the Bengalis. From 
Oli's past experience, he could not recall so many top-ranking officers visiting a 
battalion on a Sunday (a holiday) without there being any emergency. Gen. Hamid 
left for the Chittagong Cantonment at 11 AM. Major Zia returned to the Battalion 
Headquarters at 11.30 AM and Capt. ON narrated everything to him including his 
suspicions about being attacked or disarmed by the Pakistan Army at any time. Major 
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Zia decided to meet Lt. Col. M. R. Chowdhury and Captain Rafique to discuss the 
implication of the general's untimely visit. Brig. Majumder, in addition to holding the 
post of Chittagong Area Commander, was the Commandant of the East Bengal 
Regimental Centre (EBRC) at the Chittagong Cantonment and Lt. Col. M. R. 
Chowdhury was the chief instructor under him. They hailed from the same area and 
had been keeping close contact with each other since 8 March 1971. Brig. Majumder 
extended his full support and assurances that other Bengali officers would join. 
However, he pointed out that it would be better to keep him away from the direct 
leadership, since the Punjabis had him under surveillance. Both Zia and Oli asked 
him, through Col. Chowdhury, to contact Col. Mohammad Ataul Ghani Osmani who 
had joined the AL and was the senior most retired Bengali military officer working 
for Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Osmani was informed of the plans and programme in 
detail and was given the responsibility of contacting and coordinating the 4 East 
Bengal Regiment at Comilla, the 1 East Bengal Regiment at Jessore, the 2 East 
Bengal Regiment at Joydevpur and the 3 East Bengal Regiment at Saidpur. Col. 
Osmani agreed to take this responsibility and act as the vital link between Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman and the Bengal regiment. They had already developed contacts with 
local leaders of the Awami League in order to keep abreast of the political 
developments at Dhaka. East Pakistan was now under the de facto control of Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman from 2 March 1971, the government of Gen. Yahya Khan having 
lost effective control. Col. Osmani conveyed that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman intended to 
have several meetings with Gen. Yahya in Dhaka to work out the details of handing 
over power to him. 
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The Declaration of Independence 
Since the beginning of March 1971, Captain Yakub, the Quarter Master of the 
20th Baluch Regiment in the Chittagong Cantonment had been communicating with 
Capt. Oli by telephone about their activities and about the movement of the Pakistan 
Army from West Pakistan to East Pakistan. In addition, Oli had several casual 
meetings with Captain Yakub in his office in connection with the different 
requirements of his battalion. During the course of discussions, Capt. Yakub informed 
him that new battalions of FF, Baluch, Punjab and other troops were being brought 
from Pakistan. These troops, comprising the F. F., Baluch regiment and Punjab 
regiment were brought from Pakistan and deployed in East Pakistan with a view to 
suppressing the Awami League leaders and supporters and the Hindus who, the West 
Pakistani leaders and Generals thought, were trying to disintegrate Pakistan. As usual 
Oli informed Col. Chowdhury and Major Zia about all developments. 
On 22 March 1971, Capt. Oli met Col. Chowdhury in his office to discuss 
their preparation and future plans. He was suffering from fever. Little did O1i know 
that it was to be their last meeting. Col. Chowdhury was arrested by the soldiers of 20 
Baluch regiment on the night of 25 March 1971 and was brutally killed by the Baluch 
Regiment on the order of Col. Fatemi. The road communication between the 
Chittagong Cantonment and the 8 East Bengal Regiment was disrupted. On the 
morning of 23 March 1971 the people erected hundreds of barricades on the main 
roads all over Chittagong. The newly designed Bangladesh flag was also hoisted on 
all buildings. People were left with no alternative but to walk on foot and contact each 
other by telephone. The distance between the Chittagong Cantonment and 8 East 
Bengal's office in the city was about four miles. On 23 March 1971, Zahur Ahmed 
Chowdhury and M. R. Siddiqui, the two senior most political leaders of Chittagong, 
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left for Dhaka by car on the request of Major Zia and Capt. Oli, to meet Sheikh 
Mujibur Rabman and to brief him about the preparation of the 8 East Bengal 
Regiment at Chittagong. Capt. Oli and Major Zia wanted a clear instruction from 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman about their role under the present situation. They wanted him 
to declare the independence of Bangladesh before it was too late. They were 
anticipating a final crackdown by the Pakistani troops at any time. Unfortunately 
Zahur Ahmed Chowdhury and M. R. Siddiqui on their return journey met with an 
accident in front of the Nizampur College, which was about 31 miles from Chittagong 
City. Next morning M. R. Siddiqui informed them that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had 
no directions for them at that stage and only instructed them not to allow the 
unloading of a ship called "Swat". This ship, anchored at the Chittagong Port, carried 
a large quantity of arms and ammunition from West Pakistan. Zia and Oli were 
greatly frustrated at the lack of political direction. Mujib could not foresee the danger 
ahead; but they knew that Pakistani troops would strike them at an opportune 
moment. At about mid day on 23 March 1971, Capt. Amin Ahmed Chowdhury 
telephoned Capt. Oli that he and Brig. Majumder were ordered to leave for Dhaka by 
a helicopter. Capt. Amin Ahmed Chowdhury felt that the authorities were suspicious 
of them and that they might be placed under 'house-arrest' at Dhaka or, worse, be 
interrogated to obtain information about the morale and psychology of the Bengali 
officers and troops. However, Capt. Amin assured Oli that Col. M. R. Chowdhury 
would remain in Chittagong and the troops of the East Bengal Regimental Centre 
were fully prepared under his leadership to meet any situation. Capt. Oli requested 
him to establish contact by telephone on reaching Dhaka and to inform him about the 
situation there. If he did not call Oli by 10 PM, Oli should presume that they were 
taken into custody. In the same evening at about 8 PM Capt. Amin left a message for 
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Oli with the duty clerk saying that they were all right and were staying with one of the 
friends of Brig. Majumder at Dhanmondi in Dhaka. So far they did not sense any 
danger for them but had been asked to stay in Dhaka until further orders. Capt. Oli 
communicated all this to Major Ziaur Rahman. During the whole period they were in 
a state of tension and great anxiety. They were certain that they would be hanged for 
mutiny in the army. 
On 24 March 1971 at about 7 PM, Lt. Col. A. R. Janjua, Commanding Officer 
of the battalion, sent a message to Capt. Oli to the effect that the 106 recoilless rifles, 
which were brought from the 20th Baluch Regiment on loan, should be returned at 
once and that Oli should go personally to hand over the weapons. The instruction left 
him full of suspicion. The journey from his location to the cantonment was not safe at 
all. He suspected that the Punjabis would ambush and kill him in the darkness. He got 
up from his bed and put on the uniform. He did not forget to carry a loaded pistol. 
Calmly he came down to the ground floor of the mess. He found Lt. Col. A. R. Janjua 
and Major Mir Shawkat Ali sitting together in the drawing room. Col. Janjua asked 
him to go immediately to return the rifles. Oli pointed out to him that an officer was 
not required for this trivial job. Capt. Oli suggested that one NCO could be deputed, 
or if he insisted on an officer, the duty officer of the day - Lt. Azam, a Punjabi officer 
could carry the weapon. The colonel, insisted that Oli should go in person. Capt. Oli's 
suspicion was further intensified. He refused to go during the night in the midst of 
political unrest. The colonel became annoyed and asked him to go back to his room. 
The news of these developments spread like wild fire among the troops. Capt. Oli was 
informed that some troops were getting ready to shoot the colonel if he insisted on Oli 
returning the rifle in person. Oli hurriedly left for the battalion lines thinking that any 
premature action on their part would jeopardize the plan and endanger their lives. On 
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reaching the main gate of the Battalion Headquarters, Capt. Oli met Havilder Abdul 
Kader, who was with Oli in the 4 East Bengal Regiment, their parent battalion and 
informed him of the tense situation. Oli then found some troops with loaded rifles. 
Somehow he managed to cool them down. He assured them that he would order them 
into action when the time was right. At this critical point of time Subedar Major T. M. 
Ali, a Non Bengali JCO and the most senior among the soldiers, arrived on the scene. 
He maintained direct links between the troops and the commanding officer. Capt. Oli 
was worried and nervous to see him in the battalion lines. He immediately asked Oli 
to advise him as to what should he say to the commanding officer about this particular 
incident. Capt. Oli advised him to tell the colonel that the soldiers were agitated after 
hearing a lot of noise from the nearby areas and that Oli had handled the situation 
tactfully. Subedar Major Ali briefed the colonel accordingly and thus tackled the 
situation. He never disclosed the secret to anyone. 
On 25 March 1971, officers and troops of 8 East Bengal Regiment were 
deployed to remove the barricades created by the civilians on the road between their 
location and the Chittagong Cantonment in order to stop movements of Pakistani 
officers and soldiers. The colonel himself was supervising the operation. Major 
Kamal (Punjabi) and Capt. Aziz (Bengali) along with their troops from the East 
Bengal Regimental Centre started the cleaning and clearing operation from the other 
end. Capt. Oli was the only officer not directly deployed, thus he was sitting in the 
office pondering matters. All the incidents of the last 24 hours gave him a clear 
indication that something was going to happen that night. Around 11 AM he saw Col. 
Janjua along with Major Shawkat, Capt. Ahmed Ali, Capt. Sadeque, Capt. 
Khalequzzaman and Lt. Azam coming back with their troops to the battalion. The 
colonel explained to Oli about the change in the plan. He said that Major Zia along 
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with some other officers and soldiers of the battalion had been given the task of 
clearing the road. While from the other end, Major Kamal and others, were given the 
task. Every one would have their afternoon and evening meals at the place of duty. As 
usual they left for the Officers' Mess after 2 PM and the colonel left for his residence. 
At about 4 PM Capt. OR received a message from the colonel ordering him to be the 
duty officer of the day and Lt. Azam (a Punjabi Officer) to be the assistant duty 
officer. In fact there was no practice of having an assistant duty officer in the army. 
ON realized that Lt. Azam's task was to keep an eye on him. In the meantime Major 
Shawkat, Capt. Ahmed Ali, Capt. Khalequzzaman and Capt. Sadeque were asked to 
stay in their rooms until further orders. 
Capt. Oli left for the battalion headquarters accordingly. On arrival at the 
Battalion Headquarters in the duty officers' room he found that Lt. Azam was already 
sitting there. He seemed to be extra alert. He wanted to listen to all the telephone calls 
in Oli's presence, which was not a common practice in the army. His activities 
confirmed Oli's suspicions and prompted him to organize a revolt. Capt. Oli alerted 
his trusted Naib Subedar Abdul Hamid to remain ready with a platoon on the roof of 
the building, fully armed to meet any situation. He kept four armed guards slightly 
away from his room to keep a close watch on Lt. Azam. There were only about ten to 
twelve non-Bengali officers and troops in the battalion. The main source of worry was 
from the 20th Baluch Regiment and from an air strike. At about 4.30 PM Col. Janjua, 
along with his adjutant Major Mir Shawkat All, arrived in the office. The Charlie 
Company, which was commanded by Major Shawkat in addition to his duties, was 
ordered to get ready. Col. Janjua and Major Shawkat along with the Charlie Company 
left without any arms for Chittagong Port to unload arms and ammunition from the 
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ship `Swat'. Gradually troops were dispersed and with every contingent one or two 
Punjabi officers were placed alongside the Bengali officers. 
At 8 PM Capt. Oli tried several times to contact Capt. Rafique (Adjutant of 
EPR) over the telephone, but he was not available. It was necessary to brief him about 
the latest situation. The night was getting dark and Oli sensed an impending danger. 
Around 8.15 PM he decided to meet Major Zia at the Bayzid Bostami area - who was 
given the responsibility to clear the road towards the Chittagong Cantonment - to tell 
him about his feelings. Oli took a small truck from the battalion and told the assistant 
duty officer that he needed to carry food for the troops on duty clearing the barricades. 
He started for the destination along with a few soldiers and some foodstuffs for the 
on-duty personnel. Oli was surprised to see that all barricades were replaced on the 
roads and people were guarding them. He met Major Zia on the premises of the K. 
Rahman Coca-Cola Factory. He explained to Zia the latest situation and his 
apprehension about the possible crack down by the Pakistan Army. Zia was of the 
same opinion. They lost contact with Lt. Col. M. R. Chowdhury and Captain Rafique. 
Zia came back with Oli to the Battalion Headquarters on the pretext of having food in 
his residence. Lt. Mahfuz, Lt. Shamsher and Lt. Humayun were on duty on the same 
road at different places. Major Zia left for his residence at about 9 PM and Oli went to 
the duty officers' room. Oli thought if anything should happen, it would happen by 
one o'clock. Oli wanted to remain awake and near the telephone until that time. He 
wanted Lt. Azam to sleep during this period and remain away from telephone so that 
he might not hear any conversation of the Bengali officers. Therefore, ON proposed 
that Lt. Azam should perform his duties from 2 to 7 AM and Oli should continue until 
2 AM. Lt. Azam agreed to Oli's proposal and went to sleep in a nearby room. Major 
Zia came to the office after dinner and asked Oli if there was any message from the 
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colonel; Oli replied in the negative. Zia informed him that the colonel had telephoned 
his wife and she in turn telephoned Major Zia's wife to pass on the message that Zia 
should report to the Chittagong Port immediately for duty. This news perplexed them. 
They failed to understand, firstly, why the colonel should ring up his wife instead of 
the duty officer; and secondly, how could the colonel know that Zia would come to 
his residence at that time. Zia was supposed to be with his troops at Baizid Bostami 
area at that time. They discussed the pros and cons of the matter and decided that Zia 
should go to the Chittagong Port, since they had not received any information or 
instruction from Sheikh Mujibur Rahman or his political associates in Chittagong. 
Moreover they had the Charlie Company already operating at that particular place. 
It was about 10.30 PM; both of them were taken by surprise to see Col. Janjua 
and Major Shawkat entering the room. Capt. OR became nervous because the colonel 
was not supposed to be there. Colonel Janjua said that Brigadier Ansari was waiting 
for Zia at the Chittagong Port and that Zia should immediately join Ansari. The 
colonel also ordered Lt. Azam to accompany Zia. He ordered Oli to be on duty the 
whole night and ordered Major Shawkat to go to the Officers' Mess for rest. He did 
not give them any chance to talk further. 
The colonel further instructed Oli to send Capt. Khaleque along with his 
Company (Delta Company) to the transit camp located opposite Chittagong Port. 
Capt. Oli ordered the Delta Company to get ready within half an hour and sent a 
message to Capt. Khaleque to report for duty immediately. The colonel said that he 
had brought one truck from the navy with some naval troops and asked Zia to leave 
for the Chittagong Port on that truck. 
At about 10.35 PM Col. Janjua, Maj. Zia, Maj. Shawkat and Capt. Oli were 
coming down the stairs. Lt. Azam was following them. Half way down Oli heard the 
137 
telephone ringing and hurriedly went up to receive the call. He heard the voice of one 
of his close friends - Mr. Abdul Kader, the Vice President of Standard Bank, 
Chittagong. He informed Oli that the Pakistan Army started shooting and killing the 
unarmed Bengali civilians in Dhaka. Oli asked him to obtain further information from 
Dhaka. Kader said that there was no communication with the city. He had been trying 
to contact Dhaka since 6 PM, but had failed. The telephone exchange and other modes 
of communication might have been taken over by the Pakistan Army. Kader received 
the news of the crack down from one of his relatives. His relative also informed him 
that the tanks and troops had been controlling and patrolling the streets of Dhaka since 
I PM. Lt. General A. A. K. Niazi, in his book The Betrayal of East Pakistan described 
the brutality resorted to by the Pakistani troops on the 25th/ 26th March '71 as 
follows 
On the night between 25/26 March 1971, General Tikka struck. Peaceful night 
was turned into a time of wailing, crying, and burning. General Tikka let loose 
everything at his disposal as if raiding an enemy, not dealing with his own 
misguided and misled people. The military action was a display of stark cruelty, 
more merciless than the massacres at Bukhara and Baghdad by Changez Khan 
and Halaku Khan, or at Jalianwala Bagh by the British General Dyer. 
General Tikka, instead of carrying out the tasks given to him, i. e., to disarm 
armed Bengali units and persons and to take into custody the Bengali leaders, 
resorted to the killing of civilians and a scorched-earth policy. His orders to his 
troops were: `I want the land and not the people. ' These orders were carried out 
in letter and spirit by Major-General Farman Ali and Brigadier (later Lt. Gen. ) 
Jahanzeb Arbab in Dhaka. Major-General Rao Farman Ali wrote in his table 
diary, 'Green land of East Pakistan will be painted red. ' It was painted red by 
Bengali blood. This diary was found by the Bengalis when they occupied 
Government House on 14 December 1971.... 
... On the night 
between 25/26 March 1971 Yahya sneaked out of Dhaka before 
the start of military action. He told Tikka before leaving Dhaka, 'Sort them out. ' 
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Bhutto had remained behind to see what Tikka did. Bhutto saw Dhaka burning 
and heard the cries of the people, the crackle of burning material, the roar of 
tanks, the boom of guns and rockets, and the rattle of machine guns. (Niazi 
1998: 45-46) 
Farooq Aziz Khan also wrote in his book Spring 1971: "The Rajarbagh Police 
Lines, the Dhaka University students' residences and the EPR centre at Pilkhana were 
attacked by the army. They opened up with tanks and heavy equipment. While the 
police forces and the EPR soldiers returned fire and fought back with whatever 
weapons they had before they were forced out of the area suffering heavy casualties, 
the real massacre took place on the Dhaka University campus where unarmed students 
were killed in hundreds and buried in mass graves which the victims were forced to 
dig at gun point seconds before they were shot and killed and then pushed into the 
graves. I heard from a friend that when the Rajarbagh police lines were under attack, 
the police chief was relaxing in his Dhaka residence with friends. Such was the state 
of preparedness on our side" (Khan 1993: 55). 
Capt. Oli was disturbed to receive the news from Mr. Kader, but assured him 
that they would fight back. He rushed to the ground floor to inform Zia about the 
news, but found it extremely difficult, as he was surrounded by Colonel Janjua and 
Maj. Shawkat. Zia was looking anxious and worried. Capt. Oli could not figure out 
what to do. He needed to inform and warn Zia that he was about to be made captive or 
killed. However, he was unable to talk to Zia in the presence of other officers but 
signaled him of impending danger. The colonel wanted to make sure that Zia left for 
the Chittagong Port in his presence. Maj. Zia along with Lt. Azam moved to the 
Chittagong Port to report to Brig. Ansari. The colonel left in his jeep for his residence 
and took Maj. Shawkat along with him. OR felt a sensation in him beyond any 
description. He was also very eager to save Zia's life. He desperately tried to find 
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some one to follow Zia and inform him about the incidents at Dhaka and the 
imminent danger that awaited him at the port. 
It was about 10.45 PM then. Oli knew that Capt. Khaleq had not yet left for 
the transit camp. He came to Oli's office at that time and Oli told him everything 
about the crackdown at Dhaka and asked him not to go to the transit camp, but to 
bring back Zia instead. They had to fight the Pakistan Army or else the Pakistanis 
planned to isolate and kill them. Capt. Khalequzzaman, along with a few soldiers 
from his company, rushed out to bring Zia back. He had no risk because the transit 
camp was in the same direction towards the Chittagong port and his movements 
would not arouse any suspicion of the Pakistanis. Capt. Oli ordered Naib Subedar 
Abdul Hamid to open the armoury and issue weapons to all. In the meantime Oli 
arranged for the protection of the Officers' Mess through Mess Havildar Abdul Aziz, 
because Maj. Shawkat, Capt. Sadeque and Capt. Ahmed Ali (a Punjabi officer) were 
sleeping there. Oli contacted Lt. Shamsher Mobin Chowdhury through telephone and 
asked him to assess the situation at the Chittagong Cantonment. He was on duty at the 
Baizid Bostami area closer to Chittagong Cantonment. He telephoned Oli at about 11 
PM informing him that he could not get very close to the cantonment, because of the 
heavy barricades created by the civilians. He could, however, hear the sound of firing 
and tanks. Lt. Shamsher Mobin Chowdhury did not have the necessary weapons at his 
place of duty nor sufficient troops to attack the Chittagong Cantonment. Oli asked Lt. 
Mobin to come back to the headquarters along with his troops. Oli also told him to 
contact Lt. Mahfuz on his way back and to ask him to report to the headquarters. Both 
of them reported to Oli, but could not bring all the troops back. The troops were 
dispersed at different places and they could not inform them all due to the shortage of 
time. Capt. Oli had total control of the situation and felt relatively at ease. Oli tried his 
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best, in vain, to contact Col. M. R. Chowdhury and other Bengali officers at the 
Chittagong Cantonment. The Punjabi operators were placed on duty at the telephone 
exchange. Oli requested them to connect him to Col. M. R Chowdhury and others. The 
operator replied that they were not available. Capt. Oli dispatched two small 
contingents to arrest Capt. Ahmad Ali from the Officers' Mess and Lt. Humayun 
Khan on duty at the Sholasahar Railway crossing. Both of them were arrested and 
brought before him by 11.30 PM. Oli made them sit in a separate room in front of his 
office and kept them under armed guard. He kept Major Shawkat informed about all 
incidents. Shawkat was still staying in his room at the Officers' Mess. 
Major Zia could not move fast because of the barricades on the road. Capt. 
Khaleque met him near the Dewanhat Railway crossing about 3 miles from battalion 
headquarters and gave him the warning message. Zia returned to the headquarters at 
about 11.45 PM and jumped out of his vehicle. He quickly snatched a sten-gun from a 
Bengali soldier on duty in front of the quarter guard and shouted at Lt. Azam and 
other seamen in the same truck saying, "You surrender your arms; you all are under 
arrest. " They were placed under arrest and kept in separate rooms on the first floor 
next to Oli's room. Lt. Shamsher and Lt. Mahfuz were given the responsibility of 
keeping an eye on the arrested persons. 
Zia and Oli had a brief meeting and decided to carry out their plan without 
further delay. According to their earlier plan, Oli was supposed to go to the residence 
of Col. Janjua to arrest him. But at that moment he could not leave headquarters 
because no one except Oli had a clear idea of the latest situation. Therefore, he 
requested Zia to go personally to arrest Janjua and also to bring Major Shawkat from 
the Officers' Mess on his way back. Janjua was arrested and brought to the 
headquarters, accompanied by Major Shawkat. Janjua was made to sit in his office 
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room along with Capt. Ahmed Ali. Lt. Humayun Khan and Lt. Azam were placed in a 
separate room. All of them were under armed guard with a clear order to shoot if they 
tried to escape. Security arrangements were tightened around the headquarters under 
the command of Naib Subedar Abdul Malek. 
At this fateful moment Lieutenant General Mir Shawkat Ali, one of the 
respondents in this study said, after seeing Major Zia arresting Colonel Janjua, the 
commander of 8 East Bengal Regiment and thus committing an act of open rebellion: 
"Zia told me, `This bastard (Colonel Janjua) was going to kill us. I have revolted. 
What do you say? ' So I said that `you are the commanding officer. As far as I am 
concerned I salute you. ' We shook hands and Zia told me to come over to the 
battalion. " 
The Bengali military officers did not want to lose any time and hurriedly 
organized a meeting between Zia, Shawkat and Oli. They decided to go out of the city 
immediately and take stock of the prevailing situation. They needed to assess their 
own strength in terms of troops, weapons, ammunition and weaknesses. They feared 
that the Pakistani Military Junta might carry out an air strike the following morning, 
followed by attack with tanks under the command of the 20th Baluch Regiment. They 
did not know what to do with the arrested officers and soldiers. Finally it was 
considered necessary to kill them. They were shot and the dead bodies were lying on 
the floor. They decided to kill the Pakistani officers and jawans for two reasons. First 
of all, they did not know where to go from the battalion headquarters after the revolt. 
Secondly, they had not yet made any arrangement for retaining the captured soldiers 
according to international law available for the purpose. Moreover, they were not sure 
of what would happen the next morning. 
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At about 0.30 AM Capt. Oli ordered Havilder Abdul Aziz, the Mess Havilder, 
who was responsible for guarding the Officers' Mess, to arrest Major Abdul Hamid 
and Capt. Nazar, both Pakistani officers of the EPR from the EPR Officers' Mess 
located just opposite to their Mess. The arrested officers were brought before Oli and 
he found out from them that they were given the responsibility to kill the officers of 8 
East Bengal Regiment who were sleeping in their respective rooms. Both these 
officers were shot dead. In the meantime Brig. Ansari telephoned Oli to learn about 
the departure of Zia. Oli told him that he was on his way although Zia was sitting in 
front of him at that moment. At about 1 AM one havilder and two sepoys of the East 
Bengal Regimental Centre came to the 8 East Bengal Headquarters. They were 
weeping. They stated that the 20th Baluch Regiment, armed with tanks and heavy 
weapons, had attacked their family quarters and barracks, killing about 50 troops and 
officers. Col. M. R. Chowdhury was not available anywhere. Major Zia and Capt. Oli 
understood the gravity of the situation. Their troops were agitated; but they knew their 
strengths and limitations. They did not have enough arms and ammunition for 
launching a counter attack At that time, their resistance was in "an embryonic stage". 
At 1.15 AM Capt. Oli ordered all JCOs and other ranks of the battalion to 
assemble in the open space inside their headquarters. They were all brought to 
attention and Oli handed over the parade to Major Zia. Troops were asked to get ready 
within one hour in uniform with all available weapons and ammunition. They were 
going to vacate this location for good. Zia addressed the troops and asked them to be 
ready for supreme sacrifices for Bangladesh. None was allowed to carry anything 
other than food and ammunition. At that time most of the Bengali soldiers, who were 
deployed to clear off road blocks in the streets and unloading of ship `Swat' at 
Chittagong Port, did not come back. For their safety and security a rear party was 
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arranged. They detailed the rear party under Naib Subedar Abdul Malek to give 
necessary directions to the soldiers who would return afterward. Major Shawkat was 
asked to go out in a jeep to contact the Awami League leaders and to tell them about 
the military decision to revolt. Shawkat came back at 2.45 AM, but had no instruction 
or information from the Awami League leaders. It looked like all were caught 
unaware. However most of them eventually joined the fight. 
After the execution of commanding officer Janjua and his Pakistani associates 
when Major Zia delivered his first speech in the meeting of the officers and troops of 
the battalion organized by Capt. Oli, a description of the situation has been given by 
Lt. General Mir Shawkat Ali in the following words: "There Zia had to say 
something. There was no high place; there was an innovative couple of soldiers who 
rolled down a 45 gallon drum and brought it up there. Drum was erect. Zia stood on 
the drum and there he said that we have revolted and we will fight for the 
independence of our country and we declare independence and thus he gave the 
executive military order of moving from Solashahar market toward Kalurghat. " 
At about 3 AM on the morning of 26 March 1971 Zia, Oli, other officers and 
soldiers finally left their Battalion Headquarters and went out of the city area to a 
place called Karal-Denga Pahar under Boalkhali Thana. It was a partially hilly area, 
away from nearby villages. On their way to Karal-Denga Pahar, they met Capt. 
Haroon Ahmed Chowdhury of EPR with his company at Kalurghat. He was coming 
to join Captain Rafique. They asked him to join them and he'did so. On 26 March 
1971 at about 10 AM, they took an oath according to the army custom by reciting the 
following: "We shall fight until death to liberate our motherland and will be faithful to 
the Government of Bangladesh under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahmau". 
Major Ziaur Rahman conducted the oath ceremony. 
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They spent the whole day in that jungle trying to listen to the radio news and 
to establish contact with the Awami League leaders. They wanted to find out if there 
was any instruction for them from Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The local Awami League 
leaders came to meet them and arranged food. But none could say anything about 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman or about the senior leaders. In the meantime they tried to 
establish contact with Col. M. R. Chowdhury and Capt. Rafique. But they could not 
obtain any information. Nothing was found right on 26 March 1971. No body revolted 
on that day except 8 East Bengal Regiment. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman did not foresee 
the events. He possibly did not believe them or did not think of their support. Farooq 
Aziz Khan comments in his book Spring 1971: 
Sheikh Mujib was the undisputed leader of 75 million Bengalis and he made 
the single largest contribution in uniting the nation against Pakistani 
domination; he spent more than 16 years in Pakistani prison and was 
implicated in a conspiracy case during the Ayub regime. But he was not a 
revolutionary leader like Mao Tse Tung, Ho Chi Minh or Fiedel Castro. 
Sheikh Mujib believed in constitutional politics and never thought of going 
underground during his long political career. That is why when the time came 
for him to act as a revolutionary he faltered and decided to give himself up and 
surrendered to the Pakistan Army at considerable personal risk. He probably 
thought that this was the best way for him to face the grave situation that had 
already slipped out of his hands. 
`He couldn't have gone out of his house', Tofael Ahmed, a. prominent Awami 
League leader told me, `his house was surrounded by Pakistani commandoes 
and if he had tried to get away he would either have been arrested or killed. 
Bangabandhu knew that; besides where could he have gone? The Pakistanis 
would have found him out. The Indian border is at least 60 km away and he 
probably didn't like to go there because as we heard he was not given a good 
reception in 1962 when he went to Agartala. " (Khan 1993: 52). 
Siddiq Salik echoed the same in his book Witness to Surrender: 
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The President's departure from Dacca was kept a secret-a greater secret than 
his arrival ten days earlier. A small drama was staged to deceive the public. 
The President drove in straight to Flag Staff House in the cantonment for 
afternoon tea. Before the light started fading, the President's cavalcade drove 
back to the President's House with the usual fanfare-the pilot jeep, outriders, 
the President's car with four-star plate and flag. But the President was not in 
the car. Brigadier Rafiq deputized for him. This blind was considered a great 
success, although Mujib's spies saw through the game. Lieutenant-Colonel A. 
R. Chaudhury, who was on Yahya's staff, saw the Dodge carrying the 
President's baggage to the airport and informed Mujibur Rehman. When 
General Yahya Khan entered the P. A. F. gate to board the plane at 1900 hours, 
Wing Commander Khondkar, who watched the show from his office, passed 
the word to Mujib. Fifteen minutes later, a foreign correspondent rang me 
from Hotel Intercontinental saying, 'Major, could you confirm that the 
President has left? ' 
By then, the night had already set in. Nobody knew then that it would be a 
night without a healing dawn at its end. (Salik 1977: 69-70; also see 
Appendix- 3&4: 71-78 & 79-80)) 
Fazlul Quader Quaderi very rightly points out: 
This arbitrary postponement provoked demonstrations in Dacca and other 
cities on March 1, which the military decided to control by force. The military 
authorities conceded 172 deaths in the disturbances, though the Dhaka 
correspondent of The Observer (London) put the figure nearer 2,000. Despite 
this bloody provocation the Awami League refrained from taking a decision. 
Instead they launched a campaign of civil disobedience to demand a return of 
troops to barracks and an inquiry into the firings. The campaign of non- 
cooperation effectively transferred civilian authority to Sheikh Mujib but even 
in the massive rally of March 7 Sheikh Mujib still spoke of a united Pakistan 
with autonomy for each province. His preparedness for negotiation and 
commitment to the unity of Pakistan was demonstrated by his continuation of 
talks for the next two weeks despite the well-advertised influx of West 
Pakistani troops. Indeed, in retrospect it would appear that the West Pakistani 
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officials were never negotiating in good faith; negotiations were a way to 
forestall an open break until sufficient numbers of West Pakistani troops could 
be brought on the scene to unleash a terror whose full dimensions are only 
now becoming known. The Awami League's commitment to a peaceful 
political settlement was convincingly demonstrated by the complete lack of 
preparation of the civilian population to the onslaught of military arms which 
was unleashed on them on the night of Thursday, March 25,1971. (Quaderi 
1972: 41) 
Now the revolutionaries knew that they had to make their own plans to keep 
the Chittagong area under their control. They made a deployment plan for Chittagong 
city. Major Ziaur Rahman took over the command of the 8 East Bengal Regiment. 
They had only three hundred soldiers with . 303 rifles and twelve LMGs, and just 
enough ammunition to sustain the Liberation War for 20 days. The deployment plan 
was as follows: 
a. One contingent, under Maj. Mir Shawkat Ali, to be deployed at the 
Chittagong Port area. 
b. One contingent, headed by Capt. Khalequzzaman, to be deployed at 
Kalurghat and the Chittagong Radio Station area. 
c. One contingent of EPR, under the command of Capt. Haroon, to be deployed 
at the Chittagong College and the Chittagong Medical College area. 
d. One contingent, under Capt. Sadeq Hossain, to block the reinforcement of 
the Pakistan Army at Sitakund. 
e. One contingent, under Lt. Mahfuz, to be deployed at Kalurghat to form a 
reserve. 
f. One contingent, under Lt. Shamsher Mobin Chowdhury, deployed for the 
Radio Station Kalurgat and Chakbazar area. 
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g. The Headquarter was established at Fultalla Primary School, Boalkhali 
under Capt. Oli Ahmad for coordinating the operations in Chittagong area. 
Major Ziaur Rahman and Capt. OR briefed all the contingent commanders. 
They were asked to avoid attack in the initial stage and resort to guerrilla warfare and 
defensive tactics. They were ordered to occupy their respective positions after sunset. 
Major Zia asked them to arrange their own logistics locally and keep Headquarters 
informed about situations every day through telephone or courier. The available 
weapons and ammunition were issued equally. No transports and wireless were 
available for use by the contingents. They were also asked to keep liaison with the 
nearest contingent commander. As a matter of fact all the commanders were asked to 
act independently and to include police and para-military forces with them. They 
wanted to surprise the Pakistani soldiers by taking up positions in several places 
during darkness. All the contingents moved out accordingly. Zia and Oli, with two 
sepoys as their bodyguards, followed them. They stopped in a village after about two 
miles walk and slept in a school building. Next day they started walking to reach the 
Patiya police station needing to establish contact with others over telephone. 
They failed to discover the exact location of Capt. Rafique, who had also 
deployed his troops inside the city. They heard from different sources that Rafique 
with his troops had taken up a defensive position in Halisahar and the Railway 
Headquarters areas with a view to blocking naval reinforcements. In the meantime, 
they found Subedar Mofiz of EPR going towards the city to meet Capt. Rafique with 
two truck loads of soldiers. They were also joined by about twenty policemen from 
Patiya. So two truck loads of soldiers and one truck load of police were placed under 
the command of Subedar Mafiz to take up a defensive position in the Chittagong 
Court Building area, which would also help establish contact with Rafique. Everyday 
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several police and members of the auxiliary forces named Ansar were joining them 
from different places. Gradually students and labourers from different factories also 
joined them and they increased their strength to a sizable number. However, they still 
faced the limitations in arms and ammunition. 
The Political Leaders in Disarray 
Zia and Oli kept on trying to find out if there was any announcement over the 
radio by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman or his colleagues, or indeed any instructions from 
him. Meanwhile, they established contact with the local Awami League leaders, 
including Dr. Jafar, an eye specialist, Prof. Nurul Islam and some student leaders. 
None, however, knew the whereabouts of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman or his senior 
colleagues. There was no instruction or guidance from the political leadership. 
Everybody was busy in getting out of the city to a safe shelter. Mr. Farooq Aziz Khan 
described how the Awami League Leaders had fled from the Dhaka city for a safe 
shelter: 
Reaching his house after leaving Sk. Mujib's residence at about 10.30 PM 
Tajuddin changed his clothes and wearing a lungi and a kurta and slinging a 
rifle on his shoulder, the three of them including Dr. Kamal Hossain and 
Barrister Amirul Islam headed for a friend's house in Lalmatia as 
arrangements were made earlier. According to Amirul Islam, Dr. Kamal 
Hossain declined to go any farther with his two friends and instead was 
dropped near road No. 15 where one of his relatives lived (Liberation War 
Documents, Vol. 15). He however told his friends that he would meet them 
as soon it would be possible for him to do so. Tajuddin and Amirul Islam 
went to their friend's house from where they planned to travel to India as 
soon as it was safe for them to undertake the journey. Dr. Kamal Hossain 
failed to turn up and the two left Mr. Musa's house in Lalmatia on March 27 
when the curfew imposed in the night of March 25 was relaxed for two 
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hours. Tajuddin and Amirul Islam played very important roles in the next 
nine months, particularly Tajuddin Ahmed, who made the most important 
contribution to our Liberation War in the absence of Sheikh Mujib. The two 
of them headed straight for the river Padma and crossed over to the district 
of Faridpur. (Khan, 1993: 53- 54) 
Drawing on extensive research on the contemporary situation during the War, 
Maniruzzaman Talukder rightly confirmed in his book: "The EBR (East Bengal 
Regiment) and EPR (East Pakistan Rifles) officers requested the Awami League 
leaders to send them a message about the outcome of their talks with Yahya. 
However, the AL leaders either deluded themselves into believing as late as March 24 
that Yahya was going to announce an agreement on the transfer of power, or they 
feared that a revolt by the Bengali officers might result in the displacement of the 
civilian AL leadership of the nationalist movement by the Bengali armed forces. In 
any case, no message from the AL leaders ever reached the EBR and EPR men. " 
(Talukder, 1988: 86) 
From the available information and circumstances, the Pakistani leaders were 
sure that their brutal actions taken in desperation, unleashing genocide, would quell 
the revolution by force, but unwittingly they fired the first shot in the break-up of 
Pakistan and thus prepared the Bengalis for total war (Hamoodur Rahman 
Commission Report, "1971: The Untold Story)2. In the meantime they met a 
gentleman at Patiya named Mahmud who was looking for Capt. Oli. He proposed to 
Capt. Oli Ahmad to declare Independence of Bangladesh. Mahmud claimed to have 
good connections with the government of USA and assured them of necessary help 
from the 7t' fleet including aircraft and heavy armaments anchored at Bay of Bengal. 
2 On the magnitude of atrocities committed by the Pakistani Army to the unarmed civilians of East 
Pakistan during the nine-month long Liberation War, see "1971: The Untold Story" by the Hamoodur 
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But Capt. Oli suggested Maj. Zia to go to Kalurghat Radio Transmission Centre and 
prepare his draft speech for the nation. The area was under their control. Mahmud 
informed them that he knew many officers and engineers serving in the radio station. 
Oli requested him to bring them at the Kalurghat Radio Transmission Centre in order 
to help them broadcast the declaration. He immediately left in a microbus and at about 
1 PM returned with the following personnel: Belal Mohammad, Abdul Kashem 
Chowdhury, Abdullah Al Farooque, Kazi Habib Uddin Ahmed, Jahedur Hossain, 
Aminur Rahman, Syed Abdul Sarker, Shakuzzaman, Mustafa Anwar and Rezaul 
Karim Chowdhury. 
Capt. Oli had many advantages over some of his collegues, because he hailed 
from Chittagong area whose entire community supported them in their struggle and 
participated in various ways. They were still sitting in the Patiya Police Station which 
is only 10 KM from Kalurghat and it was around 2 PM when Zia and Oli left for their 
respective destinations by private jeep arranged by the Officer in-Charge of the Police 
Station. Oli stopped on the way at the Fultala Primary School to establish and 
organize the temporary headquarters. Maj. Zia left for the Radio Transmission Centre 
accompanied by Mahmud and the other radio station staff. Zia asked Oli to reach the 
place by 5 PM to finalize the draft of the Declaration of Independence. 011 reached his 
headquarters at 2.30 PM and got hold of some civilian officers of the Boalkhali Police 
Station. He requested them to help him set up his temporary office. By 4.30 PM he 
set up his headquarters with police guards and a telephone connection. At about 4.35 
PM he started for the Kalurghat Radio Transmission Centre in a private jeep. On the 
way he was surprised to see Maj. Shawkat and Capt. Khalequzzaman near the 
Kalurghat Railway Bridge. They were supposed to be inside the city in their 
Rahman Commission Report 2000, published in India Today Group online. httn_h,, tivw India- 
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respective positions. They explained to Oli that they failed to cross the bridge last 
night and they would do so on this night. He asked them to stay back until he returned 
and briefed them about the latest developments. They might be needed to move to 
Cox's Bazaar with their troops, to stop any `beach landing' in their rear. They already 
knew about the planned Declaration of Independence, because they met Zia on his 
way to the Radio Station. Capt. Oli reached the Radio Station at 5.15 PM and found 
Maj. Zia waiting for him with a draft declaration. Zia was excited and tense. The 
original draft began by saying: "I Maj. Zia declare the Independence of Bangladesh 
and myself as head of the state". In the declaration, Zia asked all Bengali army 
officers, soldiers, paramilitary, Police, Ansar and civilians to join the Liberation War. 
He further said that 8 East Bengal Regiment had revolted on the night of 25/26 March 
1971 against the Pakistan Military Junta and announced the names of all officers of 
the battalion. He appealed to the international community to extend their full support 
and to give recognition to Bangladesh as an independent country. 
Siddiq Salik, a PRO in the Pakistan Army, who came to Bangladesh in 
January 1970 on duty and witnessed the surrender by Niazi, wrote in his book: 
The rebels initially had all the success. They effectively blocked the route of 
the Comilla column by blowing up the Subhapur Bridge near Feni. They also 
controlled major parts of the Chittagong Cantonment and the city. The only 
islands of government authority there were the 20 Baluch area and the naval 
base. Major Ziaur Rahman, the second-in-command of 8 East Bengal, 
assumed command of the rebels in Chittagong in the absence of Brigadier 
Majumdar who had been tactfully taken to Dacca a few days earlier. While the 
government troops clung to the radio station, in order to guard the building, 
Major Zia took control of the transmitters separately located on Kaptai Road 
and used the available equipment to broadcast the 'declaration of 
today com/itoday/e. tra/71war/atrocities6. htm108/27/2000. 
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independence' of Bangla Desh. Nothing could be done to turn the tables unless 
reinforcements arrived in Chittagong. (Salik, 1977: 79-80). 
Rehman Sobhan remarked: "On 27 March 1971 the people of Bangladesh and 
later the world heard the voice of an unknown major proclaiming independence for 
Bangladesh. " (Sobhan, 1993: 33). 
Oli read the draft declaration very carefully. He felt that if the first sentence of 
the announcement, wherein Zia declared himself as the Head of the State went on air, 
there might be non-cooperation from the followers of Mujib, who were prepared for 
the movement under his leadership. Besides, the Bengali military officers did not have 
any political ambition. They had to fill up the vacuum and cover-up the failures of the 
politicians to save the nation from total massacre in the hands of the Pakistan Military 
Junta. This view was held not only by Major Zia and Captain Oli but by all the 
Bengali officers who joined the Liberation War. This was corroborated by the fact 
that when the Government-in-exile was formed in 17 April 1971 the military officers 
and soldiers fought under the political leadership headed by Prime Minister Tajuddin 
Ahmed. 
The spirit of the action taken at that time is expressed by Sukhwant Singh who 
wrote: "Meanwhile, Radio Chittagong came on the air with Maj. Ziaur Rahman, a 
Bengali officer, announcing the formation of the provisional government of 
Bangladesh on 26 March. This was welcome news indeed to supporters of the 
liberation struggle, but the fate of Mujib and other top leaders of the Awami League 
still remained unknown" (Singh, 1980: 9). The Bengali military officers did not want 
to annoy any political leaders through their declaration on the one hand and the nation 
needed a direction at this critical juncture of the history, on the other. 
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Sukhwant Singh continues: "8 EBR, an all-East Pakistani battalion, killed its 
commanding officer and moved to the hills overlooking the base under its second in 
command Ziaur Rahman. He took over Radio Chittagong and raised the first cry of 
armed revolt against the military dictatorship. Zia was joined by elements of EPR and 
EBRC, and together they attacked 20 Baluch, which was firmly entrenched in the 
EBRC lines, with much success. Later, they occupied the whole of Chittagong town, 
causing damage to its non-Bengali colonies. They destroyed textile mills set up by 
some of West Pakistan's 22 ruling families to exploit the protected markets of East 
Pakistan. " (Singh, 1980: 10) 
The sole intention of the Bengali military officers was to unite the nation 
through the Declaration of Independence and inform the world about the War of 
Independence. It was not their aim to challenge the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman. Having that in mind they eventually amended the first sentence of the draft 
and the rest remained the same. The amended sentence was as follows: 
"I, Maj. Zia, declare the Independence of Bangladesh and myself as a 
Provisional Head of the state under the blessing of Bangabandhu Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman". 
Muhammad Shamsul Haque, once the Foreign Minister of Bangladesh, wrote 
in his book that President Sanjiva Reddy [of India] at the banquet hosted by him on 27 
December 1977 reverberated the spirit of friendship in the rich tributes paid by him to 
President Ziaur Rahman. The following excerpt is illustrative: 
"Your position is already assured in the annals of the history of your country 
as a brave freedom fighter who was the first to declare the independence of 
Bangladesh. Since yoti took over the reins of government in your country, you have 
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earned wide respect both in Bangladesh and abroad as a leader truly dedicated to the 
progress of your country and the well-being of your people. " (Haque, 1993: 96) 
Major Zia declared the Independence of Bangladesh on 27 March 1971 from 
Kalurghat Radio Transmission Centre at Chittagong and Capt. Oli was beside him. 
Subsequently the announcement was repeated every hour both in English and Bengali 
for the next twenty four hours by Lt. Shamsher Mobin Chowdhury, who was on duty 
for the protection of the Kalurghat Radio Transmission Centre. Both Zia and Oli left 
the Transmission Centre after giving these instructions to Lt. Shamsher. At about 7.45 
PM they reached the southern bank of the Karnafuli river and met Shawkat and 
Khalequzzaman. Capt. Oli realized that it would be madness for them to fight the War 
alone without weapons, ammunition and other necessary equipment. He discussed this 
issue with Maj. Zia, Maj. Shawkat and Capt. Khalequzzaman. They all knew that 
without external help, they would not be able to sustain the fight for more than 30 to 
40 days. Mahmud was asked to leave for Cox's Bazaar on the night of 27/28 March 
1971 to contact 7 ̀h fleet. Unfortunately the plan did not materialize as he was killed on 
suspicion by the local people on 28 March 1971 at a place called Dolahazara on Cox's 
Bazaar Road. 
The Declaration of Independence by Maj. Zia created a sensation, brought a 
sigh of relief to all sectors of society, gave a sense of direction to the nation, boosted 
the morale of the people and gave impetus to the sagging political movement in the 
absence of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. People now could know what to do and where to 
go. Zia's announcement "was heard by many and passed on by word of mouth to 
those who had not" (Jacob, 1998: 34). 
The War of Independence started from Chittagong. The military officers 
started with virtually no resources except a deep commitment and devotion to the 
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cause of Independence of Bangladesh. The atrocities of the Pakistan occupation forces 
made them determined and courageous. On hearing the Declaration of Independence 
by Zia, many Bengali armed forces and civilian personnel organized themselves in 
hundreds of small groups and started resisting the Pakistan Army throughout the 
country. Most of the senior political leaders left for India in search of a safer shelter. 
They were not available to give leadership at least during the initial stage of the 
revolt 
Thus the course was determined for the people of East Pakistan, who through 
grueling ordeals and painful moments during the following nine months had the 
privilege of celebrating victory on 16 December 1971. What is unique about this 
chapter of Bangladeshi national history is that the military officers, mostly of the 
ranks of captain and major, were constrained to do what the political leaders were 
supposed to do. These officers, youthful but mature enough to respond to the demands 
of the time, did not fail to take the crucial decision and carry it out. The political 
I- leaders, on the other hand, failed in their avocation. Once the Declaration of 
Independence was made, a definite direction was pointed out, indicating the only 
highway open for the nation and that was the highway to the Liberation War. 
As noted earlier in this Chapter, the military are unlikely to achieve a 
resounding victory in a national cause unless backed up by organized national efforts 
which can be properly mobilized by political parties and movements. During the 
course of the Liberation War this support was forthcoming but not before 17 April 
1971. Till then the military officers were the lynchpins of the entire movement. Even 
after three decades of national liberation, the insiders' story, which has remained 
untold till now, is the key to an understanding of the genesis of the Liberation War. 
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The First Stage in the Liberation War 
Major Shawkat and Captain Khalequzzaman were put in charge of Cox's 
Bazaar in order to recruit and organize the new freedom fighters and protect the 
coastal belt. Maj. Zia and Capt. Oli decided to undertake the following action 
programmes: 
a. Since their resources were very limited, they would resort to guerrilla tactics, 
ambush and engagement in defensive battles; 
b. they would open at least five to six battle fronts inside Chittagong city to 
disperse and draw the enemy in different directions; 
c. they would continue to draw support from the general public and from 
Awami League leaders and workers in particular; 
d. they would make a second announcement on radio to hand over power to 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and declare Major Zia as the Commander-in-Chief 
of the Liberation Forces. 
The Bangladeshi troops, although not well-equipped, were brave and also 
efficient in ambushes and guerrilla attacks that created terror in the hearts of the 
Pakistani occupation forces. They were, however, uncertain whether they would be 
able to maintain their capability, without a continued supply of weapons, ammunition 
and without a clear political direction. 
They could not get any information about Captain Rafique who was 
commanding the EPR, nor could they ascertain his whereabouts. Capt. Oli sent his 
men to different places of Chittagong city, but to his surprise, they could not trace 
him. Later on, he came to know that Rafique had gone alone to Ramgar, a small town 
located near the Indian border about 50 miles away from Chittagong city. He wanted 
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perhaps to establish contact with the neighbouring country. However, his departure 
meant that there was a communication gap and Captain Rafique did not leave any 
information. Consequently, many of his EPR troops joined 8 East Bengal and 
participated in the different battlefronts. The combined number of troops now reached 
nearly one thousand but they needed more officers to command them. 
The Stage of Full Mobilization 
The Bengali military officers were trying to establish contact with other 
Bengali officers in the Chittagong Cantonment to lead and command the troops 
operating in different parts of the city. There were 5 to 7 Bengali Officers in the 
Chittagong Cantonment; but they were not available. Captain Muslim, another 
freedom fighter, somehow managed to escape from the Embarkation Headquarters 
and organized a small group at Hathazari on the north of Chittagong Cantonment. He 
conducted battles in different places near the Chittagong University area. Captain 
Subed All Bhuiyan of EBRC had crossed the border by car along with his family on 
28/29 March 1971 and reached India to ensure the safety and security for himself and 
his family. It surprised and shocked everybody that he too had left the battlefield at 
Chittagong. 
Gradually some of the troops of the EBRC started to join the fight, reinforcing 
the strength of the rebel forces. Some of the troops quickly left for their respective 
districts, leaving the battlefield at Chittagong. There were two possible reasons for 
them to quit Chittagong: firstly, they might have been worried about the ultimate 
outcome of the war; secondly, in the light of the guerrilla warfare, they considered it 
more suitable for them to fight in their respective areas, where the terrain and people 
were better known to them. Communication was difficult. They did not have any 
158 
telephone or wireless sets with the troops in different locations. It was very difficult to 
ascertain who were fighting and where. Only 7 officers of the 8 East Bengal Regiment 
and Captain Haroon of the EPR continued to command the troops inside the city. 
On 30 March 1971 there were fierce battles in some places of the city of 
Chittagong. The performance of the Bengali troops and a few Bengali officers were 
simply excellent. Many Pakistani soldiers were killed, but the exact number could not 
be ascertained. Some troops of the First Commando Battalion of the Pakistan Army 
landed in several places of Chittagong by C-1303. The Commanding Officer of the 
First Commando Battalion along with adjutant was killed in the action. At about 2 PM 
Capt. Oli brought to the notice of Major Zia the real state of affairs and requested him 
to change his plan. He persuaded Zia to make a new announcement. Both of them left 
for the Kalurghat Transmission Centre. At 5 PM Major Zia made an announcement, 
drafted by Oli and himself, saying that: "I, Major Zia, declare myself as Commander- 
in-Chief of the Liberation Forces of Bangladesh and hand over the power to Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman. " This second announcement was intended to show respect to 
democratic values and to the elected public representatives. 
After the announcement was made, Oli along with Major Zia, returned from 
the transmission centre to their Headquarters in a jeep. On the way approximately one 
platoon of the Pakistan Army commando attacked them. The commandos missed the 
target and they reached their destination safely. Capt. ON has faced death a number of 
times in his life and he is of the opinion that the final hour is only known to God. He, 
along with his comrades, joined the war for the liberation of Bangladesh, which was 
necessary for upholding and ensuring the fundamental rights of the Bengali nation. 
3A specialized aircraft used for conveyance of military personnel. 
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They believed that they were fighting for a noble cause; a cause created and nurtured 
by history. 
On March 30 in the evening at 7 PM Maj. Zia told Oli that he intended to 
leave for Ramgar immediately and wanted to establish contact with the Indian 
Government to procure arms and ammunition. They could not capture the Chittagong 
Cantonment and the Chittagong Naval Base mainly due to the absence of a timely 
political decision. Besides, one of the main personalities, Lt. Col. M. R. Chowdhury 4, 
who planned the revolt, was killed by the Pakistan occupation forces on the night of 
25 March 1971. 
Pakistani troops were well trained and equipped with abundant weapons. On 
the other hand, the freedom fighters needed a continued supply of weapons to resist 
them. Maj. Zia, quite aware of the severity of the crisis, maintained a calmness 
throughout, although at the time, Zia did not know the whereabouts of his wife and 
children. Capt. OR noted with astonishment that he uttered not a word about his 
family. All his worries seemed to centre on the War. OR found him calm and steady, 
yet prompt in taking the major decisions. 
Maj. Zia suggested that Oli should be in charge of conducting operations at 
Chittagong for such time as Maj. Shawkat remained at Cox's Bazaar. Major Zia left 
for Ramgar with only 20 troops. It was then 7.30 PM. Zia handed over to Oli charge 
of planning and control of affairs in the Chittagong District. 
Later on, Oli ascertained that the enemy troops, who launched the attack on 
them on 30 March 1971 took position in a building located near the Transmission 
4A critical report on the role of military in the war, published in The People's I'Jew (February 
29,1972), noted: "Lt. Col. M. R. Chowdhury is one of the high ranking army officers at Chittagong who first thought of armed revolt for the cause of the people of Bangladesh if such a call came from Sheikh Mujibur Rahmau". 
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Centre. Capt. Oli ordered Lt. Mahfuz and Subedar Abdul Aziz to attack the enemy 
commando platoon. This was possibly their first real battle and it was a precious 
experience for them. Lt. Mahfuz and his troops inflicted a crushing defeat on the 
Pakistani Commandos, capturing all their weapons, ammunition, uniforms and 
wireless sets. They handed over the items to Oli in the morning of 31 March 1971 at 8 
AM in the Fultala Headquarters. It was a great victory for the freedom fighters. Lt. 
Mahfuz and his troops displayed a truly heroic spirit. On the same day the Pakistani 
troops attacked the Bengali forces positioned at the Chittagong College, Shitakunda, 
and Halishahar area. The Bengali troops despite their limited resources resisted the 
attack. The enemy suffered heavy losses and casualties. 
The Indian BSF was on alert and the Indian Government was observing the 
situation in Bangladesh. Refugees from Bangladesh started crowding the Indian 
borders for shelter. The Pakistan occupation forces were relentless in their oppression. 
They started killing innocent civilians mercilessly. They attacked three residential 
halls of Dhaka University and killed hundreds of students. They even went inside the 
residences of Dhaka University teachers and on the night of 25 March 1971 killed at 
least 15 of them including Professor M. Maniruzzaman, Philosopher Gobinda C. Dev, 
Professor Abul Khair, Professor Muneir Choudhury and so on. According to one 
estimate, as many as 50,000 innocent people, living mostly in the slum areas of Dhaka 
city, lost their lives in the night of 25 March 1971 (Ali, 1973: 94). Oli contacted 
Major Zia through an EPR wireless from time to time and appraised him of the 
situation. Major Zia was not a man to remain silent. He was active in organizing the 
liberation forces and freedom fighters in different places of north Chittagong, 
Noakhali and part of Comilla district. He also organized training for them. He ordered 
the EPR troops to be stationed in different places and take defensive positions. Fierce 
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battles took place all over Chittagong City and brave commanders and soldiers fought 
well in every action. Nobody knew the whereabouts of Major Zia except Oli. But Oli 
did not disclose the news of Zia's departure to any one until 7 April 1971, because 
Zia's absence might negatively affect the morale of the troops. It was a huge 
responsibility for Capt. OR alone to organize food, arms, and ammunition for the 
soldiers and, above all, to keep regular contact with them. He made it clear to all 
commanders that they should gradually draw the Pakistani troops out of the city and 
inflict as many casualties as possible without spending more ammunition. 011 
conducted the affairs on behalf of Major Zia from 31 March onwards. His principal 
aim was to reassemble with Zia finally near the India-Bangladesh border at Ramgar 
for reorganization, regrouping and further help from India. 
By this time, Capt. Haroon, Lt. Mahfuz and Lt. Shamsher Mobin Chowdhury 
along with their troops had taken a defensive position on the north bank of the river 
Karnafuli at Kalurghat. Capt. Matin of 4E Bengal along with his company was 
brought by Zia from the Comilla area and asked to take up a defensive position at 
Sitakund about 30 km on the north of Chittagong City, while Capt. Muslim was 
fighting the Pakistani troops in the Chittagong University area. They had driven the 
Pakistani troops out of the city area in three different directions and successfully 
divided their strength. The freedom fighters had an upper hand over them, as the 
Pakistani troops did not get any support from the local people. 
It was clear that during the period between 26 March and 11 April 1971, the 
whole of greater Chittagong district and Chittagong Hill Tracts remained under the 
control of 8 East Bengal Regiment. Oli knew for sure that there had been successes in 
their ambush and attacks. However, in the absence of external help, they were not 
certain as to how long they could endure the pressure of the War, despite their best 
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efforts. Moreover, Major Zia could not come back because he wanted to remain near 
the Indian border and at a centrally located place from where he could coordinate the 
battles in the three greater districts of Chittagong, Chittagong hill tracts and Noakhali. 
Capt. OR had contact with him by wireless. By 6 April, they started receiving small 
quantities of arms and ammunition from the BSF, although not on a regular basis. 
Since the departure of Major Zia for Ramgar, Oli had to remain particularly vigilant 
until the withdrawal of Bengali troops from the Fultala Primary School. 
On 2 April 1971 the Occupation Forces attacked the defensive positions at the 
Court Building and State Bank areas causing heavy casualties to both sides. The 
combined troops of the freedom fighters lost ten soldiers in these battles. Between the 
period of 3 April and 6 April 1971 there had been relentless street fighting in 
Chittagong City. On 6 April 1971 the Pakistani troops attacked the defensive position 
at Chawk Bazaar with tanks. Capt. Haroon and Lt. Shamsher Mobin fought the enemy 
with great courage, inflicting heavy casualties on them and lost five soldiers. On 7 
April 1971 the Pakistan forces attacked the Kalurghat Transmission Centre. 
Consequently, the Bengali troops were withdrawn. Maj. Shawkat along with Capt. 
Khaleq came back on 7 March 1971. They started visiting different positions in the 
area from 8 April 1971. Capt. Khalequzzaman took a defensive position on the 
southern bank of river Karnafuli in support of others on the northern bank. 
Maj. Shawkat took over the command of Chittagong from Capt. Oli. On 9 
April 1971 one platoon of soldiers, led by Maj. Shawkat, raided and defeated the 
enemy positions at the Agricultural Building near the Kalurghat Radio Transmission 
Centre. It was a heroic action by him and the troops under his command. 30 Pakistani 
soldiers were killed in this battle. Since the Headquarters was located at the Fultala 
Primary School of Kalurghat, it was the target of Pakistani forces. At 6 AM on 11 
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April 1971 they attacked the defensive position at Kalurghat bridge area with artillery 
support and fierce fighting took place the whole day. The Pakistanis encircled the 
Bengali troops by the evening. The people of Boalkhali and Patiya were not safe and 
there could have been civilian casualties later on. Therefore, Oli considered it to be 
suicidal for them to stay there. Besides the troops did not have enough arms and 
ammunition. There was also a danger of being forced to move towards the Burmese 
border and be isolated from rest of the freedom fighters. The Pakistan Army had the 
plan to set fire and burn the local houses. The freedom fighters were not in a position 
to confront them without replenishing ammunition. There was no other alternative for 
them but to withdraw from there. Under these compelling circumstances, Major 
Shawkat and Capt. Oli ordered a withdrawal of the entire forces in order to avoid a 
massacre of the civil population in the hands of Pakistani forces. 
On 11 April 1971 Oli recorded in his diary: "Left Kalurghat Bridge and 
ordered the withdrawal of complete forces to Ramgar via Banderban, Kaptai, 
Rangamati and Mahalchari to avoid the massacre of civilian population. Boalkhali 
and Patiya are very thickly populated; hundreds of civilian population may be killed 
by the Pakistani troops. My troops will also be cornered in the hilly areas, if there is a 
Pakistani attack, if we can not withdraw by this evening. " They had, therefore, to 
withdraw and leave for Ramgar to replenish arms and ammunition. Oli, Shawkat, 
Mahfuz and Khalequzzaman left for Ramgar on the night of 11 April 1971, along 
with the troops, following the long, perilous and mountainous routes through 
Banderban, Kaptai, Rangamati, Mahalchari and Matiranga. Facing great odds, they 
did not lose heart. The savagery of the Pakistan Forces made them all the more 
adamant to face and crush the enemy. The Pakistani forces plundered the local 
villages one after another, destroyed houses and farms by setting fire recklessly, raped 
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and/or killed innumerable women and massacred thousand of innocent civilians 
(Choudhury & Kabir, 1991). The atrocities by the Pak Army were so grave that Lt. 
Gen. AAK Niazi, who headed the Eastern Command, himself acknowledged the 
nature of savagery committed by his soldiers. (See Appendix- 6, Niazi, 1998: 282- 
283. See also The Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report, 1971). 
Farooq Aziz Khan puts the gruesome period in the following terms: 
"Those of my readers who were not in Bangladesh on the night of March 25 
and the following months would never appreciate fully the agony through which the 
75 million Bengalis had gone. The terror that was unleashed by Yahya's army and 
their Bengali henchmen, who were religious fanatics, cannot be matched by anything 
that we read in history or see in the movies. My own description of the real situation 
will fall far short of what had actually happened. The pen may be mightier than the 
sword but it can hardly draw the true picture of what the Pakistanis did in Bangladesh 
in the nine months following the crackdown. " (Khan, 1993: 61) 
Major Shawkat, Capt. Khalequzzaman and Lt. Mahfuz stayed back at 
Mahalchari for stopping the advancement of the Pakistani forces towards Ramgar. 
Capt. Oli reached Ramgar on 13 April 1971 and met Zia to brief him about the latest 
situation. 
The Taste of Victory During the Initial Stages 
The next significant phase in the War of Liberation started when Major Zia 
instructed Oli to proceed to Mirersarai. The Pakistan forces launched a major attack in 
Sitakund causing the freedom fighters to retreat. The message of the retreat shocked 
Major Zia. He felt that the forces there might have insufficient organizational skill to 
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withstand an offensive. He was determined to stop the advancement of the Pakistani 
Army towards Mirersarai, located strategically between the Chittagong and Comilla 
Cantonments. Zia summoned Oli at the dead of night on 13 April 1971 and directed 
him to proceed to Mirersarai with the mission of thwarting the advancement of the 
enemy forces. Oli left to lead the operation to be launched at Mirersarai, about 35 
miles away from Ramgar. 
On 14 April 1971 Capt. Oli and his company of soldiers took a defensive 
position at Mirersarai and maintained complete secrecy regarding their position. Oli's 
strategy was to lure the enemy to come into a trap, as their arms and ammunition were 
simply not sufficient to directly counter the well-stocked and highly trained enemy 
forces. Oli's only advantage was his familiarity with the local landscape. He had two 
platoons of Ex-EPR and one platoon of newly trained freedom fighters for the 
operation. His Company was equipped with only one 3" mortar under Havilder 
Siddique, one MG under LNK Abul Hossain and one 75mm RR from the Second East 
Bengal Regiment. The Pakistani Brigade operating at Sitakund had all types of heavy 
and light machine guns. 
But these odds failed against Oli's undaunted zeal and vigour. As Oli joined 
them, the soldiers were very much encouraged and pledged to fight with reassured 
energy and enthusiasm. He carefully surveyed the locality and chalked out the details 
of operation. He followed the 'defensive intelligence' strategy, which he learned and 
practiced while he was at the Lahore Cantonment under the command of Lt. Col. 
M. R. Chowdhury. In spite of their repeated attempts, the enemy forces failed to trace 
the freedom fighters' location. Oli observed the movements and behaviour of the 
Pakistani troops until 19 April 1971. It was early in the morning on 20 April 1971 that 
Oli started the usual business of going round the company's positions at different 
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points. His personal escort Naik Faiz Ahmed of the 8 East Bengal Regiment 
accompanied him. But to his utter surprise he found neither the platoon commander 
Subedar Serajul Islam, nor the platoon Havilder in their respective trenches along 
with their troops. He decided to go round all the trenches to see whether the soldiers 
had been on duty or not. Oli ordered all the soldiers and freedom fighters to go to their 
respective trenches and to be fully prepared for the attack. He categorically ordered 
them not to leave their respective positions until direct orders came from him as the 
company commander. 
No sooner had he reached the main road he saw a microbus moving speedily 
towards their position. He stood still for a while hiding himself behind a bush. He 
found the microbus being followed by a truck, popularly called `3 tonner'. The 
subsequent events happened very quickly. The `3 tonner' entered the Bengali 
defensive position, followed by about 20 more trucks with Pakistani soldiers on 
board. The military build-up of the Pakistan side was clearly great. ON intended to 
attack them suddenly and to take advantage of the initial shock and surprise of an 
unexpected attack. He ordered his company to fire on the enemy convoy. Lance Naik 
of the 2 East Bengal Regiment, Abul Hussain, who was in charge of MG detachment, 
put up gallant fighting and destroyed the rear most vehicle. The enemy soldiers were 
caught unprepared. Havilder Siddique took the opportunity to fire a few rounds of 3" 
mortar on the enemy vehicles. The shots were accurate and the enemy could not find 
any routes to escape. Havilder Siddique was a brave fighter. The actions of other 
troops were also prompt and they carried out coordinated firing on the enemies from 
both sides of the Dhaka-Chittagong Trunk Road. Most enemy soldiers died inside 
their vehicles. The Pakistan artillery unit and mortar platoons fired back, but to little 
avail as they failed to locate the exact positions of the freedom fighters. They were 
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trapped within the radius of the defensive positions. They could move neither 
backward nor forward. Oli was happy to see his combat plan succeed in the field. 
During this battle, he personally destroyed three enemy vehicles with a 75mm RR. 
At about 3 PM, another platoon of Ex-EPR under the leadership of Subedar 
Saidul had another fierce battle with the enemy in the locality. During the action, L/N 
Abul Kalam of EPR died on the spot when a piece of splinter of a mortar-shell hit him 
on his chest. This fearless soldier joined those great patriots, who sacrificed their lives 
for the freedom of the motherland. At about 2 PM Havilder Siddique received a bullet 
injury to chest and later on he was removed to the nearby hospital for immediate 
treatment. 
This was the first time since the start of the War that such a strong enemy 
force as large as a battalion was contained, trapped and crushed with heavy casualties. 
In this battle more than 150 enemy soldiers were killed and many sustained injuries 
and as many as 8 vehicles were completely destroyed. The battle continued from 6 
AM in the morning until 10 PM at night. Later on Oli ordered his soldiers to move 
back to Mastan Nagar under cover of night. Mastan Nagar was their next defensive 
position. 
The Battle of Mirersarai was significant and it offered hope to the freedom 
fighters. They gained confidence to proceed whatever might be the strength of the 
enemies. They were, however, well aware that the enemy forces would certainly 
arrange a counter attack to take revenge on them. In case the enemy reinforced 
themselves, it would not be possible for them to resist them from the defensive 
positions they occupied at Mirersarai with such meagre resources. Therefore, Oli 
considered it unwise to remain at Mirersarai. To form another defensive position 
towards the north, Oli withdrew the troops and moved to the hilly areas of Mastan 
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Nagar. Amongst the civilians, Musharraf Hussain, MPA, especially extended his 
cooperation to the freedom fighters. His services were laudable. In the Battle of 
Mirersarai, one soldier was lost while five others were injured. 
The Stage Set for a National War of Independence 
After the withdrawal from Mirersarai on 20 April 1971, Capt. Oli along with 
Capt. Matin decided to occupy the small hillocks of Mastan Nagar, overlooking the 
Dhaka - Chittagong Highway. Capt. Matin, along with his company, occupied the 
western side of the highway, while Oli's company took position in the hillocks on the 
eastern side. Major Zia visited them at about 10 AM on 21 April 1971 and left after 
half an hour for his Headquarters at Ramgar to coordinate the battles within the 
Chittagong and Noakhali areas. On 21 April 1971 at 11 AM the enemy attacked their 
positions, supported by artillery and tanks. They used tanks for the first time since 26 
March 1971. The fighting continued for the whole day. The enemy forces were 
desperate to keep the Dhaka - Chittagong Highway clear for the movement of their 
troops. It was difficult for Matin and OR to resist the huge force, despite their courage 
and dedication. Both of them decided to move to the next defensive position at 
Karerhat next day during the early hours. Oli fought successive engagements at 
Karerhat, Tulatala, Haku, Chikanchara, Baganbari and finally at Ramgar. Likewise, 
Maj. Shawkat, Capt. Khalequzzaman and Lt. Mahfuz fought engagements at 
Mahalchari and Guimara and finally moved to Ramgar to cross the border on the 
night of 2 May 1971. During these battles, they received a limited supply of arms and 
ammunition from the Indian Border Security Forces. India also supplied them with 
explosives to blow a few bridges out along their frontier. 
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Maj. Rafique stationed himself at Ramgar during this whole period and tried 
to establish contacts with the Awami League leaders and the Indian Border Security 
Forces. On 22 April 1971, he visited Oli at Karerhat with some explosives and stayed 
one night with him at the Karerhat High School. They were successful in drawing the 
Pakistani troops in different directions close to the Indian border. Maj. Khaled 
Musharraf, along with 4 East Bengal Regiment, located at Bramanbaria, and Major 
K. M. Safiullah along with 2 East Bengal Regiment, located at Joydevpur, joined the 
fight on 29 March 1971. Capt. Hafiz along with 1 East Bengal regiment, located at 
Jessore, joined on 30 March 1971 while Major Nizam with 3 East Bengal Regiment, 
located at Saidpur, joined the war subsequently. By the end of the first week of April 
1971 numerous large and small groups organized themselves under the leadership of 
many Bengali Officers, JCOs and NCOs of the Army, EPR, Police and Ansar and 
started resisting the enemy all over Bangladesh. 
Oli, Zia, Maj. Rafique, Shawkat and others reached the Harina Camp on 
Indian Territory on 3 May 1971 and soon afterwards, they started organizing 
themselves for the next battle. The Indian Border Security Forces (BSF) were on alert 
along the border. BSF started helping the evacuation of unarmed civilians, rendering 
medical facilities, supplying a limited quantity of food stuff, arms and ammunition. 
By this time, the civil (political) government, with assistance from India, had 
organized its activities and started to exercise its authority in different spheres. A 
cabinet was formed and given the oath on 17 April 1971 under the direct guidance of 
the Indian government and army generals. Syed Nazrul Islam was made the Acting 
Vice-President and Tajuddin Ahmed, the Prime Minister. Eventually, for ensuring 
better management of the War of Independence, the entire country was divided into 
eleven "sectors", headed by the following Sector Commanders. 
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Name of Sector Area Name of Commander 
No. 1 Sector Chittagong and Chittagong " Major Ziaur Rahman (from April 
Hill Tract districts up to Feni 1971 to June 1971) 
River. " Major Mir Shawkat Ali (June 
1971) 
" Major Mohammad Rafique (from 
July 1971 to December 1971) 
No. 2 Sector Noakhali District, Comilla " Major Khaled Musharraf (from 
District up to Akhaura, April 1971 to September 1971) 
Bhairab Railway line, Part of " Major A. T. M. Haider (from 
Faridpur, and Dhaka District. September 1971 to December 
1971) 
No. 3 Sector From Akhaura - Bhairab " Major K. M. Safiullah (from April 
Railway Line - Eastern side 1971 to September 1971) 
of Comilla District, Habigonj " Major Nurruzzaman (from 
and Kishoregonj Sub division September 1971 to December 
and Part of Dhaka District. 1971) 
No. 4 Sector From Eastern Side of Sylhet " Major C. R. Dutta 
District up to East, Western 
Side of Sylhet - Douki Road. 
No. 5 Sector Western Side of Sylhet " Major Mir Shawkat Ali (from July 
District, Sunamgonj 1971 to December 1971) 
Subdivision and up to 
Mymensingh Border. 
No. 6 Sector Greater District of Rangpur " Wing Commander M. Basher 
and Dinajpur. 
No. 7 Sector Rajshahi, Bogra and Pabna " Major Kazi Nuruzzaman 
District. 
No. 8 Sector Kustia, Jessore, Khulna " Major Abu Osman Chowdhury 
District and part of Faridpur (from April 1971 to August 1971) 
District. " Major M. A. Mannan (from 
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Name of Sector 
No. 9 Sector 
No. 10 Sector 
No. 11 Sector 
Area 
Barisal, Patuakhali District 
and Part of Khulna District. 
River Ports including 
Chittagong and Chalna. 
Part of Mymensingh and 
Tangail District. 
Name of Commander 
August1971 to December 1971) 
" Major A. Jalil 
" Under the Naval Commandos. 
" Major Abu Taher (from August 
1971 to November 1971) 
" Flight Lieutenant M. Hamidullah 
(from November 1971 to 
December 1971) 
On the military side, three new brigades were raised after July 1971 and these 
were: 
Name of the Brigade 
'Z' Force 
'K' Force 
'S' Force 
Name of Brigade 
Commander 
" Lt. Col. Ziaur Rahman 
" Lt. Col. Khaled 
Musharraf 
" Major Abu Salek 
" Lt. Col. K. M. Saflullah 
Period 
" July 1971 to Dec. 1971 
" Sept. 1971 to Nov. 1971 
" Nov. 1971 to Dec. 1971 
" Sept. 1971 to Dec. 1971 
The (political) Ministers had little idea about what was going on in the war 
zones. Indian army generals started monitoring the day to day affairs of the Freedom 
Fighters directly and, in some places, through the Indian Border Security Forces. The 
Bangladeshi politicians wanted to establish their control and command over the entire 
forces fighting for Independence; and with that end in view, they appointed Col. 
M1 
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M. A. G. Osmani (Retd. ), an elected member of Parliament from the Awami League, as 
the Commander-in-Chief of the Bangladesh Armed Forces. He was promoted to the 
rank of general from that of colonel, and another retired Col. Abdur Rouf of the Army 
Supply Corps was appointed his Deputy. Major Ziaur Rahman, Capt. OR and other 
military officers always remained loyal to the Bangladesh Government-in-exile. They 
accorded their full support to Col. Muhammad Ataul Gani Osmani (Retired)- the 
Commander-in-Chief, although he was a retired officer and had nothing to do with 
the army. Besides he was an elected member of the parliament representing the 
Awami League. The Awami League Government could not rely on an officer in 
uniform with the position of commander-in-chief. Moreover they wanted to check 
and control the activities of Major Ziaur Rahman by placing Col. M. A. G. Osmani 
(Retd. ) in charge. According to the announcement from the Radio-Kalurghat, 
Chittagong on the 30 March 1971, Major Ziaur Rahman continued to be the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Liberation Army. But immediately after crossing over to 
India, he was made the sector commander of No. 1 Sector (Greater Chittagong, 
Chittagong Hill Tract and a part of the greater Noakhali District). 
Hundreds of camps were set up along the India-Bangladesh border, with the 
assistance of India, to provide training and orientation to thousands of young freedom 
fighters. To their surprise, they observed that even after appointing a retired colonel 
(and a party man) as Commander-in-Chief, the politicians still could not rest assured 
and could not place their full trust in Bangladesh Army. They started raising and 
patronizing a separate force, known as the Bangladesh Liberation Forces, popularly 
known as the Mujib Bahini, mainly constituted by the followers of Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman. The Acting President and the Prime Minister of the Bangladesh Government 
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in exile had little control over this special force. They were directly under the control 
of the Indian Army for all practical purposes'. 
Here two things need to be clarified. The Bangladesh Government-in-exile, 
which was formed at Mujibnagar on 17 April 1971, consisted of the Awami League 
leaders. This government appointed MAG Osmani, a retired Colonel and an elected 
member of the parliament the Commander-in-Chief of the Bangladesh armed forces, 
and Major Ziaur Rahman, the commander of Sector One. The Bangladesh Army 
expected that Major Ziaur Rahman, who revolted from the Pakistan Army and 
declared Independence of Bangladesh, would be the Chief of Bangladesh armed 
forces. The researcher feels that this was due to several reasons. In the first place, the 
Government-in-exile took the responsibility of mobilizing the war efforts and put 
such a person in the position of the Commander-in-Chief who was an Awami 
Leaguer. Secondly, recalling the fact that the Awami League leadership failed to 
declare Independence of Bangladesh in right moment and it was done by a young and 
energetic army officer Major Ziaur Rahman, the government thought that Major Zia 
might emerge as a person more powerful than anyone else. He might not obey the 
instructions of the government. 
This created a bit of tension in the minds of the Bengali military officers. The 
Bengali Army however ignored all these and fought gallantly under the leadership of 
Colonel MAG Osmani, who was later on promoted to the rank of a general. 
The Government of India, on the other hand, had their own reasons for getting 
involved in the East Pakistan crisis. This was reflected in the statement of K. 
Subrahmanyam, Director of Indian Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis. On 31 
s In the same vein, after the Independence of the country, a separate force, called Rakkhi Bahini, was formed, controlled by an officer of the Indian Army, for the personal safety and security of the 
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March 1971 he told in the meeting of the Indian Council of World Affairs in Delhi 
that "dismemberment of Pakistan was in India's interest" and hence it would not be 
wise for India to waste the opportunity presented by East Pakistan crisis, an 
opportunity "the like of which will never come again" (Subrahmanyam, 1971). 
While the Indian leadership was supportive of the Liberation War in East 
Pakistan, it was equally keen to ascertain the nature of leadership of the Bangladesh 
military. Troubled as India was by the pro-Chinese militants in the state of West 
Bengal (Brown, 1972: 287), India did not want to encourage such armed resistance in 
East Pakistan as it could lead to similar situation and strengthen the left forces there. 
Consequently, it was not until the second week of April 1971 when the Government 
of India learnt that East Pakistan's political leadership had sworn support' to the 
leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Awami League and found that the Awami 
League was not a left leaning political party, then they acquiesced in the formation of 
Bangladesh Government-in-exile. 
That was not all. While advocating Indian military intervention in East 
Pakistan to help its separation from Pakistan, Indian leadership argued that "by such 
pre-emptory military moves India could ensure her security by preventing a radically 
left-oriented leadership from being installed in free Bangladesh (Peter Hazelhurt's 
Report 1971; Subrahmanyam, 1971). With that end in view, the Government of India 
organized the Mujib Bahini, comprising the followers of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. 
But the main battle was however conducted by the Bangladeshi armed forces 
and the freedom fighters. Not getting any support from the people of East Pakistan 
and being attacked from all sides in East Pakistan, which for all practical purposes 
President of Bangladesh - Sheikh Mujibur Rahman - who was subsequently killed by a group of army 
officers and troops on 15 August 1975 in his official residence in Dhaka. 
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was a distant foreign land to the soldiers of West Pakistan, the Pakistan Army became 
exhausted. Moreover, the objective before the Pakistan Army was not inspiring; it was 
merely to suppress the people of East Pakistan and keep East Pakistan as a captive 
land by force. The large-scale killing of the innocent people of East Pakistan, mainly 
to create an environment of fear all around for achieving their end, was also 
demoralizing to the Pakistani armed forces. At the beginning they underestimated the 
fighting capabilities of Bengali officers, soldiers and civilians. The Pakistan Army 
thought that a heavy onslaught against the Bengalis would destroy their power of 
resistance and they would be left helpless to submit to the wishes of Pakistani ruling 
elite. The high ideals of freedom and independence in the free state of Bangladesh 
began to motivate the Bengali armed forces as days passed by and they began to 
emerge as an indomitable force. Moreover, being supported by the entire nation, 
which underwent a revolutionary zeal during the nine-month long Liberation War, the 
Bangladesh armed forces became practically invincible. It became gradually clear 
that they could not suppress the nation's desire and struggle for Independence. 
Ultimately, they had no option but to surrender and the Bangladesh Army won its 
War of Independence on 16 December 1971. (Appendix- 7) 
Zia and Oli started the war without knowing much of the possible 
consequences. They revolted in the midst of great uncertainties and in the absence of 
any clear, political direction and guidance. They, however, knew well that victory 
comes from courage, faith, patience and devotion to a cause, as professed and 
suggested in the Holy Quran (Ali, Vol. - 2,1390). 
Victory and help go with calmness of mind, faith, fidelity, zeal, and 
earnestness; not with greed, lukewarmness or timidity. Discipline and 
obedience are essential for service. The rewards for service are not to be 
measured by immediate results, but accrue in countless hidden ways for 
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patience and restraint. Be strong against evil, but kind and gentle amongst 
yourselves: the seed will grow and become strong to your wonder and delight. 
The researcher wants to close this chapter by quoting the comments about his 
role in the revolution made by Major Zia and Major Shawkat - the two valiant 
freedom fighters - at a later date (Appendix- 8). 
"This officer played the main part which enabled 8`'' Battalion the East Bengal 
Regiment to revolt on the crucial night of 25/26 March 1971 at Chittagong" (remarks 
of Ziaur Rahman on 8 August 1973). It may be noted that Zia's view was endorsed by 
the first Chief of Army Staff, Maj. Gen. K. M. Safiullah. 
This is corroborated by a statement of Brig. Mir Shawkat Ali. He said: 
"This officer has an extraordinary ability to organize things. His services 
during war was commendable; he in fact was the first officer who took risk and on his 
own initiative informed Gen. Ziaur Rahman regarding Declaration of Independence 
on night 25/26 Mar 71. " (Remarks of Mir Shawkat Ali on 8 March 1974). Kader 
Siddiqui, another freedom fighter, known as "Tiger Siddiqui" in the circle of famed 
fighters in the Liberation War of 1971, writes: "A large number of military officers 
served with remarkable heroism under the leadership of Zia. Among them Major Abu 
Taher, Major Shafaat Jamil, Major Khaleque, Major Zia Uddin and Capt. 
Salahuddin's name are worth mentioning. Capt. ON Ahmad's contribution is the 
highest or hundred percent for the success, credit and fame of Zia. Oli remained with 
Zia from the beginning of the war to the end of his life with highest faithfulness, 
allegiance and love. " (Siddiqui, 1992: 420) 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Political Consciousness and the Motivations of 
Key Military Officers 
Introduction 
This chapter explains the level of political consciousness and motivations of 
eight key Bengali military officers who played important roles in the Liberation War 
of 1971. Among the questions asked is why did they discard their professional code of 
conduct which was instilled in them through rigorous military training for years and 
join the war? 
When the Liberation War began on 26 March 1971, fifty officers along with 
some four thousand of their troops from five cantonments in East Pakistan joined the 
war (Ahmed, 1995.30,178). Of them, 6 officers are still in the defense services of 
Bangladesh and so not available for comment; 12 of them have gone abroad and 
settled there; 16 of them have died; the rest have not been available for the purpose. A 
few of them have not been able to give time because of pressing preoccupations in 
their own business enterprises; in fact, two them agreed, but when the researcher and 
his team reached the fixed destinations, they were not available. Four of them have 
answered in the negative, pointing out that they would have to remain outside the 
country for a few months. The researcher has been able to collect relevant information 
from eight of them. All of these officers have retired from service. Three of them are 
involved at present in political activities as party activists; two are in commercial 
enterprises, and the rest are living peaceful retired lives. 
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All of these eight officers were actively involved in field operations and two 
of them were awarded BIR UTTAM (Great Hero), the second highest gallantry award, 
and two were awarded BIR BIKRAM (Notable Hero) the third highest award and two 
BIR PRATIK (Hero) for extraordinary heroism in the Liberation War, while another 
officer was awarded the Commendation Certificate of the Commander-in-Chief. They 
were young and idealistic. All of them were recruited as members of the Pakistan 
Officers' Corp. All of them had to undergo rigorous military training in the Pakistan 
Military Academy. All of them had to take the oath to work for the preservation of 
territorial integrity and sovereignty of Pakistan. When zero hour came, they did not 
hesitate even for a moment to think of their oath and decided to get involved in 
liberating East Pakistan from the Pakistani forces and making it independent 
Bangladesh. So the key question is - Why? 
The relevant data on the level of their political consciousness and motivation, 
the sources of their inspiration and the spontaneous urge for their joining the war were 
collected through the administration of a structured questionnaire designed to generate 
information on broad issues (see Appendix- 9) and then focussed through discussion 
with them. For the latter purpose, an interview schedule was already prepared. 
The process of interview was a painstaking one. A prior appointment was 
made with each respondent. The timing and venue were such that they could speak in 
relaxed mood for quite some time and they were able to look at prepared notes, if 
necessary. The researcher along with two personal assistants was present with tape 
recorders so that the points of view and assertions of the respondents could be 
recorded in full and without any editing due to transcription. The interview of each 
officer lasted for more than three hours, and they were forewarned about all the 
requirements. [See Table 8.1]. 
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When the researcher began the interview, he had a lot of apprehensions in his 
mind. Since this study is an objective account of the Liberation War of 1971, this 
demands a value free explanation of the motivation of key actors for shedding light on 
this particular phase of national history. Some of the key actors have however 
remained emotionally involved about their roles in the war, and treated their 
participation as the most precious achievement in their lives. Would they be able to 
provide an objective account of what they thought and did during those days? Could 
they be free from their emotional biases while responding to the queries? These are 
some of the questions that agitated the mind of the researcher. 
The researcher has found, after the completion of the interview, that these 
inhibitions were not entirely ill-founded. He has found out that at least three of the 
respondents disagreed quite a bit from the focal point of inquiry and began talking 
how he thought about the independence of Bangladesh since childhood. The 
statements of most of them were very lengthy; at least two of them concentrated 
mainly on the contextual aspects of the issue. This has made the task of the researcher 
a bit difficult. He had to remain silent most of the time during interviews; he had to 
edit quite considerably the statements made by the respondents, which were quite 
often lengthy, occasionally irrelevant, especially on the background of the issue. He 
also had to edit many points on date and time. 
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What motivated them to join the War? 
The political leaders, who were militant on the autonomy issue and 
uncompromising about the Six-Point Programme, still faltered and remained indecisive 
during those critical days of the last week of March 1971. When the Pakistan Army 
decided to strike on the midnight of 25 March 1971, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the 
recognized leader of the Bengalis, was arrested and taken to West Pakistan. Most of his 
followers and the top ranking leaders made their moves towards the Indian borders in the 
west, north and east, quietly, unnoticed by hostile elements and incognito. Some of them 
absconded and went into hiding. The military officers however revolted and decided to 
join the war. 
When asked what motivated them to get involved in the war, Major General 
Ibrahim, then only a second lieutenant, said that he took it as "a golden opportunity" to 
free East Pakistan, which was, to him "almost a colony of Pakistan", so that the Bengalis 
would not have to continue as "second class citizens", and the officers as "second class 
officers". Major General Saflullah, who retired as the Chief of Army Staff of Bangladesh 
in 1975, replied that he joined the war to make East Pakistan an independent state. 
Referring to the historical role East Pakistan played in the creation of Pakistan in 1947, 
he said in detail how the people of East Pakistan were deprived economically in united 
Pakistan during the previous 23 years and how they were made to suffer politically and 
culturally by the ruling elite in Pakistan. When, after the general election of 1970 the 
West Pakistani politicians and generals declined to hand over power to Awami League, 
which emerged as the majority party in Pakistan, simply because it was East 
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Pakistan-based, the intentions of the ruling elite became clear and it was nothing but 
retaining it as a colony. 
Lieutenant General Mir Shawkat Ali, then a Major, replied curtly to this question. 
When the Commander of 8 Bengal Regiment, Ziaur Rahman revolted and took a stand 
for the Liberation War, he (i. e. Shawkat) joined it. In his own words, "there was a fight 
and I had to join the fight;... an officer is first of all loyal to his troops. I was in 8 Bengal. 
So I fought for Bangladesh. " Major General Ejaj Ahmed Choudhury said in response that 
the reports of a brutal massacre by the Pakistan Army on the 25th and 26th March 1971 
motivated him to join the war. In his own words, "Pakistan Army ruled this part of the 
country as their colony" and the nefarious moves initiated in March 1971 were designed 
to perpetuate their rule over East Pakistan. 
Colonel Shafaat Jamil however was more forthright when he said: "I got myself 
involved in the war to defend my land and my people to whom I belonged and also to 
liberate the people and land from the outsiders, who kept on ravaging this country. " In 
the similar vein, Major General Ainuddin, then a Captain, said: "It was my duty to rescue 
the people of Bangladesh, who were mentally prepared to get separated from Pakistan. " 
That is why, as a trained soldier of East Pakistan he felt constrained to join the war. 
Major General Mohammad Abdul Halim replied that it was "Bengali nationalism, love 
for the Bengalis" that motivated him to get involved in the war. Major Hafizuddin's 
answer was also straightforward. He joined the war because he thought by doing this he 
joined "our people; people will support us and definitely this will be an act of patriotism". 
In sum, the Bengali military officers joined the war to liberate East Pakistan from 
the clutches of the Pakistan Army and make it an independent and sovereign state - 
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where the Bengalis could live as free citizens and fashion their lives in accordance with 
their own culture and distinct social norms. 
What was their overall goal? 
The urge to liberate East Pakistan was not only the motivating factor, the 
independence of East Pakistan also became their overall goal in the Liberation War. 
When asked what was their guiding spirit in the war, Major General Ibrahim answered 
without mincing any words that "the only guiding spirit was independence, nothing short 
of it. " General Shawkat, in his usual way, responded that a soldier fights for his own 
country. In his own words, he fought because "my country was in trouble; so I have (sic) 
to fight to rescue (Bangladesh)". Major General Ejaj felt that his guiding spirit in the War 
of independence was to save "his country" and "its people from the unbelievable 
atrocities of Pakistani rulers". 
Colonel Shafaat Jamil, elaborating a little on this question, replied that "the 
guiding spirit was to gain independence for our (sic), from a colonial rule". He also said 
that they (Pakistanis) had nothing in common with the Bengalis except the religious 
bond. To General Ainuddin, the independence of East Pakistan was a necessity because 
the ruling elite in Pakistan did not offer to the Bengalis their due share of the economy. In 
his own words, "The Pakistan military junta did not recognize the election result and they 
were not ready to hand over power to the Bengalis". General Abdul Halim took it as an 
opportunity to stand by the people during their crucial hours. He stated that the guiding 
spirit was to have "a free country of their own, where our people can live with honour 
and dignity. " Major Hafizuddin's guiding spirit in the war was "the love for my people" 
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and the independence of East Pakistan. He felt that if Bangladesh could be liberated and 
made an independent state, they could have their Bengali cultural identity and that was 
the main guiding spirit. 
The motivation of the Bengali military officers to join the Liberation War had 
another dimension, however. The political situation in East Pakistan, especially after I 
March 1971 when President Yahya Khan postponed the session of the National Assembly 
of Pakistan for an indefinite period, became marked by a deep sense of distrust between 
the people of East and West Pakistan. Even the cantonments were infected with the 
pervading schism. The West Pakistani military officers, most of whom were in command 
even in East Pakistan, did not have the least trust in their colleagues from East Pakistan. 
One group began to treat the other group as their enemy. The situation became critical 
after 25 March when Capt. Oli Ahmad along with Major Zia revolted and the news of 
this rebellion spread to different cantonments. The conditions became quite uncertain and 
became epitomized in the statement of Major General Ibrahim when he said, "Either I 
follow their (i. e. the West Pakistanis) line or they will kill me. " Even General Shawkat 
said, "if we are caught then Pakistanis will kill us. " Thus, their patriotic feelings for East 
Pakistan and love for the people reinforced by the dire insecurity of their lives in the 
cantonments became the great motivating factor for the Bengali military officers to join 
the war and it continued to serve as their guiding spirit throughout the dark days of the 
War of Independence. 
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What do they feel about it now? 
Do the Bengali military officers have any qualms about what they did during that 
period? The researcher posed a question - "Do you feel very gratified now? " - with a 
view to eliciting what they now think of their crucial decision taken three decades ago. In 
answer to this question Major General Ainuddin said: "I think the only good job I have 
done in my life is participating in Liberation War and liberating my country. " Major 
General Ibrahim feels gratified at the remembrance that he was one of the freedom 
fighters. He is proud to recollect that he belongs to that group of persons who took up 
arms for fighting in the war. He might have been dead, but so what! With pride he 
remembers that he had a role in the creation of independent Bangladesh. Major General 
KM Safiullah speaking in the same vein has given out that they were able to free this 
country through a stream of tears and blood. In his own words, "We could teach them 
(Pakistanis) a lesson that we cannot (sic) be taken for granted all the time. We feel 
gratified that we have been able to fight for and win our own rights. " 
Lieutenant General Mir Shawkat All has said that their decision was correct at 
that point of time, but he would have been happier if the right kind of political 
environment could have been fabricated by the decision-makers of Bangladesh after 
independence. Major General Ejaj feels greatly gratified. "Now we are independent; we 
are controlled no longer by the Pakistani junta; we decide our own fate and we take our 
own decisions". Like Lieutenant General Mir Shawkat, Shafaat Jamil added that things 
could have been better in Bangladesh "with dedicated and honest leadership and by 
skillful handling of state-craft. " Major General Mohammad Abdul Halim has said that he 
is proud to have been a participant in the war. In his own words, "I consider myself one 
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of the luckiest man as I could join and fight for my country". He has also stated that "it is 
a rare occasion for anybody who gets the opportunity to fight the Liberation War". Major 
Hafizuddin feels extremely gratified about his role in the war. He related that his life has 
been meaningful as "a citizen of a free country". The reason being, as he sees is that "he 
could take part in the Liberation War". It is a matter of great pleasure and deep 
satisfaction for him that he could "form a small part of the independence movement". 
What do they mean by patriotism? 
The freedom fighters of Bangladesh have been identified as the greatest sons of 
the soil of Bangladesh. The regard in which they are held, even the veneration, have been 
profound, and so has been the hatred or indifference to those who were opposed to the 
Liberation War of 1971. The nation has always looked at her valiant sons with a deep 
sense of gratitude. They are identified as great patriots because they joined the war 
against the heaviest of odds by risking their secure jobs, comfortable living, even the 
security of their lives and those of their family members. The researcher has, through this 
structured interview, tried to get their views on it. When asked how they conceptualize 
patriotism, the respondents answered differently on this issue. Shafaat Jamil thought of it 
as an "act of an individual to stand beside his own people and his own land, against all 
forms of aggressions. " To Abdul Halim, a patriot is one who "upholds the truth and 
never bows down to any wrong doing". A patriot, "always stands by the oppressed and 
fights against injustice". In this case, the indifference by the West Pakistani ruling elite 
towards the Bengalis' legitimate rights, their deprivation and sufferings during the last 
two decades gave rise to patriotism among the Bengali military officers". Hafizuddin 
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thought about it as the "love for his country, love for his countrymen", and he feels 
strongly that a patriot is supposed to "fight and die for his own country". To him, "my 
country right or wrong" and "my country, above everything else" constitutes the solid 
basis of patriotism. Ejaj Ahmed Choudhury, without philosophizing the concept of 
patriotism, stated that "I considered myself as a patriot and as such joined the Liberation 
War. " Mir Shawkat Ali has conceptualized patriotism as the love for his country. In his 
own words, "you are born in some place, you live there, you grow up there, you speak the 
language and that's your birth place. You love your country like your mother. " General K 
M Safiullah, much like Mir Shawkat Ali, has said, `Bangladesh is my country; in this 
land I was born; this is my birthplace. So I have all the love and affection for this country 
and people. " Patriotism, being a state of mind to General Ibrahim, means "a commitment 
towards the people and the country". He said that "patriotism is a feeling by which we 
sacrifice our own interest, our family's interest, our group interest for the sake of the 
nation". Mohammad Ainuddin has taken it as a kind of pride in his integrity, his birth 
place, his own language and the culture he is enriched with. He joined the war when he 
thought his sentiment was mauled by the conduct and actions of the Pakistani military 
junta in flouting the election result of 1970 and suppressing the legitimate demands of the 
Bengalis by force. In sum, patriotism to those military officers is nothing else than deep 
love for the people of East Pakistan and strong commitment for upholding their rights 
which were violated brutally by the oppressive regime of Pakistan. They joined the war 
to liberate East Pakistan, which was their motherland with a distinct life style, separate 
cultural pattern and value system. The independent Bangladesh would enable the people 
to fashion their lives in accordance with their value system. In fact, these officers thought 
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in terms of nationalism and fought as Bengali nationalists in the sense of being different 
from the people of West Pakistan both in language, culture, life-style and ethnicity and 
identifying themselves as sons of Bangladesh. 
What would have happened if they had not succeeded? 
Did they ever think of the consequences if the War of Liberation had failed? 
While joining the war, along with their troops, did they ever take into consideration the 
consequences that might follow in case of failure? In answer to the question - "Did you 
know that failure in the war of independence would mean not only an end of your career 
but also an end of your life? " - Ejaj Ahmed Chowdhury has said that he was fully aware 
of its dire consequences. He would have been definitely court-martialed and put to death. 
Even then he revolted because he was convinced of the justness of the cause. He thought 
it right to give his life "for the right cause of the country". He knew that participation in 
the Liberation War would amount to gross breach of discipline and because it was, to 
him, "a question of our prestige, our identity; as a patriot I could not be a silent spectator 
to all these barbaric actions of Pakistan Army". 
General Ibrahim representing the same view has given out that joining the war 
amounted to a mutiny against the Pakistan Army and failure meant death penalty for the 
mutineers, yet he did it only for the independence of Bangladesh. So " my career, my life, 
my destiny" - all were enmeshed with the fate of "my country". Shafaat Jamil has said 
more emphatically that he knew full well of its implications, yet having a firing squad in 
view, he could not be a silent spectator to the relentless "decimation of my people and 
land". He responded to "the silent call" of "my people and land" - and "came for help 
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with arms". Mohammad Abdul Halim elaborated it further by saying that in case it failed, 
"the politicians, businessmen, students and other people who joined the war could come 
back and re-start their normal activities", but "for us, in the armed forces, punishment" 
was sure death. Yet he joined the war and "our consideration was 70 million people and 
their fate". 
Hafizuddin was even more emphatic when he said that "we had no other choice 
but to fight", and " we knew what eventually was to come if we failed". He said that his 
father was a member of Parliament of Pakistan at that time. "The Politicians", he has 
said, "could sit around a round table and forget the past and make up the differences", but 
for a soldier there would be no round table conference. For mutinous soldiers, a firing 
squad would have been ready. Md. Ainuddin has said that they were quite confident of 
the liberation of East Pakistan and the birth of independent Bangladesh because the entire 
population was with them. After the military crackdown of 25 March 1971, "we did not 
think of any consequence if we failed because the very existence of our homeland and 
our cultural heritage were at stake at that time". General Shawkat has elaborately 
described how he took an oath of allegiance to Pakistan Army while he passed out from 
the Pakistan Military Academy and became committed to preserving "the integrity and 
sovereignty of Pakistan", yet he joined the war because "I had no option but to fight if I 
were to call myself a Bengali. " "If we failed, " it would be "a firing squad for me, it might 
be firing squad probably for most members of my family", yet he joined the war. 
In sum, these Bengali military officers, who were recruited in the Pakistan Army, 
trained and indoctrinated in the Pakistan Military Academy, knew very well the 
consequences which might follow if they did not succeed, but yet they joined the war 
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because they were imbibed with a very high level of motivation, in the first place. 
Secondly, they were confident of success because they felt that the people of East 
Pakistan were behind them as the strongest support base. Their love for the people and 
the land, and probably their hatred for the atrocities committed by the Pakistani military 
junta to the people, and especially the Pakistani general's hatred to the Bengalis prompted 
them to do what they did and sustained them in their struggle for independence of East 
Pakistan. Highly politicized as they were, they could have felt the pulse of the people, 
who were vociferous with the demand for autonomy at the beginning and that for full 
independence since 25 March 1971. 
Did they understand the political situation that prevailed in East 
Pakistan? 
As military officers, they were neither supporters of any political party nor 
preachers of any political slogan, yet they were fully aware of the political situation in 
East Pakistan at that time. As it has been already stated, the Bengali military officers 
were fully aware of the revolutionary situation prevailing in East Pakistan since 1 March 
1971. The chief political leader of East Pakistan was expected to declare independence of 
Bangladesh on 7 March 1971 in the mammoth public meeting held at Paltan Maidan. 
Their inaction on this count, especially their useless on-going negotiation with the West 
Pakistani political leaders and generals, was strongly resented by the Bengali military 
officers. That they were disillusioned with the vacillating political leadership has been 
obvious in the statements of the respondents. General Ejaj Ahmed Chowdhury stated that 
he was not a supporter of any political party though, yet he knew what was happening in 
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East Pakistan. In his own words, "I was keeping myself abreast of day to day happenings 
in the country since February 1971". KM Saflullah however confesses that though 
politics was banned for the military, yet they have been drawn into it, by default, through 
situational pressures. He said that political situation in East Pakistan deteriorated in 
March 1971 for several reasons. The West Pakistani leaders could not believe that 
Awami League would have been able to score such a "thumping" victory in the 1970 
general election, so that it could turn out to be the majority party in Pakistan, practically 
on the threshold of political power. This is what the ruling elite in Pakistan disdained 
most and they began to hatch a conspiracy to keep the Awami League out of power. The 
postponement of the session of the National Assembly by President Yahya Khan on I 
March 1971 can be termed as the climax of that conspiratorial move. KM Safiullah 
stated that "the political situation at that time was so tense that nothing besides 
independence could have satisfied anybody". General Ibrahim said in reply that they 
were aware of the political situation "through newspapers and contacts with the 
civilians". Moreover, "our friends from Dhaka University" were also sources of manifold 
information. He however has said that "during the War of Liberation we were supporters 
of a political party which was guiding the war, though we were not, after the war". It may 
be mentioned that General Ibrahim was a graduate of Dhaka University, and as such he 
was in touch with his friends in the university. 
Shafaat Jamil however said in detail that he was quite aware of the political 
situation as a regular reader of newspapers, though he was not actively connected with 
politics. He stated that "people went ahead, although the leaders lagged behind". The 
Awami League, which won the majority of seats in the election, and its leaders also "did 
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not know what to do". The military officers observed the situation closely and wanted to 
hear the right kind of message from the political leaders. Shafaat Jamil feels that even 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman "failed to give proper leadership at that moment. " Mohammad 
Abdul Halim has said that he was not a supporter of any political party but he was aware 
of the political situation in East Pakistan from the date of postponement of session of the 
National Assembly. He was fully conversant of the content of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's 
historic speech on 7 March 1971 in the Ramna race course and followed carefully the 
happenings since the beginning of the Non- Cooperation Movement since then. He was 
greatly disturbed by the chain of events that followed, especially the "shootings" by the 
Pakistan Army and "massacres" at various places caused by them. 
Major Hafizuddin has also reported that he was not a supporter of any political 
party, but he was well aware of the political situation of the country for several reasons. 
His father was a member of the National Assembly, in the first place. Secondly, he was 
on duty in one of the polling centres on the election day and he was happy to see the East 
Pakistan- based Awami League winning the election and becoming the majority party in 
Pakistan. He thought that at last political power would be handed over to an East 
Pakistani political party, which might be able to rectify most of the ills connected with 
widespread deprivation of the Bengalis. Mohammad Ainuddin has also confessed that he 
was not a supporter of any political party, but he was deeply grieved to learn of the 
atrocities of the Pakistani soldiers after 1 March. The conspiratorial moves and 
vacillations of the ruling elite, especially in handing over power to the majority party 
became clear signals to many of them that situation in East Pakistan reached "a point of 
no return". General Shawkat has been forthright on this point also. He has said that he 
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was a soldier and "never bothered about politics", but he was aware of the political 
conditions in East Pakistan through newspapers and radio. 
When did they think of joining the war? 
When these officers were appraised of what had been happening in East Pakistan 
in those critical days and that they were so strongly committed to the welfare of the 
people in their homeland, their joining the war was only a matter of time. When asked 
this question, Ejaj Ahmed Chowdhury has said that "though I was profoundly moved by 
the speech of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of 7 March 1971 when he said 'Ebarer Shangram 
Shadhinatar Shangram' [This struggle is the struggle for independence] and though I 
thought of joining the war of independence after the failure of dialogue between Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman and President Yahya Khan on 25 March 1971, yet in fact I did it at 
1900 hours on 29 March 1971 after hearing the Declaration of Independence by Major 
Ziaur Rahman in the evening of 27 March 1971. It provided me direction to act. " 
General KM Saflullah has answered in detail. He thought that "the change of 
government will take place after the election. A peaceful transition of power will take 
place". But that did not happen. The West Pakistani authorities had a different plan. "In 
that plan the bringing of troops, massacre, everything was being devised in Dhaka". 
Being threatened and enraged, "we revolted on 29 March 1971 and came to know that 
Major Zia declared independence from Chittagong on 27 March 1971. To General 
Ibrahim, 7th of March had been the key date. In his own words, "on that day we thought 
that something is (sic) going to happen and we are going in it, we are going to join it and 
after 19th of March our thought better crystallized. When we received a news of what 
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happened in Dhaka on the 25th night, so we had no second thought". He has also said 
that "we could hear the voice of Major Zia declaring independence; that moment, to be 
very formal, we said, we go in it". 
Shafaat Jamil reported that "an independent country for the Bengalis" had been 
"my childhood dream", but he could not do anything till March 1971. When Major Zia 
made a Declaration of Independence over the radio, that inspired the entire nation to fight 
back. He joined the war after that. Mohammad Abdul Halim responded by saying that he 
was watching the situation since the Non-Cooperation Movement was begun by Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman and remained mentally prepared. He further said that "at the very 
crucial moment I heard the voice of Major Zia declaring independence of Bangladesh on 
27 March, although 8 East Bengal had already revolted on 26 March". Then he joined 
and started fighting. 
Major Hafizuddin joined the war in the morning of 30 March 1971 a few hours 
after he was disarmed. Having discussions with his colleagues in the army, he took the 
step. He came to know after he revolted, that Major Ziaur Rahman had already declared 
independence from the Kalurghat Radio Transmission Centre in Chittagong. Mohammad 
Ainuddin has given out that he was mentally prepared for it from the beginning of March 
but "finally decided after hearing the call and announcement of Major Zia from 
Chittagong". He has also said that Major Ziaur Rahman issued a call to all for joining the 
Liberation War- "to all Bengal regiment, police, BDR (Bangladesh Rifles) to join the 
Liberation War and to liberate the country". General Shawkat has said plainly that he did 
not think of anything. "My CO (Commanding Officer) was Major Ziaur Rahman. We 
revolted when he did it"- this is what he had to say in this regard. 
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Did they consult their colleagues about joining? 
The Bengali military officers, highly politicized as they were and fully informed 
of the political situation in East Pakistan, took the key decision to join the war, not 
individually but in consultation with their colleagues, thus making it a kind of collective 
decision. Mohammad Ainuddin, while responding to this query, said that he discussed 
this with his colleagues and in view of the call of Major Zia he took the momentous 
decision. Mir Shawkat Ali reported that he was in close touch with Captain Oli and Major 
Zia and revolted along with his Commanding Officer Major Zia. It is difficult to say what 
the respondents would have done if Major Zia had not revolted and declared 
independence of Bangladesh; but it is true that Zia's action provided a solid support to 
their actions. Mohammad Abdul Halim has another story to tell. He was encouraged by 
his father who advised him to join the war. Shafaat Jamil said that he conferred with 
some battalion officers along with Khaled Mosharraf who was one of the Sector 
Commanders. Syed Mohammad Ibrahim has told that they were in a group and had been 
"consulting 24 hours round". K M. Safiullah has reported that though "we never discussed 
what we were going to do, but we knew each other and knew what we were going to do". 
Ejaj Ahmed Chowdhury has also told that he consulted his colleagues and decided to take 
"the arms, ammunition, equipment and ration of the troops with the then Major Moinul 
Hossain Chowdhury, Alfa Company Commander of the battalion. " 
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Why did they think they would alter the state of affairs through war? 
"How did you think you would alter the situation through war? " - this question 
was put to them with a view to ascertaining the level of their self-confidence and their 
sense of political efficacy, and their answers reflect much of the national psyche of the 
time. The entire nation was in the grip of revolutionary feelings. After the general 
election of 1970 the people of all strata in the society expected that political power would 
be transferred to the majority political party, the Awami League, of East Pakistan. When 
they were denied of the opportunity of wielding power, the East Pakistanis in general 
were prepared for extreme measures. They thought of nothing short of revolution, and 
began to think themselves as a nation. Ejaj Ahmed Chowdhury narrated that the 
Liberation War was supported by all sections of the society, the womenfolk included. 
Their moral as well as logistical support to the trained troops of the army, East Pakistan 
Rifle. Police practically made them invincible. These were the reasons of "my conviction 
that we would be able to alter the situation" for independence. Ejaj Ahmed Choudhury 
was wrong when he said that the Liberation War was supported by all; he was right 
however because those who opposed it constituted a bare miniscule group, only a handful 
of persons, hated by most of the Bengalis since then. 
KM Saflullah stated directly that "we had to make this country free from foreign 
domination by fighting". He also said, "we knew we would be through". Syed 
Mohammad Ibrahim has told that war was likely to generate "a new leadership, a new 
thinking, a different concept of patriotism". He said: "it is through war that we could 
bring in democracy. " Shafaat Jamil's answer was more interesting. The Liberation War 
of 1971 was "a people's war- the people versus a whole body of invading army". He has 
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said that the "process of attrition would be able to neutralize them (Pakistanis), weaken 
them and destroy their morale to fight and I think we did it". He has emphatically stated 
that our strategy was to "weaken them morally, physically and psychologically by a 
process of attrition and thereby making a final thrust and capture Dhaka and get our 
independence". 
Mohammad Abdul Halim said that it was a sheer good luck for Bangladesh that 
the military officers revolted and began the Liberation War. Their prompt actions, timely 
decisions and initiative were crucial. In his words, "Politicians joined the war much later; 
initially they were running here and there, looking for hideouts. The students, labourers 
and people from all walks of life gathered around us and we trained them to fight". 
Mohammad Ainuddin has also said that he was quite optimistic about the outcome of the 
war because such fighters as Major Zia, Major Khaled Mosharraf, Major Shawkat, 
Shafaat Jamil and so on took part in the war. "I was quite positive that we can (sic) get 
the independence of the country"- was his emphatic assertion. Here again the disillusion 
of the Bengali military officers with the vacillating political leadership has been 
expressed. 
What did they feel while receiving the Gallantry Awards? 
The Bengali military officers did what they were expected to do by the nation in 
the most critical time of its history by resisting the powerful Pakistani occupation forces 
and being victorious at the end, thus making Bangladesh an independent state. The nation 
remembers her valiant sons with a deep sense of gratitude. The gallantry awards were but 
tangible tokens of recognition by the nation. While receiving the awards, after two 
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decades in 1994, these officers expressed deep satisfaction and stated the reasons for their 
joining the Liberation War. In this section, their reactions are noted. 
Seven of the eight officers, who were interviewed, received gallantry award for 
their extraordinary bravery and crucial role in the war. Two of them were awarded Bir 
Uttam, the highest award for the surviving ones and the third and eighth Bir Bikram and 
the fifth and seventh Bir Pratik, the second and third highest award; while the fourth 
received Commendation Certificate from Commader-in-Chief (C-in-C). When they were 
asked about their reaction while receiving the gallantry award, Mir Shawkat Ali has 
expressed deep satisfaction for national recognition of their heroic role in the war. On the 
question whether his decision to join the war was adequately justified, he has replied in 
the affirmative and said, "we won the election; the power was not given to us; rather they 
made an onslaught on our civilian population, onslaught on the army". Thus they turned 
out to be our enemy and "as a soldier it was my job to destroy the enemy". 
KM Safiullah has expressed profound satisfaction for the gallantry award of Bir 
Uttam. A brigade was organized and named after him- S-Force - for conducting 
conventional warfare till the Victory Day. He has also given out that his decision to join 
the war was fully justified. He took up arms to save the honour of "my country and 
people" and the only satisfaction "I have that I have been able to take part in the war". 
Hafizuddin Ahmed, who was awarded Bir Bikram for gallantry, has said that "it 
was a great day for me to have been recognized by the nation". He has further said that it 
gave him great satisfaction that he joined the war. Mohammad Ainuddin was awarded fir 
Pratik for his bravery in the war field. He has expressed that were he not awarded, he 
would not fret or complain because he joined the war not for any prize or distinction but 
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for the vindication of honour of his land and people. Syed Mohammed Ibrahim, who was 
also awarded Bir Pratik for his heroic command and courageous leadership in the war, 
has also been deeply touched for this national recognition. He said emphatically that his 
decision to join the war was fully justified. In his own words, "There is no second option, 
no second thought; we were waiting for it". 
Why did military officers take on political roles? 
Captain Oli Ahmad along with Major Zia and other Bengali military officers 
revolted in the night between 25 and 26 march 1971, reorganized 8 East Bengal 
Regiment for fighting against the Pakistan Army for liberating East Pakistan and Major 
Zia declared independence of Bangladesh right then, which was broadcast on 27 March 
1971 through Kalurghat radio. The Declaration of Independence for a state is an 
expressly political act, done normally by the recognized political leader, commanding 
widespread allegiance of different sections of population. The war of liberation or 
independence is also organized by political leadership, though fought by the soldiers and 
other armed personnel. In the case in question, these political decisions were taken by the 
military officers themselves, which were endorsed later on by the political leadership. 
How could they do it? Why did they do it? The responses furnished by the eight military 
officers provide intriguing answers. 
Shaafat Jamil said that the political leaders of East Pakistan failed miserably to 
provide leadership at that point of time. Though Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in his Ramna 
Race Course speech announced that "the struggle of this time is for our liberation, for our 
independence", yet he knew very little of what was to follow. In his own words, "the 
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political leaders of all shades and opinions in our country failed to fathom it. As a result 
there was no physical preparation whatsoever". He further said that "Bangabandhu 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman also failed to give proper leadership at that moment when the 
crackdown started". Instead of giving proper leadership from within, "he courted arrest". 
He has further said that "this was quite surprising to us because in every liberation 
struggle the number one man gives leadership". 
Ejaj Ahmed Chowdhury expressed that being in the cantonments the Bengali 
officers knew very well how the Pakistan Army became hostile to Bengali soldiers even 
before 25 March 1971. They knew not only about the massacres perpetrated by the 
Pakistan Army on the night of 25 and 26 March, they also feared that at any moment they 
might be disarmed. Mohammad Abdul Halim has said: "I did not know what exactly 
happened on 25 March, but I could feel that the situation was quite volatile". Though the 
East Pakistani leaders were having negotiations with President Yahya Khan from 16 
March, he said, "our politicians failed to understand that Pakistanis wanted only to buy 
some time for consolidating their position on the pretext of negotiations". 
General KM Safiullah has expressed similar views. He said that "in the guise of 
conflict with India" Pakistanis were "pouring in troops" to East Pakistan, but they, as 
military personnel, knew what they were trying to do. So all these measures "made us 
think about their dubious attitude". Syed Mohammed Ibrahim has more or less similar 
views. Since the middle of March, he said, "we were mentally ready to get a call from the 
political leader (sic), but we did not get a call from the highest political leadership. The 
formal call for the War of Liberation actually was articulated by Major Ziaur Rahman 
from Chittagong. " Hafizuddin Ahmed said, "we knew, the Pakistanis (sic) are going to 
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destroy us. They are going to annihilate the Bangladeshi nation". He said that 
"Bangladeshi battalions in other places were also disarmed". Having all these in view he 
said, "we thought this was the right time to take up arms against the (Pakistani) military 
junta". 
Md. Ainuddin reported that the political environment in East Pakistan was such 
that since 3 March "nothing short of independence was acceptable to the common mass 
of the people", but Sheikh Mujibur Rahman at that time was in dialogue for regional 
autonomy with the Pakistani generals. So he said that "naturally it frustrated us. " 
Elaborating in detail General Shawkat Ali has said that the situation in East Pakistan in 
March 1971 was quite volatile. "In such a situation", he said, "there were lot of talks 
going on between Yahya Khan, Bhutto and Mujib. They were the political side, but as a 
soldier what I found in Chittagong is (sic) an ominous environment in which everybody 
was suspecting everybody". In the absence of any political direction, under such critical 
situations Major Zia and Capt. Oli took up a resolute stand and revolted. Then Major Zia 
said: "we will fight for independence of our country and we shall declare independence" 
and then he gave (sic) the executive military order for moving from Solashahar Market 
towards Kalurghat" in search of a safe base for better organization. Zia then administered 
"the oath of allegiance to Bangladesh and promised to fight till the liberation of the 
country". 
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CONCLUSION 
Focussing on the role and motivation of the Bengali military officers during initial 
but critical phase of the Liberation War of 1971, this study has analyzed in-depth its 
military dimension. The revolt of the Bangladesh military against the Pakistan Army was 
organized by Captain Oli Ahmad in consultation with Major Zia on the night between 25 
and 26 March'. The independence of Bangladesh was declared by Major Ziaur Rahman 
on 27 March 1971.2 The Liberation War began by these officers at Chittagong from the 
night of 25 March 1971. This momentous decision of the Bengali military officers of 
Chittagong was followed by other military officers and forces under their command. 
Not only did these officers start the war but they also carried it on their own till 17 
April 1971 when the Bangladesh Government-in-exile was formed at Mujibnagar with 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as the President in absentia and Tajuddin Ahmed as the Prime 
Minister of Bangladesh. In his address to the nation over Bangladesh radio on 11 April 
1971, prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed said: "Ziaur Rahman is in charge of conducting 
and directing the war in Chittagong and Noakhali. In the face of massive counter-attack 
by the Pakistan Army from air, sea and ground the toughest resistance which our freedom 
fighters and brave people put up, will go down in the history of our Liberation War much 
' "'This officer played the main part which enabled 8th Battalion The East Bengal Regiment to rc%, olt on the 
crucial night of 25/26 Mar 71 at Chittagong (1972 ACR of OR Ahmad, signed by Ziaur Ralunan on 8 Aug 
73 - Appendix 8. ) 2 "Captain Oli Ahmad in fact was the first officer who took risk and on his own initiative infonncd Major 
Ziaur Rahman regarding declaration of Independence on the night of 25/26 March 1971". (1973 ACR of 
Oli Aland, Signed by Brig. Mir Shawtikat All on 8 Mar 74 - Appendix 8. ) 
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like the resistance war of Stalingrad. " (Bangladesh Documents of Liberation War, II, 5). 
He further said that after this initial victory Major Zia established a planning cell for the 
conduct of war (Bangladesh Documents of Liberation War, II, 5). What led these military 
officers to come forward at this crucial moment of history? What circumstances 
motivated them to throw away their professional norms? Why did they do what the 
political leaders were supposed to do? This study, exploring the socio-political and 
economic conditions of East Pakistan which shaped the nationalistic aspirations of the 
Bengali military officers, and analyzing the constraints of political leaders at that time, 
has thrown some light on the transformation of a professional cadre to a band of 
revolutionary soldiers. 
As discussed earlier, the Pakistan Army had a specific ethnic bias because of 
historical reasons. The British deliberately excluded certain groups and races of northern 
and eastern parts of India from the British Indian Army since the "Mutiny of 1857". 
Recruitment to the British Indian Army was confined to the north-western part of India 
from the so-called "Martial Races" since then. After independence in 1947 the Indian 
Army discarded this and an arrangement was made for adequate representation of all 
those races and groups. In Pakistan however the myth continued. In 1971, East Pakistan's 
representation in the defence services did not exceed 8 to 9 percent in both officer and 
other ranks. Thus the Bengali military officers had always smarted under a sense of 
deprivation and injustice. They pinned their hopes on the electoral victory, which they 
thought would help redressing some of their grievances. President Yahya Khan's 
announcement on 1 March 1971 postponing the session of the National Assembly came 
to them as a rude shock. 
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Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the recognized political leader of East Pakistan and 
chief of Awami League, played a brilliant role in mobilizing the people for the attainment 
of regional autonomy. The Six-Point Programme, which was a veritable Magna Carta to 
the people of East Pakistan, was initiated by him for ameliorating the depressed 
conditions of people. In the general election of 1970, the first ever general election held 
in Pakistan on the basis of universal adult suffrage during the last twenty three years of its 
life, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman emerged as the leader of the majority party in Pakistan by 
winning 167 out of 313 seats in the National Assembly. The people of East Pakistan also 
took the election as a referendum to the Six-Point Programme. After the election he 
began to think in the tradition of parliamentary practice that at last his party would be 
able to wield political power in Pakistan, and he interpreted the election result as the de 
facto transfer of power. He became busy in giving final touches to the proposed 
constitutional reorganization in the light of Six-Point formula. He began to play up his 
image as the majority leader in Pakistan. President Yahya Khan also termed him once as 
prospective Prime Minister of Pakistan and announced that session of the National 
Assembly of Pakistan would be held on and from 3 March 1971. The people of East 
Pakistan expected that at last their representatives would hold the rein of power in 
Islamabad. 
Only two days before the session of National Assembly, much to the 
disappointment of all concerned in East Pakistan, President Yahya Khan announced on I 
March 1971 the postponement of session of the National Assembly, citing Zulfigar All 
Bhutto's unwillingness to participate in the Assembly as the primary cause. That sparked 
rebellious demonstrations all over East Pakistan and it was taken as the most sinister 
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move of the ruling elite in Pakistan to keep the Bengalis out of power for good. The 
students and teachers, labourers and workers, lawyers and literati professionals burst out 
in indignation. All of these social sectors felt that the Six-Point formula had outlived its 
utility and from different corners came out the vociferous demand for one-point action 
and that was the independence of East Pakistan. 
Sheikh Mujib came under tremendous pressure from all the power bases of 
Awami League to declare independence. In a public meeting in Dhaka on 7 March he 
addressed a mammoth gathering of about one million people. There he put his demand 
quite forcefully but stopped short of declaring independence and pleaded for the transfer 
of power to the elected representatives. Simultaneously the Awami League under his 
leadership launched a non-co-operation movement which put the Sheikh in absolute 
control of East Pakistan. 
Faced with such a situation President Yahya Khan came to Dhaka, seemingly for 
a negotiated settlement of the crisis and prolonged the negotiation for about ten days on 
the one hand, and continued vigorous airlifting of soldiers and heavy weapons from West 
Pakistan, on the other. On 23 March 1971, the Awami League leaders presented a draft 
proclamation to the President, which in effect was to transfer power to the elected 
representatives on the basis of the Six-Point formula and hoped that the ruling elite would 
do that. President Yahya, however, without formally breaking the talks, decided to bring 
about a military solution of the problem. By ordering the reinforced armed forces to 
march against the unarmed civilians, he left Dhaka on the night of 25 March 1971. A 
veritable reign of terror was thus set in. Sheikh Mujib surrendered to the Pakistan Army 
and asked his party leaders to go underground. 
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At this critical moment of history of this land, a band of young Bengali military 
officers, fired with nationalistic zeal and patriotism of the highest order, responded 
positively to the yearnings of people of East Pakistan and took a momentous decision, 
first of all, through a mass revolt, then by issuing a declaration of the Independence of 
Bangladesh, and finally by launching the Liberation War through mobilization of their 
forces in all the cantonments. The Bengali military officers kept the flag of Bangladesh 
aloft till the formation of Government of Bangladesh in-exile on 17 April 1971. This 
study has focussed on these military officers, their motivations, ideals and activities at 
this critical phase of history. 
Pakistan came into being in 1947 through a voluntary union of East and West 
Pakistan. The main factors that led to the union were the predominantly Muslim majority 
in both the wings and their fear of domination by Hindu majority in united India. Apart 
from these two, most of the ingredients that generate in people a solid bond of unity and 
keep them going as a nation were absent in Pakistan. The people of East and West 
Pakistan had neither any experience of living together for generations within a continuing 
political framework nor had they been under any identical political institutions which 
might have fostered common political perceptions, nor did they belong to a distinct 
cultural area. The only common bond that existed between the people of the two wings 
was a set of Islamic values and some experiences of the political movement for a separate 
homeland for the Muslims in the Hindu-dominated India on the basis of two-nation 
theory. 
East Pakistan was separated from West Pakistan with more than 1000 miles of 
Indian territory lying between them. This geographical distance also created differences 
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in the configuration of physical and climatic conditions in the two regions. The 
differences in topography and climate of the two regions not only generated differences 
in agricultural patterns but also nurtured different food habit, dress, rituals and customs, 
thus producing two distinct cultures. This exclusive geographical separation also 
prohibited the communication and social interactions between these two different socio- 
cultural units in the same country. The population was not evenly distributed in the two 
wings. The area of East Pakistan being six times smaller than that of West Pakistan 
contained 54 percent of the total population of Pakistan, thus the population density of 
East Pakistan being seven times higher than that of the other wing. 
The topographical and climatic diversity also determined the linguistic 
complexity in Pakistan. East Pakistan had one dominant mother tongue, Bangla; but a 
totally different scenario existed in West Pakistan, where a complex polyglot was 
practiced. Bangla remained almost an unfamiliar language in West Pakistan; likewise the 
majority of Bengalis could never adopt Urdu, Punjabi, Pushtu, which were spoken in 
West Pakistan. The differences in the alphabets and script imposed a barrier in the 
acceptance of language in both the wings. 
Though the societies in East and West Pakistan were based on Islamic principles, 
still there remained basic differences in terms of attitude towards religion. In East 
Pakistan, Islam is more of a liberal type in the sense that more of its ethos rather than the 
archetypal rites and practices had appeal to the people. In West Pakistan, however, Islam 
is more conservative and orthodox. In terms of ethnicity, East Pakistan was more 
homogenous. The majority of its population (more than 97 percent) belong to one ethnic 
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group, the Bengalis; in West Pakistan many ethnic and tribal groups formed the social 
mosaic. For all these Pakistan has been known as a ̀ double country' since its inception. 
National integrity in Pakistan demanded a policy package which might have 
motivated the people of the two regions to get closer through involvement in the carefully 
devised participatory programmes. It needed some creative steps which might have 
fostered unity and curb separatism. The ruling elite however pursued from the very 
beginning certain policies which, instead of bringing the two regions closer to each other, 
exacerbated the existing structural differences. The administrative policies through such 
instruments as the highly centralized civil and military bureaucracies, more in the format 
of British Indian control and domination of colonial India through the good old Indian 
Civil Service (ICS), resulted in the domination of West Pakistan over East Pakistan under 
the domineering role of the West Pakistan- based bureaucrats. 
The bureaucrats in Pakistan, inheriting the intellectual orientation of the ICS and 
British Indian Army and apparatuses of colonial bureaucracy, being recruited and trained 
in the same tradition and working within similar institutional framework, became the 
most dominant social sector in Pakistan. The political system was also more or less 
similar to that which functioned in British India -a highly centralized and unitary system 
conducted by the bureaucrats. For historical reasons, there was an imbalance in 
bureaucracy in respect of regional representation right from the beginning. At the time of 
partition there were only two ICS officers from East Pakistan and till 1950 only 17 new 
recruits entered the Pakistan Civil Service out of a total of 175 such officers. Over the 
years East Pakistan's representation increased and in the period 1950- 68,40 percent of 
the new recruits were from East Pakistan, though overall representation remained less 
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than 30 percent in the civil service. This representation was however in the lower 
echelons and in departments which did not influence the vital areas of policy. Like the 
civil servants, all the top-ranking military officers were from West Pakistan. 
The policies of administrative and political centralization thus demonstrated the 
domination of West Pakistan. In the first decade following independence, Bengali 
participation in national policies was limited, but the parity among the political elite had a 
balancing effect. After the military take over in 1958 it was totally lost, because military 
rule was in effect a rule of the bureaucrats where the representation of the Bengalis was 
the minimum. The pursuance of this kind of policy first prompted the Bengalis to raise 
the issue of regional autonomy. The cultural policy of assimilation in a heterogeneous 
society of Pakistan provided a wider emotional appeal to the demand of autonomy and 
helped develop a linguistic nationalism in East Pakistan. The ruling elite believed that the 
two regions could be held together only if there were one language and one culture in 
Pakistan. Their insistence on making Urdu the only state language in Pakistan, even 
though Urdu was practically unknown in East Pakistan, was opposed tooth and nail as it 
was taken to keep them subjugated politically, educationally, culturally and 
administratively. The central government still then persisted till 1956 when the 
constitution recognized both Urdu and Bangla as the state languages of Pakistan, after a 
gory language movement in 1952. The language movement helped foster the beginning 
of Bengali nationalism and set a pattern of student-literati-professional alliance which 
began to be used in subsequent movements against West Pakistan. 
In sum, the policies of administrative and political centralization and the 
assimilationist cultural policy, pursued by the ruling elite, not only alienated the people of 
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East Pakistan from the overarching framework of Pakistan but also made them conscious 
of their separate identity as a people. The rule of the West Pakistan- based bureaucrats 
always reminded them that they were neither equal partners and participants in the affairs 
of Pakistan nor masters at their own home. 
While the administrative policy of centralization and cultural policy of 
assimilation added an emotional appeal to the demand for autonomy and helped develop 
a linguistic nationalism among the various classes in East Pakistan, the economic 
policies, which directly affected the emerging middle classes, led to a wholesale 
alienation, added militancy to the autonomy movement and helped strengthen 
nationalistic bond among the Bengalis. The Bengali military officers were deeply 
influenced by it. 
As it has been already discussed, the two regions of Pakistan were dissimilar in 
many respects, but they were similar in that both were industrially underdeveloped and 
had been the producers of agricultural raw materials. At independence, the industrial 
bases of two regions were almost of the same size. The small gap that existed between 
the two regions widened rapidly over the years and in the 1960s it took critical 
proportion. In 1949/50 the disparity was 19 percent but in 1959/60 it rose to 32 percent 
and in 1969/70, to 61 percent. 
These differential rates of growth in the two regions were primarily due to 
different rates of industrialization. In East Pakistan the industrial sector accounted for 9.4 
percent of regional output in 1949/50 and it rose to about 20 percent in 1969/70, but in 
West Pakistan the industrial sector came to account for almost a third of the regional 
output, though it was only 14.7 percent in 1949/50. The principal reason for the 
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differential rates of growth in the two regions was the differential shares of investment 
and various policies the Government of Pakistan followed since 1948. East Pakistan's 
share of investment varied from 21 percent to 26 percent in the 1950s and from 32 
percent to 36 percent in the 1960s, but by far the larger shares of both revenue and 
development outlay went to West Pakistan. During the pre-plan period (1947- 1955), the 
per capita development and revenue expenditures on an average were Rs. 22.08 and Rs. 
37.75 respectively in East Pakistan as against Rs. 108.03 and 201.94 respectively in West 
Pakistan. A similar policy was followed in respect of allocation of foreign aid and loans. 
East Pakistan received only 17 percent and 30 percent of the foreign aid and the US 
commodity aid, whereas West Pakistan enjoyed 83 percent and 70 percent of the external 
assistance. 
Disparity in the allocation of resources, both domestic and external, in the two 
regions was the inevitable outcome of the development strategy pursued in Pakistan. An 
entrepreneurial approach based on a one-economy policy in Pakistan comprising 
basically two different regions lying far apart from each other was the main feature of the 
development strategy. The bureaucrats defended it on grounds of efficiency and 
productivity. West Pakistan had a large stock of social and economic overheads in the 
form of power, transportation and communication facilities and higher ratio of natural 
resources with relatively lesser density of population. The West Pakistan railway system 
was more developed and less affected by partition. The port of Karachi was more 
developed. In East Pakistan transport and communication facilities were poor. Chittagong 
port was yet to be developed. Under these circumstances, the adoption of one-economy 
policy based on an entrepreneurial approach accelerated the rate of disparity. 
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The allocative bias in favour of West Pakistan, concentrating nearly 75 percent of 
the total expenditure in a region where only 46 percent of the total population lived, 
generated not only income and employment opportunities, but also a favourable climate 
for private investment. Such financial institutions in Pakistan as the Industrial 
Development Bank of Pakistan (IDBP), the Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment 
Corporation (PICIC) also followed a kind of discriminatory attitude to East Pakistan. 
Apart from the disproportionate expenditure and differential growth of the private 
sectors in the two regions, disparity increased because of the government's agricultural 
policy. The Government of Pakistan adopted a policy of industrialization through private 
sector and to make industrialization a success, fiscal and monetary policies were geared 
to extract adequately the surplus from agriculture and thus re-channel it to industries. It 
was estimated that over 15 percent of the value of gross agricultural output was extracted 
and re-directed to industries and manufacturing. Its burden on the farmers was over 10 
percent of their income. East Pakistan was severely affected by the policies because East 
Pakistan accounted for a larger share of export than West Pakistan and a greater 
proportion of agricultural goods in total export package. The transfer of surplus from 
agriculture to industry was in effect a transfer of agricultural surplus of East Pakistan to 
industries in West Pakistan. Furthermore, through a surplus in international trade and a 
deficit in the inter-wing trade, a sizable amount of East Pakistan's foreign exchange 
earnings was diverted to West wing. Added to this was East Pakistan's foreign aid which 
was utilized in West Pakistan. Mahbub-al Haq estimated that such transfer amounted to 
Rs. 210 million per year from 1950 to 1955 and perhaps Rs. 100 million a year from 
1956 to 1969. The advisory panel of economists showed that net transfer amounted to Rs. 
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31,120 million at the rate of 1,556 million a year. In other words, West Pakistan grew at 
the expense of East Pakistan. All these created an awareness among the Bengali elite and 
they became anxious for effective participation in the political system, especially at the 
policy-making level. When they felt that the bureaucrats-dominated system prevented 
them from enjoying equal share of the national pie, they became determined to bring 
about a structural change in the system. The Six-Point Programme, which was a reaction 
of, and a challenge to, the policy measures of the bureaucrats, can be understood only in 
this context. 
The Six-Point Programme was a significant politico-economic document. 
Politically it sought to re-structure the political system in a manner which might ensure 
effective participation of the Bengalis; economically, it was designed to put the East 
Pakistani resource management at the disposal of the Bengalis; militarily, it wanted to 
make East Pakistan self-sufficient militarily. The Six-Point Programme, thus fabricated in 
1966 differed radically from the Bengalis' autonomy demand of the 1950s in that it 
advocated that regional governments have the right to establish separate trade and 
commercial relations with foreign countries and keep separate accounts of foreign 
exchange earning and suggested that the regions have their own military or para-military 
forces. For all practical purpose, a confederal rather than a federal form of government 
was built into the Six-Point Programme. 
For its radical nature and built-in suggestions, its appeal to the different social 
groups in East Pakistan became so great. It had an emotive appeal to the rising 
businessman and industrialist, because it meant the elimination of competition from the 
West Pakistani big business houses. It attracted the urban salaried professionals because 
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in it they saw an opening to further prospects. Bengali bureaucrats supported it 
enthusiastically because they found in it the key to their independence from centre's 
control and prospects of their promotion to the decision-making structure. The army 
officers favoured it because it meant an unlimited scope for their promotion and 
consolidation of their position in East Pakistan. These groups in fact were the main 
constituencies of the Awami League and in effect the linchpin of the politically relevant 
strata of the society. The workers lent their support because their lower wages, coupled 
with the fact that many of the industrial establishments in East Pakistan belonged to the 
West Pakistanis, led to an admixture of class, regional and ethnic conflicts. The rural 
farmers were looking for a change, and the Six-Point Programme became a symbol of 
change to them. 
The 1970 general election worked as a catalyst to sharpen the east-west 
confrontation still further. The Awami League representing the emerging middle classes 
in East Pakistan took the election as a referendum to the Six-Point formula. The election 
results were more than what they expected, winning an absolute majority in the National 
Assembly of Pakistan. The Awami League expected, very rightly, to come to power after 
the election. The ruling elite in Pakistan, however, was adamant to keep the Awami 
League out of power and unwilling to protect Pakistan with the primacy of the Bengalis. 
President Yahya's sudden announcement of postponement of session of the National 
Assembly on 1 March 1971 became the turning point. The Six-Point formula, at that 
point of time, unwittingly became transformed into a one-point demand and that was for 
an independent Bangladesh. 
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The ruling elite of Pakistan comprising some of the senior most bureaucrats and 
top level generals wanted to buy some time. President Yahya Khan came to Dhaka 
seemingly to work out a political settlement of the crisis; it has however been proved that 
their intention was to reinforce their position in East Pakistan by bringing in more men 
and materials, both by air and sea, from West Pakistan under the cover of a prolonged 
negotiation. Sheikh Mujib and his advisers however took the negotiation seriously and 
continued it in right earnest till 25 March 1971 and hoped that the Pakistanis would 
finally respect the verdict of the poll. Only the Bengali military officers, especially those 
stationed in Chittagong, because of their nearness to the only sea-port, knew what was 
happening and how massive preparations the Pakistanis were making. 
At the crucial stage of negotiation, the generals from West Pakistan played vital 
role. They were primarily concerned with the defence and defence forces in Pakistan. 
They thought that the regional government's control of currency, foreign exchange 
earnings, foreign trade and taxation, as envisaged in the Six-Point Programme, would 
result in a drastic weakening of the defence of Pakistan through a drastic cut in the size of 
Pakistan Army. To the Bengali leaders, however, the defence of Pakistan was nothing 
more than the defence of West Pakistan. The 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, during which East 
Pakistan was totally defenceless, left an indelible impression in the minds of the Bengali 
elite. The ruling elite of Pakistan, especially the generals who were dominant at that 
stage, denounced the Six-Point Programme as secessionist, condemned the Awami 
Leaguers as traitors and decided to undertake a military solution to the political problem. 
Thus, without formally breaking the talks President Yahya Khan launched the cowardly 
attack on the night of 25 March 1971 and left Dhaka. 
218 
A revolution as it is understood in this study, in the sense of "a challenge to the 
established political order and eventual establishment of a new order, radically different 
from the preceding one" had its full play in East Pakistan. The legitimacy of the system 
was completely eroded after the general election and the authority disintegrated. The 
Bengali military officers, though junior in ranks, played a historic political role at this 
crucial moment and helped shape the destiny of the nation as leaders of Bangladesh 
Revolution of 1971. Unlike their counterparts in some other countries, at that point of 
time, they moved adroitly, not to take over political power for themselves but to rid East 
Pakistan of the marauding occupation forces from West Pakistan and to make it an 
independent Bangladesh. This may be treated as a case study of a band of military 
officers and soldiers who, being fired with a nationalistic zeal, stood by their brethren to 
fight for independence even at the risk of their lives and social position. What is of 
significance is that though in most cases the political leaders initiated the moves and the 
trained military worked under their guidance and supervision, in the case of Bangladesh 
Revolution the military personnel took up the initiative at the critical moment and 
continued the holding war-operation till the formation of Mujibnagar Government in- 
exile. The military remained the symbol of independence till then, and as regimental 
colour they kept the flag of Bangladesh aloft. 
At that time there were about 50 Bengali trained military officers and 
approximately 5000 soldiers stationed in Chittagong, Comilla, Jessore, Saidpur and 
Dhaka Cantonments, in addition to about 15,000 members of East Pakistan Rifles (EPR), 
a para-military force trained for guarding the national frontiers. The Chittagong 
cantonment had an added advantage in the sense that the Bengali military officers of 
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Chittagong Cantonment had ample opportunity to watch closely how, during those days, 
the Pakistani strategists were reinforcing their grip over East Pakistan by bringing in 
more and more arms through the Chittagong Port. The Comilla Cantonment being closer 
to it provided suitable opportunity for easy communication amongst them. Chittagong, 
moreover, had one radio station. 
The Bengali military officers, who played crucial role in the Liberation War, were 
highly politicized and intensely nationalistic. Recruited and socialized under the shadow 
of Ayub Khan's martial law, they became not only conscious of regional imbalance in the 
armed forces, but many of them also were victims of discriminatory policies. Their 
complaints became louder when regional conflicts were diverted from normal political 
channels of expression and deflected into bureaucracy, and bureaucracy turned into arena 
for covert forms of political struggle after the imposition of martial law in Pakistan. 
Many of the military officers established linkages with the dominant East 
Pakistan political party, the Awami League and remained on good terms with Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman. Many of them supplied secret information to the Awami League 
leadership and provided materials, which helped them sharpen the case of autonomy. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, the Bengali civil and military officers lent full support to Sheikh 
Mujib's call for civil disobedience and non-cooperation movement which paralyzed the 
entire administration in East Pakistan from 01 March to 25 March 1971. Only in this 
context, the role of the Bengali military officers can be properly appreciated. 
The facts revealed from the carefully conducted interview of the eight war heroes 
also testify to the nationalistic orientation of the Bengali freedom fighters. All of them 
expressed the view that the Liberation War provided them a "golden opportunity" to free 
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East Pakistan, which was more like "a colony of Pakistan". The urge for liberating East 
Pakistan from the clutches of the marauding Pakistan Army and making it an independent 
Bangladesh, that is why, became the guiding spirit in the war. Even today with profound 
nostalgic remembrance they recollected their joining the war as the greatest deed done in 
their lives. That they could stand by their oppressed and suffering brethren in times of 
crisis still enlivens them in their public discourses. They were in the know of what was 
happening in East Pakistan during the early months of 1971 and joined the war not as 
supporters of any political party but as patriotic citizens of Bangladesh. All of them 
expected that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman would declare Independence of Bangladesh on 7 
March 1971 and most of them thought that it was the most propitious time. When they 
heard of East Pakistani leaders' eagerness for negotiation with the ruling elite of Pakistan 
from 16 March, most of them were dismayed at the thought that this was nothing but a 
ploy for the West Pakistani generals to buy some time for adequate preparation. That 
speaks why all these officers took it as momentous decision when they heard from 
Chittagong Radio Station the announcement of independence by one of their colleagues, 
Major Zia on 27 March. Some of them had discussions with their colleagues and soldiers 
and joined the war without any hesitation. They took the Liberation Was as the `people's 
war', a "war between the people and a body of invading army". 
The declaration of independence for a state is expressly a political act, done 
normally by a recognized political leader commanding widespread allegiance of different 
sections of the community, and fought by the trained soldiers. In this case, it was done by 
military officers because political leadership was trapped in an "arranged negotiation", 
which was, in the words of Mascarenhas, "the worst political deception of the century" 
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(Mascarenhas, 29 April 1971) and thus faltered and fumbled and ultimately failed to take 
a decision at the crucial moment. The Bengali military officers felt that "nothing short of 
independence was acceptable" to the people and they responded effectively to the 
cherished dream of the people of Bangladesh. Having some arms and armed personnel at 
their disposal and fired with nationalistic zeal of the highest order, they went ahead and 
succeeded where the political leaders failed. They had, in fact, no political axe to grind 
and when the Bangladesh Government-in-exile was formed at Mujibnagar on 17 April 
1971, they came under the direction of the government and ultimately achieved the 
people's dream of `Sonar Bangla' (Golden Bengal) - an independent Bangladesh after 
nine-month long grueling fights on all fronts and celebrated the Victory Day on 16 
December 1971. 
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APPENDIX- 1 
CHART OF BENGALI OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS 
LOCATED IN EAST PAKISTAN 
1. Chittagong Cantonment to include 
Chittagong City Area 
Total Strength was: 
a. About 2000 untrained recruits, and 
b. 200 trained soldiers. 
Chittagong Cantonment (East Bengal 
Regimental Centre) 
Officers 
1. Brig. M. R. Majumder (taken to Dhaka 
on 23.3.71) 
2. Lt. Col. M. R. Chowdhury (killed on 
night 25.3.71) 
Chittagong City 
Total strength was about 700 soldiers. 
a. 300 soldiers were present and the rest 
were on leave and at Kharian 
Cantonment of West Pakistan. 
3. Capt. Mohsinuddin Ahmed (hanged for 
mutiny in the year 1981) 
4. Capt. Enamul Haque 
5. Capt. Abdul Aziz. 
6. Capt. Subed Ali Bhuiyan 
7. Capt. Amin Ahmed Chowdhury (taken 
to Dhaka on 23.3.71) 
8 East Bengal Regiment 
Officers 
1. Major Ziaur Rahman (who became the 
President of the Republic and was killed 
by a group of military officers on May 
30,1981) 
2. Major Mir Shawkat Ali 
3. Capt. Chowdhury Khalequzzaman 
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4. Capt. Sadeq Hossain 
5. Capt. OR Ahmad 
6. Lt. Mahfuzur Rahman (hanged for 
mutiny in the year 1981) 
7. Lt. Shamsher Mobin Chowdhury 
(arrested on 11.4.71) 
East Pakistan Rifle 
Total Rifle strength was about 10 to 15 
thousand for East Pakistan 
Officers of EPR at Chittagong City 
1. Major Shamsuddin Ahmed 
2. Capt. Rafiqul Islam 
3. Capt. Harun Ahmed Chowdhury 
Officers on different duties at Chittagong 
2. Comilla Cantonment 
Total strength was about 700 soldiers. 
a. About 600 were present and the rest was 
on leave. 
1. Capt. Mulemuddin 
2. Capt. Abul Basher 
4 East Bengal Regiment located at 
Brahmanbaria about 50 miles away from the 
Cantonment 
Officers 
1. Major Khaled Musharraf (who was 
killed by the soldiers during a mutiny on 
8 November 1975) 
2. Capt. Shafaat Jamil 
3. Capt. Abdul Matin 
4. Capt. Ainuddin 
5. Capt. Abdul Gaffar Haider 
6. Lt. Mahbubur Rahman 
7. Lt. Fazlul Kabir 
8. Lt. Harunur Rashid 
Officers on different duties at Comilla I. Major Khaleque (killed on 30.3.71) 
Cantonment 2. Capt. A. T. M. Haider (was killed by the 
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soldiers during a mutiny on 8 November 
1975) 
3. Dhaka Cantonment 
Total strength was about 700 soldiers and 
out of this about 100 soldiers were on leave. 
Officers on different duties at Dhaka 
Cantonment 
4. Jessore Cantonment 
Total strength was about 700 soldiers. 
a. About 350 soldiers were on leave 
b. About 150 soldiers lived with their 
family. 
c. About 200 soldiers joined the war. 
3. Lt. Imamuzzaman 
2 East Bengal Regiment located at 
Joydevpur about 25 miles away from Dhaka 
Cantonment 
Officers 
1. Lt. Col. Rakibuddin (he did not join the 
war) 
2. Major. K. M. Safiullah 
3. Major. Nurul Islam 
4. Major. Moinul Hossain Chowdhury 
5. Capt. A. S. M. Nasim 
6. Capt. Azizur Rahman 
7. Lt. Ejaz Ahmad Chowdhury 
8. Lt. S. Gulam Helal Murshed 
9.2nd Lt. Muhammad Ibrahim 
1. Capt. A. J. M. Aminul Haque 
2. Capt. Akbar Hossain 
1 East Bengal Regiment 
Officers 
1. Lt. Col. Reazul Jalil (he did not join the 
war) 
2. Lt. Hafizuddin 
3.2nd Lt. Anwar (died on 30.3.71) 
4.2°d Lt. Shaft Washiuddin (he did not 
join the war) 
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5. Saidpur Cantonment 
Total strength was about 700 soldiers. 
a. About 400 soldiers joined the war 
b. The rest were on leave. 
6. Besides these there were about 30 
Bengali Officers in different 
Cantonments: 
3 East Bengal Regiment 
Officers 
1. Major. Nizam (killed in the action in 
March 1971) 
2. Capt. Mohammad Ashraf 
3. Lt. Anwar Hossain 
4. Lt. Mukhlesur Rahman 
5.2°d Lt. Rafique (surrendered to Pakistan 
Army. Later on killed. ) 
a. Army Medical Corps 
b. Army Officers of different Arms (came 
on leave) 
c. Officers of different Arms posted in 
these five Cantonments on various jobs. 
d. Officers of Air-Force/ Navy. 
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APPENDIX- 2 
THE SIX POINTS 
The text of the Six Point Formula as originally published and 
subsequently amended in the Awami League's Manifesto. 
POINT I 
The Constitution should provide for a Federation of Pakistan in its true sense on the basis 
of the Lahore Resolution, and Parliamentary form of Government with supremacy of 
Legislature directly elected on the basis of universal adult franchise. 
Amended:. The character of the government shall be federal and parliamentary, in which 
the election to the federal legislature and to the legislatures of the federating units shall be 
direct and on the basis of universal adult franchise. The representation in the federal 
legislature shall be on the basis of population. 
POINT 2 
Federal government shall deal with only two subjects, viz. Defence and Foreign Affairs, 
and all other residuary subjects shall vest in the federating states. 
Amended: The federal government shall be responsible only for defence and foreign 
affairs and, subject to the conditions provided in (3) below, currency. 
POINT 3 
1. Two separate but freely convertible currencies for two wings may be introduced, or 
2. One currency for the whole country may be maintained. In this case effective 
constitutional provisions are to be made to stop flight of capital from East to West 
Pakistan. Separate Banking Reserve is to be made and separate fiscal and monetary 
policy to be adopted for East Pakistan. 
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Amended: There shall be two separate currencies mutually or freely convertible in each 
wing for each region, or in the alternative a single currency, subject to the establishment 
of a federal reserves system in which there will be regional federal reserve banks which 
shall devise measures to prevent the transfer of resources and flight of capital from one 
region to another. 
POINT 4 
The power of taxation and revenue collection shall vest in the federating units and that 
the Federal Centre will have no such power. The Federation will have a share in the state 
taxes for meeting their required expenditure. The Consolidated Federal Fund shall come 
out of a levy of certain percentage of all state taxes. 
Amended: Fiscal policy shall be the responsibility of the federating units. The federal 
government shall be provided with requisite revenue resources for meeting the 
requirements of defence and foreign affairs, which revenue resources would be 
automatically appropriable by the federal government in the manner provided and on the 
basis of the ratio to be determined by the procedure laid down in the Constitution. Such 
constitutional provisions would ensure that the federal government's revenue 
requirements are met consistently with the objective of ensuring control over the fiscal 
policy by the governments of the federating units. 
POINT 5 
1. There shall be two separate accounts for foreign exchange earnings of the two wings. 
2. Earnings of East Pakistan shall be under the control of East Pakistan Government and 
that of West Pakistan under the control of West Pakistan Government. 
3. Foreign exchange requirement of the Federal Government shall be met by the two 
wings either equally or in a ratio to be fixed. 
4. Indigenous products shall move free of duty between two wings. 
5. The Constitution shall empower the unit Governments to establish trade and 
commercial relations with, set up trade missions in and enter into agreements with, 
foreign countries. 
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Amended: Constitutional provisions shall be made to enable separate accounts to be 
maintained of the foreign exchange earnings of each of the federating units, under the 
control of the respective governments of the federating units. The foreign exchange 
requirements of the federal government shall be met by the governments of the federating 
units on the basis of a ratio to be determined in accordance with the procedure laid down 
in the Constitution. The Regional Governments shall have power under the Constitution 
to negotiate foreign trade and aid within the framework of the foreign policy of the 
country, which shall be the responsibility of the federal government. 
POINT 6 
The setting up of a militia or a paramilitary force for East Pakistan. 
Amended: The governments of the federating units shall be empowered to maintain a 
militia or paramilitary force in order to contribute effectively towards national security. 
229 
APPENDIX- 3 
ALLOTMENT OF TROOPS TO TASKS 
DACCA 
Command and Control: Maj. -Gen. Farman with H. Q. M. L. A. 
Zone B. 
Troops: 
H. Q. 57 Brigade with troops in Dacca, i. e. 18 Punjab, 32 Punjab (C. O. to be replaced by 
[Lt. -Col. ] Taj, GSO I (Int. )), 22 Baluch, 13 Frontier Force, 31 Field Regt., 13 Light Ack- 
Ack Regt., company of 3 Commando (from Comilla). 
Tasks: 
1. Neutralize by disarming 2 and 10 East Bengal, H. Q. East Pakistan Rifles (2500), 
Reserve Police at Rajar Bagh (2000). 
2.2. Exchange and transmitters. Radio, TV, State Bank. 
3. Arrest Awami League leaders-detailed lists and addresses. 
4. University Halls, Iqbal, Jagan nath, Liaqat (Engineering University) 
5. Seal off town including road, rail and river. Patrol river. 
6. Protect factories at Gazipur and Ammo Depot at Rajendrapur. 
Remainder: Under Maj. -Gen. K. H. Raja and H. Q. 14 Div. 
JESSORE 
Troops: 
H. Q. 107 Brigade, 25 Baluch, 27 Baluch, Elements of 24 Field Regt., 55 Field Regt. 
Tasks: 
1. Disarm 1 East Bengal and Sector H. Q. East Pakistan Rifles and Reserve Police incl. 
Ansar weapons. 
2. Secure Jessore town and arrest Awami League and student leaders. 
3. Exchange and telephone communications. 
4. Zone of security round Cantt., Jessore town and Jessore-Khulna road, airfield. 
5. Exchange -at Kushtia to be made inoperative. 
6. Reinforce Khulna if required. 
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KHULNA 
Troops: 
22 FF 
Tasks: 
1. Security in town. 
2. Exchange and Radio Station. 
3. Wing H. Q. East Pakistan Rifles, Reserve Companies and Reserve Police to be 
disarmed. 
4. Arrest Awami League students and communist leaders. 
RANGPUR-SAIDPUR 
Troops: 
H. Q. 23 Brigade, 29 Cavalry, 26 Frontier Force, 23 Field Regt. 
Tasks: 
I. Security of Rangpur- Saidpur. 
2. Disarm 3 East Bengal at Saidpur. 
3. If possible disarm Sector H. Q. and Reserve Company at Dinajpur or neutralize by 
dispersal. Reserve Company by reinforcing border outposts. 
4. Radio Station and telephone exchange at Rangpur. 
5. Awami League and student leaders at Rangpur. 
6. Ammo dump at Bogra. 
RAJSHAHI 
Troops: 
25 Punjab 
Tasks: 
1. Dispatch C. O. -Shafqat Baluch. 
2. Exchange and Radio Station Raj shahi. 
3. Disarm Reserve Police and Sector H. Q. East Pakistan Rifles. 
4. Raj shahi University and in particular Medical College. 
5. Awami League and student leaders. 
COMILLA 
Troops: 
53 Field Regiments, 1'/2 Mortar Batteries, Station troops, 3 Commando Battalion (less 
Company) 
Tasks: 
1. Disarm 4 East Bengal, Wing H. Q. East Pakistan Rifles, Re serve District Police. 
231 
2. Secure town and arrest Awami League leaders and students. 
3. Exchange. 
SYLHET 
Troops: 
31 Punjab less company 
Tasks: 
1. Radio Station, Exchange. 
2. Koeno Bridge over Surma. 
3. Airfield 
4. Awami League and student leaders. 
5. Disarm Section H. Q. East Pakistan Rifles and Reserve Police. Liaise with Sikandar. 
CHITTAGONG 
Troops: 
20 Baluch, less advance party; company 31 Punjab present ex Whet; Igbal Shari to 
lead a mobile column from Comilla by road and reinforce S. T. 0100 hrs (H hrs) on 
D-Day. 
Mobile Column: Brig. Iqbal Shafi with Tac H. Q. and Communications; 24 Frontier 
Force; Troop Heavy Mortars; Field Company Engineers; Company in advance to Feni on 
evening D-Day. 
Tasks: 
1. Disarm E. B. R. C., 8 East Bengal, Sector H. Q. East Pakistan Rifles, Reserve Police. 
2. Seize Central Police Armoury (Twenty thousand) 
3. Radio Station and Exchange. 
4. Liaise with Pakistan Navy (Commodore Mumtaz) 
5. Liaise with Shaigri and Janjua (C. O. 8 East Bengal) who have been instructed to take 
orders from you till arrival of Iqbal Shafi. 
6. If Shaigri and Janjua feel sure about their outfits then do not disarm. In that case 
merely put in a road block to town from Cantt. by placing a company in defensive 
position so that later E. B. R. C. and 8 East Bengal are blocked should they change their 
loyalties. 
7. I am taking Brig. Majumdar with me. Arrest Chaudhry (C. I. E. B. R. C. ) on D-Day 
night. 
8. Arrest of Awami League and student leaders after above accomplished. 
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PUBLISHED 
PAPERS NOT 
INCLUDED 
APPENDIX- 6 
CONFIDENTIAL 
IMMEDIATE 
HQ Eastern Command 
Dacca Cantt. 
Tele: 251 
721/ R/ t 
15 April 1971 
To: Comd 9 Div 
Comd 14 Div 
Comd 16 Div 
DG EP CAF 
Comd EP Log Area 
CONCEP 
Comd CAF 
ACC PAF 
OC 3 Cdo Bn 
OC Log Fit 
OC 604 FIU 
OC 734 FIC 
Info: 
Internal: 
Distr: 
Subject: 
HQ MLA Zone'B' 
GS Branch 
HQ Def Coy 
Discipline - Troops 
OC 27 GL Sec 
Det ISI 
Estb. Branch 
1. Since my arrival, I have heard numerous reports of troops indulging in loot and arson, 
killing people at random and without reason in areas cleared of the anti state 
elements. Of late there have been reports of rape and even the West Pakistanis are not 
being spared; on 12 Apr. two West Pakistani women were raped, and an attempt was 
made on two others. There is talk that looted material has been sent to West Pakistan 
through returning families. 
2. I gather that even officers have been suspected of indulging in this shameful activity 
and, what is worse, that in spite of repeated instructions, comds have so far failed to 
curb this alarming state of indiscipline. I suspect that COs and OSC units/sub-units 
are protecting and shielding such criminals. 
3. Here I wish to sound a note of warning to all comds that if this tendency is not curbed 
and stamped out at once, it will undermine battle efficiency and discipline of the 
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Army. It is a contagious disease and you must be fully alive to its adverse effects and 
far-reaching consequences; some day it may well boomerang involving our own 
women-folk and your own person. It is not uncommon in history, when a battle has 
been lost because troops were over indulgent in loot and rape. 
4. I, therefore, direct that the troops must be got hold of and the incidence of 
indiscipline, misbehavior and indecency must be stamped out ruthlessly. Those, 
including officers, found guilty of such acts must be given deterrent and exemplary 
punishment. I will NOT have soldiers turn into vagabonds and robbers. Such 
elements must be given no quarter, mercy or sympathy. 
5. I would also like to remind comds, that we have a sacred mission before us and we 
are yet very far off the goal set before us. Nothing must detract us from the 
fulfillment of the task entrusted to us. Indiscipline will only undermine it 
6. I would like every soldier in this Theatre to be an embodiment and an example of 
discipline. As far as the officers are concerned, I wish to remind them that they have a 
code of honour and conduct, and as gentlemen and officers I would like them to abide 
by it. This is necessary if we are to achieve the aim and win back the people of this 
Province. 
7. These instructions equally apply to all intelligence agencies MP and SSG operating in 
East Pakistan. 
Sd/- 
Lt. -Gen, 
Commander Eastern 
Comd 
(Amir Abdullah Khan 
Niazi) 
CONFIDENTIAL 
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APPENDIX- 7 
TEXT OF INSTRUMENT OF SURRENDER 
The PAKISTAN Eastern Command agree to surrender all PAKISTAN Armed Forces in 
BANGLADESH to Lieutenant-General JAGJIT SINGH AURORA, General Officer 
Commanding in Chief of the Indian and BANGLADESH forces in the Eastern Theatre. 
This surrender includes all PAKISTAN land, air and naval forces as also all paramilitary 
forces and civil armed forces. These forces will lay down their arms and surrender at the 
places where they are currently located to the nearest regular troops under the command 
of Lieutenant-General JAGJIT SINGH AURORA. 
The PAKISTAN Eastern Command shall come under the orders of Lieutenant-General 
JAGJIT SINGH AURORA as soon as this instrument has been signed. Disobedience of 
orders will be regarded as a breach of the surrender terms and will be dealt with in 
accordance with the accepted laws and usages of war. The decision of Lieutenant- 
General JAGJIT SINGH AURORA will be final, should any doubt arise as to the 
meaning or interpretation of the surrender terms. 
Lieutenant-General JAGJIT SINGH AURORA gives a solemn assurance that personnel 
who surrender shall be treated with the dignity and respect that soldiers are entitled to in 
accordance with the provisions of the GENEVA Convention and guarantees the safety 
and well-being of all PAKISTAN military and paramilitary forces who surrender. 
Protection will be provided to foreign nationals, ethnic minorities and personnel of 
WEST PAKISTAN origin by the forces under the command of Lieutenant-General 
JAGJIT SINGH AURORA. 
JAGJIT SINGH AURORA 
Lieutenant-General 
General Officer Commanding in Chief 
Indian and Bangla Desh Forces in 
The Eastern Theatre 
16 December 1971 
AMIR ABDULLAH KHAN NIAZI 
Lieutenant-General 
Martial Law Administrator 
Zone B and Commander 
Eastern Command (Pakistan) 
16 December 1971 
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APPENDIX- 8 
ACR REPORTS OF OLI AHMAD, 1972 AND 1973 
Number : SS - 9706 Name : OLI AHMAD, BIR BIKROM 
PART II - REPORT BY INITIATING OFFICER AND GRADING 
Period of Report the Officer served under your command :- 
From ........................................................... 
to ....................................... 
How employed, %ith dates ............................................................................. 
1. Section ̀ A' - Performance, professional capabilities and Character Traits (Refer to Instructions and 
points Vide Anx `A' and ̀ B' to GHQ letter No .................... dated ..................... )* 
An extremely loyal, brave and devoted officer who would take any amount of risk to complete a given 
task. He has a very quick uptake and can assess any difficult situation with ease and at times admirably 
well. He is highly reliable and is very considerate to his subordinates. 
This officer played the main part which enabled 8th Battalion The East Bengal Regiment to 
revolt on the crucial night of 25/26 Mar 71 at Chittagong. 
Throughout the war of independence 1971, this officer displayed cool courage in the face of heavy 
odds and enemy opposition. He has taken part in may actions admirably. As Brigade Major he performed 
excellently, most of the time also performing as DQMG. 
His leadership qualities in the field during the war was a matter of inspiration for others including 
Indian Officer who were associated with `Z' Force from time to time. 
2. Section ̀B' - Above to Officer : 
Should improve his spoken English, a little. 
Signed by Major Ziaur Rahman 
Initial of Officer reported upon/Initiating Officer if 
Communicated in writing with date ..................... Initiating Officer's Initials and date 
Signed by Major Ziaur Rahman 
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* Officer's performance during the Liberation war also to be included in the report. 
3. Grade in present rank : 
OUTSTANDING 
Number : SS - 9706 Name : OLI AHMAD, BIR BIKROM 
14. Remarks (See Instruction): 
I concur with the report of the initiating officer. 
Signed by Brig. KM. Safiullah 
Signature and rank ............................... 
Name K. M. SAFIULLAH 
Appointment and Unit COS Bangladesh Army 
Date 17 Sep 73. 
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Number : SS - 9706 Name : OLI AHMAD, BIR BIKROM 
14. Remarks (See Instruction): 
This officer has an extraordinary ability to organise things. He is extremely hardworking and is 
capable of taking much greater responsibility than his rank demands. This officer ifproperly guided will be 
an asset to the army. His services during war was commendable - he in fact was the first officer who took 
risk and on his own initiatives inform Gen. Ziaur Rahman regarding declaration of Independence on night 
25/26 Mar 71. 
Signed by Mir Shawkat Ali 
Signature and rank ............................... 
Name Mir Shawkat All 
Appointment and Unit Brig. Commander 
Date 8 Mar 74. 
PART VI - REMARKS BY NEXT SUPERIOR REPORTING OFFICER 
15. Period served under your command: From .................. To....................... 
16. Remarks based on: 4 intimate contact/ frequent/ infrequent observation 
17. a. Do you support recommendations NO /YES 'I /EXCEPT 
in Parts III to IV? 
b. Give your recommendations on points of discent, if any : - 
c. Grading in present rank Above Average 
18. Remarks (See Instruction): 
An extremely loyal officer who is very brave and upright. He is very intelligent and full of initiative. 
Signed by Major Gen. Zia 
Signature and rank ............................... 
Name Mainr (: 'n 7;.,... n,,,..,..... 
Appointment and Unit 
Date 
""-wa výraa, c. a4111 iý411114111 
DCAS 
20 Aug 74 
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APPENDIX- 9 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. Name & Address: 
2. The sector you fought in: 
3. Please identify some of them you fought with: 
4. How do you conceptualize patriotism? 
5. Did you consider yourself as a patriot when you joined the war? 
6. Do you feel very gratified now? 
7. What motivated you to get involved in the war? 
8. What became your guiding spirit in this war? 
9. Were you aware of what was going to happen in Pakistan on 25 March 1971? 
10. Did you expect that the Declaration of Independence of Bangladesh would be made 
any time? 
11. What was your reaction when you heard of military crackdown by the Pakistani 
Leaders on 25 March 1971? 
12. Did you not know that participation in the War of Independence would amount to 
breach of discipline of your service regulations? 
13. Did you know that failure in the War of Independence would mean not only an end 
of your career but also an end of your life? 
14. When did you think of joining the War of Independence? 
15. Did you consult any of your colleagues or friends when joining the war? 
16. Did you feel any compulsion to join it? 
17. Were you aware of the political situation prevailing in East Pakistan? When? 
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18. Under whose leadership did you fight? 
19. Who do you think was your role model in the war field? 
20. Please narrate your experiences as a war-hero when you received the gallantry 
award? 
21. Were you a supporter of a political party? 
22. How did you think you would alter the situation through war? 
23. Do you think that your decision to join the war was adequately justified? 
24. Did you get any inspiration from any book you read? 
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